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This study examines the little-known history of cultural transformation initiated by 
Azerbaijani reformers between the 1850s and 1930s. Relying on a unique body of sources, 
which include handwritten manuscripts, literary works, unpublished memoirs, periodicals, 
correspondence, and political parties’ records, the research explores the new cultural settings 
that emerged after the incorporation of Azerbaijan into the Russian empire. New means of 
communication and new types of sociability, in a global context of urbanization and 
cosmopolitanization, gave rise to secular modernist reformers and empowered both European-
educated Azeri male and female elites to express modern ideas on public education and gender 
roles. The introduction of secular education for Muslim young women, initiated by modern-
educated male intellectuals and industrialists, advanced a cohort of independent and publicly 
active Azeri women who struggled for equal rights with men. Azeri Muslim women articulated 
their vision of modernity in native print media and public associations established by Muslim 
women and for Muslim women.  
After the Sovietization of Azerbaijan in 1920, the native reformers continued to 
promote their agenda to eradicate the power of Islamic and patriarchal traditions. By 
participating in the new system and installing themselves as the new political and cultural elite, 
the Azeri reformers obtained the right to speak for the name of their community. Soviet Azeri 
political leaders developed their own synthesis between the Communist goals and modernizing 
aspirations of pre-revolution reformers, introducing their own program to create a new nation, 
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A Note on Transliteration 
 
This research relies on documents and periodicals written in the Azerbaijani and 
Russian languages between the 1850s and 1930s. As this research involves encounters between 
two cultures, two languages, and several alphabets, I have made some arbitrary choices 
concerning the rendering of the names of places and people. I transliterated Azeri words and 
terms to favor readability, especially given the lack of a standard transliteration system for the 
modern Azeri Latin alphabet and language. Thus, I spelled the names of places and people as 
they were pronounced and used in the Russian Imperial and Soviet periods in Azerbaijan. I 
maintained Baku rather than Baki, Nakhichevan instead of Nakhchivan. I used Akhundov in 
place of Akhundzade, and Agayev instead of Alioglu or Agazade. In the meantime, I preserved 
the original names of people whose names were never russified, such as Mamedkulizade, 
Javanshir, Agamali ogli, and others.  
Russian is transliterated according to the Library of Congress system. I converted texts 
written with the old Russian alphabet to the modern Russian alphabet before transliterating. 
Working with the Arabic script, I used the Russian spelling. The Cyrillic script of the 
Azerbaijani language is transcribed corresponding to the modified Azerbaijani letters of the 
Soviet period. Thus, “kh” stands for “h”, “dzh” for “j” etc. When working with the Latin script 
of 1923–1939, I kept to the same system, trying to unify the variations in the Latin scripts in 
Azerbaijan introduced in 1923–1929, 1929–1939, 1991–1992, and its final version in 1992. 
The pre-1991 Azeri alphabet had one unique feature: its multiple uses of theapostrophe. For 




provides the equivalent forms for Arabic Persian Azeri, Cyrillic Azeri, and Latin Azeri letters. 
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There are interpreters everywhere. Each speaking his own language, 
even if he has some knowledge of the language of the other. The 
interpreter’s ruses have an open field and he does not forget his own 
interests. 
Jacques Derrida, Limited INC (Northwestern University Press, 












On May 14, 1974, at the Congress that marked the 50th anniversary of the women’s journal 
Azerbaijan Gadini, Azerbaijani Woman, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, 
Heydar Aliyev, articulated Soviet achievements towards Muslim women’s emancipation. In his 
speech, entitled Schast’e Zhenshchini Azerbaidzhana, Happiness of Azerbaijani Woman, Aliyev 
directed the attention of the female delegates from all Soviet republics to the past and present status 
of Azerbaijani women: 
Dear female delegates,  
The journal Azerbaijan Gadini always honestly reflected Muslim women’s 
unprivileged position before the Great October Revolution. From its pages we 
learned about the difficult path that Azerbaijani women took to liberate themselves 
from harmful patriarchal and Islamic traditions. We learned from the journal that 
those traditions and their proponents did not recognize women as human beings, 
keeping them behind the veil and as the objects of men’s pleasure from age of 
nine… Our women were deprived of the right to voice their cries…  
The position changed when the enlightened Russian sisters came to demonstrate to 
Azerbaijani women the path to liberation. This path was dangerous, but it brought 
to our women freedom from that unhuman existence…The well-known Russian 
female Communists, such as Yelena Stasova, Nadezhda Kolesnikova, Klavdiia 
Ishkova and others, dedicated their lives and all knowledge of the revolutionary 
struggle to liberate Azerbaijani women. They also fostered the Azerbaijani female 
Communists who devoted their lives to the emancipation movement. Ayna 
Sultanova, Dzheiran Bairamova, Khavar Shabanova-Karaeva, Gulara 
Kadyrbekova, and others became the prominent revolutionaries and movement 
activists. Today, one of them is among us. Let us greet Dzheiran Bairamova with 
our applause….1 
 
In this speech, Aliyev emphasized that the “friendship of peoples” and Soviet sisterhood, 
advanced by Russian people, were the crucial factors in enlightening and liberating Muslim 
women, allegedly the most ignorant part of Azerbaijani society. This rhetoric featured the official 
 
1 Heydar Aliyev, Schast’e zhenshchini Azerbaidzhana. Materialy torzhestvennogo sobraniia posviaschennogo 50-
tiletiiu zhurnala Azerbaijan Gadini, May 14, 1974 (Azerbaidzhanskoe Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, Baku, 1974). 




discourse that glorified Soviet gender achievements and regarded the emancipation effort of the 
early 1900s, articulated by the Azerbaijani reformers, as a symbol of Azeri nationalism and pan-
Turkism. As a result, those who had any connections to non-Soviet gender programs became 
excluded from the official Soviet discourse. Dzheiran Bairamova, who was associated with that 
pre-Soviet modernization drive through her activity and early publications, was the only person 
among the delegates who can also be identified as a prominent activist in the Soviet emancipation 
movement of the 1920s–1930s. The rest of the most important Azeri women politicians of the 
1920s with links to the pre-Soviet emancipation projects, such as Ayna Sultanova, Khavar 
Shabanova-Karaeva, Gulara Kadyrbekova, and others, had perished in Siberian exiles and prisons 
during the time of the Great Terror in the 1930s.  
A study that is concerned with the process and development of Soviet Azerbaijan and 
Soviet gender reforms may begin with the examination of Bolshevik methods that changed Azeri 
society and the lives of Azeri Muslim women. My study, however, is concerned with what I call a 
“synthesis” between Communist goals and the modernizing aspirations of pre-Soviet reformers in 
making a modern society and a New Woman. In this work I argue that Bolshevik ideas about 
Muslim women’s emancipation were not created on virgin soil; rather, they were combined with 
a pre-revolutionary Azerbaijani discourse on social transformation. I state that Azeri intellectuals’ 
thoughts about womanhood and motherhood during the late-Imperial period, envisaging women 
as unveiled, modern, and educated, became integrated into a broader and more aggressive Soviet 
paradigm of societal and gender reformation.  
In the 1920s, the reforms for Azeri Muslim women’s emancipation characterized two 
ideological frameworks, Communist and late-Imperial modernist. The Communist program 




social and cultural institutions. The late-Imperial modernist agenda represented the cultural 
conflict between modernity and traditionalism, to end the presumed cultural backwardness. This 
synthesis of agendas and ideologies stimulated the Soviet Azeri-native leaders to modernize 
society in more radical ways than the official Moscow-introduced program of ending female 
illiteracy, isolation and veiling. I argue that between 1920 and 1929, the discourses over nation 
and modernization were coming from the bottom up, and in this way, I challenge the Moscow-
centered point of view on Soviet history. Arguing that the Soviet modernization program was not 
a unique effort to transform Muslim society, I also study similar efforts to modernize the society 
and to make New Woman initiated by the Iranian and Turkish governments during the 1920s and 
1930s. In particular, I compare the Azeri experiment of raising Muslim female aviators, a 
postulated triumph of the native emancipation program, with the analogous programs in two 
neighboring countries as part of the broader gender emancipation programs. 
This work is also concerned with the experiences of Azeri women who responded to the 
modernist late-Imperial and Soviet calls to liberate them from patriarchal traditions. By connecting 
the story of Muslim women’s education in the Russian empire to that of women in the Azerbaijani 
socialist republic, the study explores women’s roles in influencing state projects which aimed to 
revolutionize Muslim society. Through the examination of the published writings and personal 
records of Azeri female gender reformers, I demonstrate that Azeri women were agents of their 
own liberation. I establish this by exploring the role of the Tagiev schools, the first public 
educational centres for Muslim young women, in shaping the first generation of Azeri feminists. 
This study also examines the ways in which Muslim modernist literature and culture both reflected 




To understand the cultural environment that gave rise to the late nineteenth-century Muslim 
reformers’ rhetoric on societal modernization, I look at the influence of Azerbaijani geographic 
phenomena on its culture and history. As Nikki R. Kiddie argues, geography, technology, and 
ecology, and their interaction with human beings, are extremely important in understanding the 
development of peoples and states.2 The topographic relief of Azerbaijan is dominated by wide 
valleys with highly fertile soil, large rivers, and rocky, mountainous hills. The relief does not have 
natural barriers, such as high mountain ranges and large deserts, that could limit human travel and 
isolate its population. As such, there are no geographical factors that restrict cultural exchanges 
with other peoples. Consequently, since ancient times Azerbaijan has been at the crossroads of 
many civilizations and part of the Silk Road, the trade route from China and India to Europe, and 
thus, Azeris had long interrelated intensively with different cultures.  
By the early nineteenth century, Azerbaijanis interconnected with diverse groups of 
peoples and nations: Shia Muslim Persians of Iran; Sunni Turks of the Ottoman empire; Orthodox 
Christians of Armenia, Georgia, and Russia; Muslim Tatars; Jews; Kurds; and several nomadic 
peoples. Cultural interconnections with these neighbors were responsible for Azeris adopting new 
ideas and cultures, sometimes peacefully, sometimes forcibly. Also, since their incorporation into 
the Russian empire, 1813 and 1828, Azeris became equal to Russian citizens in their rights and 
responsibilities. Thus, despite differences with Russian colonizers in religion, language, and 
lifestyle, which were softened by the tsarist moderate politics to cooperate with Muslims of 
Transcaucasia, the annexation of Azerbaijan did not produce great barriers between colonizers and 
colonized. Homi Bhabha, in his study of the relationships between European and non-European 
populations in India, configured cultural relations between colonized and colonizer in terms of 
 




“hybridity” rather than “difference” and “otherness.”3 Richard White, in his work on the 
interconnection of Native Americans and English settlers, argued that despite the acts of 
domination and resistance there was a “middle ground” in which trade, education, diplomacy, and 
other forms of exchange took place between native people and colonists, forming new cultural 
norms.4 
I look at the role of the process of urbanization and change in the ethnic composition of the 
regional population in the formation of Azeri reformist discourse. Through this perspective I trace 
how the expansion of urban culture transformed the traditional Muslim intellectual milieu: the 
long-established cultural centres, such as Ganja, Sheki, and Shusha, lost their significance in the 
development of cultural authenticity among Azeris. Baku gained prominence among all these cities 
because of the oil boom of the 1870s that transformed this small town into the largest oil centre in 
the world and the largest urban centre in the South Caucasus. In 1872, the demand for kerosene, a 
result of rapid industrialization all over Europe, pushed the tsarist government to encourage the 
exploration of oil lands. This reform attracted investors from all over Europe. By 1890 there were 
one Greek, two German, two Belgian, three French, and six British oil enterprises operating in 
Baku. The most prominent oil companies belonged to the Nobel Brothers and to the Rothschild 
family.5 The expansion of the oil industry propelled the city’s growth. The construction industry, 
which also emerged during the oil-boom years, changed the city considerably. Modern architects 
designed buildings, streets, and parks in popular European styles, reflecting the spirit of the new 
industrial multiethnic centre.6  
 
3 Homi Bhabha, Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 13-25. 
4 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 10-18. 
5 Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Muslim Community 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21. 
6 A. L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 




Thousands of people from different parts of the Russian empire and Iran arrived for 
industrial jobs, entirely changing the religious and ethnic diversity of the city’s population. In 1897 
there were 110,900 city dwellers in comparison with its numbers from 1903, when its population 
increased to 155,876 and in 1913 to 232,200 people.7 In 1903 alone, there were 44,257 
Azerbaijanis; 56,955 Russians; 26,151 Armenians; 11,132 Iranians; and thousands of Jews, Poles, 
and Greeks.8 Thus, in the beginning of the twentieth century the formerly ethnically and religiously 
homogenous town became home to a large population of Russians and Armenians. This Christian 
majority also was more economically prosperous than the formerly ascendant Muslims. In just the 
oil business, by the beginning of the twentieth century, representatives of the native bourgeoisie 
of the Baku region owned forty-nine oil enterprises; Armenian entrepreneurs owned fifty-five 
companies, and Russians, Jews, Georgians, and foreigners owned, respectively, twenty-one, 
seventeen, six, and nineteen of the total of 167 companies. The oil enterprises that belonged to 
Azerbaijani businessmen were mainly small, while the Armenian and Russian capitalists 
dominated among the medium and large businesses.9 
 The Russian economic and administrative elites considering Baku the frontline between 
Asian and European worlds tried to transform the city into a European modern urban centre. Those 
Christian dwellers of Baku viewed themselves as the emissaries of European modernity and thus, 
applied education, scientific knowledge and technology to prove their Europeanness and 
difference from the native Muslim population. Meantime, those Azeris who lived in or had recently 
moved to Baku lost connections with their traditional social environments and faced a need to 
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defend their interests and culture in the multi-ethnic urban community that no longer served an 
Azeri-only population. The pursuit of self-identity within the multi-ethnic community of Baku and 
at the larger scale of the Russian empire brought a new sense of difference that separated Azeri 
Muslims from neighboring Iran, in whose orbit Azerbaijan existed for several centuries. The Azeri 
intellectuals juxtaposed their own model of progress with the backwardness of Iranians while 
associating themselves with the progressive Europeans. Azeri men of letters in the recently 
emerged press began to articulate the distinction of Azeri language and celebrated Azeri cultural 
achievements by creating the first native secular schools, modern print media, opera, and theatre.10  
From the second half of the nineteenth century, Azerbaijani Muslims, trained in Russian 
educational centres, began to promote European cultural values emphasizing the enlightenment of 
their people. They proposed cultural change through the elimination of Muslim societal ills rooted 
in what they perceived, ignorance and cultural backwardness, while holding the clergy and 
patriarchal traditions responsible for these inadequacies. The reformers believed that Azerbaijani 
Muslims would achieve equal cultural status with advanced European societies by introducing 
modern and secular education, an independent print media, and the abolition of gender segregation. 
The reformers were a minority group who found support among the native oil magnates such as 
Haji Zeinalabdin Tagiev, Musa Nagiev, Murtuza Mukhtarov, Isa bek Ashurbekov, and others. In 
particular, H. Z. Tagiev became the leading philanthropist whose patronage enabled the Azeri 
reformers to introduce the new method of education and the project to educate young Muslim 
women at modern public schools in Baku.  
Like Muslim reformers of the Russian Empire, Jadids, the Azeri reformers believed that 
the Islamic world had entered a period of decay and that the remedy would be the enactment of 
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modern European-modeled cultural reform based on the new method of education, usul-i jadid, a 
phonetic method of teaching of the alphabet in the newly established schools.11 This term also 
gave the name to that movement, Jadidism. However, despite similar intentions to transform 
Muslim society, the Azeri reformers not only acted in different ways but also never called 
themselves Jadidists while they discussed the usul-i jadid with their Tatar counterparts in the 
Tercuman journal and other periodicals. They always presented themselves with the Azeri terms 
taraqqiparvarlar, progressives; ziialilar, intellectuals; or yiashlar, youth.  Also, unlike Central 
Asian Jadids, they rarely juxtaposed qadim, the old-way, with usul-i jadid. Azeri reformers always 
contrasted qaranliq with ishig, ignorance versus enlightenment, darkness versus light. For these 
reasons, I apply the term “reformers” or “reform-minded Azeris” instead of “Jadidists” to define 
the Azeri intellectuals who initiated the period of Azerbaijani cultural reformation.  
 Adeeb Khalid in his work, entitled The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in 
Central Asia, argues that there was no unity in the reformative movement because every ethnic 
group had imposed their own strategies in social struggles depending on the local realities.12 James 
Meyer’s statement on the strategy of the Neshr-i Maarif, a philanthropic society aiming to 
eliminate illiteracy among Transcaucasian Muslims, confirms my research findings from the 
Azerbaijani State History Archive (ARDTA) on the different tactics of the Azeri reformers. Meyer 
concludes that the leaders of the Neshr-i Maarif, unlike those from Central Asia and the Tatar 
regions, used a different strategy to promote the new type of education. Along with the opening of 
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brand-new Jadid schools, Neshr-i Maarif produced modern-educated teachers and supplied them 
to the government-established schools. This tactic did not meet opposition from the Ministry of 
Public Enlightenment and allowed the reformers to work in a comfortable environment to achieve 
their goal of societal modernization.13  
It is important to note that Azeri intellectuals did not pronounce any desire for territorial 
and political autonomy until 1917; rather, they strove for cultural autonomy within the Russian 
Empire. Hence, I do not imply the existence of the Azerbaijani nation before 1917, the year of the 
Russian empire’s collapse, which enabled the Azerbaijani reformers to realize their ideas on the 
birth of the millat, nation, with the establishment of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic in 1918. 
Also, I use the term “Azerbaijan” to refer to the region of the Southeastern Caucasus inhabited by 
the ethnic Azeris within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. This 
study does not discuss Azerbaijani national identity either.   
My point in discussing “Azerbaijanis” is not to establish who is or is not Azeri, Azeri Turk, 
Tatar, or Muslim; the latter three were the official titles for the indigenous people of modern-day 
Azerbaijan in the Russian Imperial period. I only aim to reflect the political use of “Azeri” of the 
1920s in government protocols and speeches: the discourse about Azeri women in the 1920s 
always stressed the “Muslim woman” and “Turkic woman,” tiurchanka and musul’manka, who 
was veiled and secluded. However, by the end of the 1920s, official rhetoric introduced the title 
“Azerbaijani woman” and called for her liberation from the veil and from patriarchal traditions as 
the central tactic in the creation of Soviet Azerbaijan and nationhood. As Harun Yilmaz argues, 
Azerbaijani national identity was artificially created in the 1930s as part of the Soviet construction 
of national histories and identities of all the Turkic nations in the Soviet Union. This policy aimed 
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to distance Azeri Turks or Muslims from the Turkic world and Iranian influences when relations 
with Turkey and Iran became increasingly tense.14  
Despite a growing body of literature on societal reorganization in the Middle East and in 
the former Soviet Islamic territories, the history of Azerbaijani cultural reformation remains 
understudied. Modern Western historiography largely focuses on aspects of modernization 
initiated by Muslim reformers, Jadids, in Central Asia, Crimea, and the Volga Tatar region.15 
Soviet historians completely ignored the subject of the pre-revolutionary Muslim modernization 
project in Azerbaijan, considering it nationalistic and bourgeois. The existing historiography on 
Azerbaijani national and cultural identities is limited to several works that have one unified 
standpoint: the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Azerbaijani reformists were those who 
strove to shape Azeri identity and who became a voice of the imagined millat, nation. In his major 
work on the political history of Azerbaijani identity and nationhood, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–
1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community, Tadeusz Swietochowski states 
that the self-determination of Azerbaijanis as a nation was profound but had never been realized 
in the form of a truly functional nation-state.16  
Another major study, which for almost three decades was the only English-language source 
on late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century  Azerbaijan, belongs to Audrey L. Altstadt: The 
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Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule.17 In her work, Altstadt posits the 
existence of a timeless and straightforward Azerbaijani identity that was always distinct from that 
of Azeris in Iran. Holly Shissler, in her intellectual biography of Ahmet Agaoglu entitled Between 
Two Empires: Ahmet Agaoglu and the New Turkey, maintains that Azeris of the Russian Empire 
had much in common with Russian, Turkic, and Persian identities without seeing any conflict in 
moving between those societies. She supports this statement with the life-stories of those Azeris 
who did not accept the Sovietization of Azerbaijan in 1920, and either moved to Turkey and 
became self-confessed Turks and prominent politicians or intellectuals in the newly formed 
Turkish Republic, or emigrated to Iran and developed into fully integrated Iranian citizens.18 James 
Meyer, in his work Turks Across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman 
Borderlands, 1856–1914, examines the life of Yusuf Akchura and a group of individuals known 
as pan-Turkists. He states that these intellectuals freely passed between the Russian and Ottoman 
empires because they were deeply embedded within both of these communities.19  
The process of Russian Muslims’ societal transformation was part of global changes in the 
last decade of the nineteenth century: the spread of modern scientific knowledge, the 
industrialization of production, the reduction of distances, and urbanism. This process began in 
Europe and soon, conveyed by European-educated intellectuals, reached the Western part of the 
Russian empire and proceeded rapidly to its Eastern territories. As Antonio Gramsci’s theory on 
“cultural hegemony” explains, in the mid-nineteenth century Europe began to define the cultural 
norms of the rest of the world.20 The European-educated Azeris’ pursuit of the new forms of 
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intellectual production, the new vision of the world and their place in it, was part of that global 
search for modernity – when modern conditions transform traditions and produce new cultural 
forms. Paul Rabinow, in his work French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment, 
states that the term “modernity” is impossible to define; rather, it is more important to track the 
diverse ways that scholars claimed to be modern.21 Thus, I choose to use the terms “modernity” 
and “modernism” sparingly and do not aim to find an answer to whether the pre- and Soviet Azeri 
reformers were modernists or not. Instead, I  focus on their projects of remaking both society and 
gender roles in the context of the Azeri societal makeover that was part of the global phenomenon 
since the end of the nineteenth century, from the Egyptian colonial context to interwar Europe and 
the Middle East.22  
In the interwar years, 1918–1939, several states introduced reforms to eliminate perceived 
backwardness and transform societies by mobilizing their populations in extraordinary ways.23 
Remaking women’s status and social roles by granting them greater public positions was a 
significant part of such programs. Deniz Kandiyoti argues that the history of Muslim women’s 
emancipation should be studied not through the history of the reformation of Islam and its gender 
norms but through the prism of various political projects undertaken by states that were different 
from each other historically and ideologically, as well as by class politics and the experience of 
colonialism. Kandiyoti states that a crucial part of those reforms was the call to mobilize labor 
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forces, regardless of gender, to meet national needs for industrialization.24 In her major study 
entitled Women in Soviet Society: Equality, Development and Social Change, Gail W. Lapidus 
also claims that the Soviet state emancipated women because of its need to consolidate power 
rather than because of respect for feminist concerns.25 However, the works of Margot Badran,  
Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron,  Kathryn Libal,  and Lila Abu-Lughod discuss the history of 
feminist political movements. These works focus not on political programs, but on women’s 
agency that aimed to transform women’s lives in colonial, quasi-colonial, and nationalist 
contexts.26 
The Soviet emancipation policy has attracted broad scholarly attention. Western 
historiography presents the socialist gender discourse as a part of the new Soviet-style colonial 
policy. Gregory Massell’s work The Surrogate Proletariat: Muslim Women and Revolutionary 
Strategies in Soviet Central Asia (1919–1929), published in 1974 and based on secondary sources 
provided by Soviet authorities, shaped this historiographical perception for many decades.27 
Massell states that the Bolsheviks transformed cultural practices and gender relations and 
mobilized local women as a sort of oppressed class or “surrogate proletariat,” the group that along 
with poor peasants had the most to gain and least to lose by accepting Soviet authority. Jörg 
Baberowski, in his work about Azerbaijan in 1920s and 1930s, argues that the Soviet Union was 
a colonial empire that aggressively transformed gender relations and cultural practices and thus, 
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faced violent opposition to these reforms.28 However, because Baberowski uses only Party 
documents and Russian-language published sources from the 1920s–1930s, he misses the voices 
of Azeri Communists who advanced and discussed the Soviet emancipation drive in Azeri-
language documents, in the press and in clubs for Muslim women.  
The work of Fannina Halle, Women in the Soviet East, also focuses on government and 
Communist Party actions. Halle provides a lively portrait of Azeri and other Soviet Muslim women 
whom she met during her trip to the Soviet Union in early 1930 and illustrates women’s response 
to those state initiatives, calling them liberating.29 Nayareh Tohidi, in her work Azeri in Private, 
Soviet in Public: Gender, Islam, and Nationality in Soviet and post-Soviet Azerbaijan, introduces 
the opposite point of view. Tohidi offers a dichotomous model of the domestic and public statuses 
of Soviet Azeri women. She states that Muslim women of the socialist republic persistently 
maintained their ethnic Azeri traditions, customs, and language in their private lives as a protest 
against the imposed public Soviet reality.30 Farideh Heyat, in her socio-anthropological study 
entitled Azeri Women in Transition: Women in Soviet and post-Soviet Azerbaijan, explores the 
interactions between Soviet institutions and Muslim culture that shaped the lives of Azeri women. 
She illustrates the links between gender, ethnicity, and nationalism, basing her argument on literary 
works, periodicals, and personal interviews. Heyat concludes that even though the Soviet system 
emancipated Azeri females, making many of them highly educated professionals, the ethnic 
community always regarded them as the preservers of traditional norms of conduct and custodians 
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of ethnic identity. Thus, the Azeri women had to observe strict sexual standards and perform all 
domestic responsibilities.31 Admittedly, these studies mainly examine the process of abolition of 
old traditions and female employment and do not investigate the link between the Soviet 
emancipation effort and local initiatives shaped by pre-revolution gender discourse. 
Unlike other scholars, Marianne Kamp in her article about the Soviet state-led campaign 
on unveiling in Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan investigates the development of veil abolition and 
introduces the links between pre- and post-revolution emancipation programs.32 In her major work 
on Muslim women’s emancipation in Uzbekistan entitled New Woman of Uzbekistan: Islam, 
Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism, Kamp also recognizes that pre-revolutionary ideas 
about gender reform gained ground in the Soviet period. She argues that many Muslim intellectuals 
and politicians joined the Communist Party and promoted their agenda of societal transformation 
and the abolition of gender segregation that they could not accomplish in the late nineteenth to 
early twentieth century. Also, Kamp challenges the notion that Uzbeks were the objects of Russian 
and later Soviet colonialism. In opposition to this statement, she introduces them as the primary 
actors in the modernist transformation that they initiated long before the Bolshevik revolution. 
Moreover, some of the actors in the Soviet emancipation drive were Muslim women who voiced 
their concerns about patriarchal traditions.33  
 Soviet historians examining the socialist gender achievements in Azerbaijan made little 
use of the native-language press and documents, considering them nationalistic because of the 
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predominance of ideological biases and censorship in Soviet historiography.34 Also, Soviet 
scholars were not systematically trained to read the aski alifba, the Persian version of the Arabic 
alphabet, or the Latin characters that were the official scripts between 1850 and 1929 in 
Azerbaijan. Thus, they dismissed a number of sources that illustrated the emancipation drive of 
the Azerbaijani reformers and celebrated gender equality only under the socialist banner in terms 
of access to education and jobs, and the ability to participate in political life.35 Along with this, the 
topic of women’s education in old-Imperial Azerbaijan has not been the subject of any existing 
historical accounts. In contrast, the subject of women’s education has been an important focus in 
the analysis of the Soviet era that started in the 1920s. This gap in the historiography has led to a 
popular misconception that the public education of Muslim girls only started in the Soviet period.  
Modern Azeri historians, like their Soviet predecessors, have also chosen a non-
comprehensive approach to the history of women’s emancipation. The post-Soviet writings of 
modern Azerbaijani scholars, based on a few selected facts, documents, and unreferenced life-
stories, are descriptive rather than analytical and portray every aspect of Soviet policies targeting 
Azerbaijani Muslim women as a manifestation of totalitarianism and Soviet colonialism.36 
Furthermore, focusing mainly on the conflict between the Soviet emancipation effort and local 
cultures, they call the Soviet gender program “genocidal” and ignore the voices of native gender 
 
34 A. S. Beliaeva, Zhenskie sovety (Moscow: Mysl’, 1962); Bibi Pal’vanova, Emansipatsiia musul’manki: opyt 
raskreposhcheniia zhenshchini Sovetskogo Vostoka (Moscow: Nauka, 1982); Gleb Snesarev, Raskreposhchenie 
zhenshchiny Sovetskogo Vostoka ot gneta religii (Moscow: Gosizdat SSSR, 1939); N. I. Dubinina, Pobeda velikogo 
Oktiabria i pervie meropriiatia partii v reshenii zhenskogo voprosa (Moscow: Mysl’, 1981); Yelena Yemelianova, 
Revoliutsiia v zhenskoi zhizni (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1985); Evgabel’, Bor’ba za 
osvobojdenie zhenshchiny Vostoka i religiia (Moscow: Gosizdat SSSR, 1935). 
35 T. Musaeva, Bor’ba za razvitie narodnogo obrazovaniia v Azerbaidzhane v gody pervoi piatiletki (Baku: AzGiz, 
1964); A. Sultanova, Ayna Sultanova (k vos’midesiatiletiiu so dnia rozhdenia) (Baku: AzGiz, 1976); A. Sultanova, 
Schastlivye zhenchshiny sovetskogo Azerbaidzhana, (Baku: Azerbaidzhanskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1964). 
36 Gulzar Ibrahimova, Azerbaijan gadini: tarih ve gercheklik (Baki: Elm, 2009); S. Mammedova, Bagirov Kh, 




activists who promoted Soviet-style societal transformation. The glorification of the 
modernization efforts performed by a group of Azeri intellectuals in the early 1900s towards 
education and women’s emancipation is regarded as broad societal progress. The late-Imperial era 
is viewed as a period of Azerbaijani cultural renaissance. This concept arose with the end of Soviet 
hegemony and the need for detachment from the Soviet past. However, this historical discourse, 
which is based on the neglect of primary sources, produces limited scholarship about gender 
reformation of the 1900s–1930s. 
Modern Azeri historians insist that women in Azerbaijan received equal rights with men 
during the period of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic [ADR], 1918–1920, as it was one of the 
priorities of the national government.37 However, the ADR’s official records, available at the 
Azerbaijan State Archive (ARDA), testify that the young republic did not issue any legal act 
regarding women’s rights and their emancipation. In fact, it was the Russian Provisional 
Government that released, in July 1917, a decree that granted all women of the Russian Empire 
the right to vote.38 Women’s rights were not a priority of the short-lived Baku Commune, April–
July 1918, in which Bolsheviks played a prominent role, either.39 After the Bolsheviks re-gained 
power in April 1920, they proceeded with gender reforms. The Bolshevik reforms, pursuing ethnic 
equality and supplemented by ideological indoctrination, secured them some support among 
various segments of the population. One of the first acts of the new regime was the 
acknowledgement of women’s equal rights with men across the former Russian Empire.  
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My study is an inquiry into the limited historiography on ideas about societal 
modernization, Azeri women, and their transformation. This study is also a response to those works 
that consider the call for Soviet emancipation in Azerbaijan as an act of colonialism and dismiss 
the voices of the Azeri activists who supported the Soviet appeal. This research also challenges 
the modern Azeri concept that glorified every pre-revolution project of modernity calling it “a 
mass movement.”  I intend to challenge these two notions. First, I argue that Azeri Muslim women 
were not the passive objects and victims of the Soviet state emancipation project. Second, I state 
that those pre-revolution reorganizations did not become a widespread movement but were limited 
only to Baku and its surroundings. However, I acknowledge that despite this limit the reforms in 
young women’s education changed the societal position of urban Muslim women and gave rise to 
the women’s emancipation activists of the Soviet period. Hence, this work aims to fill several 
broad gaps in the history of Azerbaijani cultural reorganization that experienced several sharp turns 
between 1900 and 1939. 
This work is an exploration of Azerbaijani history set within its multiple contexts: as part 
of the Russian Imperial colony from 1813 to 1917; during the period of the national independence 
of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, 1918–1920; and as a socialist republic, AzSSR, 1920–
1939. To conduct this study, I examined the literary works of the earliest reformers, who 
popularized their ideas in novels, pamphlets, and periodicals. I studied documentation on the 
projects undertaken by Azeri enlightener and oil magnate Haji Zeinalabdin Tagiev. These 
historical materials are available at the Azerbaijan Republic State History Archive (ARDTA), and 
the Azerbaijan Republic Institute of Manuscripts (ARIM). I investigated the official Soviet 





I also studied the women’s journals Ishig, Enlightenment, and Sharg Gadini, Woman of the 
East, personal diaries, and the correspondence of those Muslim women who struggled for gender 
equality and faced ostracism from conservative members of Islamic society. In this way, I 
emphasized female voices and presented Muslim women as active players who put their imprint 
on that movement by challenging the patriarchy. The State Archive of the Russian Federation 
(GARF) provided information on the Bolshevik agencies that pursued female emancipation. The 
Department of Nationalities at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, All-Union 
Committee for the Improvement of Labor and Living Conditions among Muslim Women, and the 
USSR Prosecutor Bureau, were particularly important resource bases for this research. The 
Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) equipped me with the files of 
Women’s Committees, revealing ideological aspects of the communist policies around gender 
reorganization in the Soviet Islamic territories. 
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter One: The Russian Muslim Society of Azerbaijan in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries 
This chapter examines the transformation of traditional Azerbaijani Muslim society after 
its incorporation into the sphere of Russian civilization analyzing the writings produced by 
prominent intellectual leaders and state directives on education reform. First, I explain the 
formation of a new pro-European group of intellectuals by analyzing their ideas about factors that 
kept Muslim society behind advanced Western civilization. Then, I examine their thoughts on 
improving the position of the Muslim community through the introduction of independent media 
and usul-i jadid, new-method, education. I also focus on the interaction between the native 




Muslim intellectual domain within the Russian empire in the South Caucasian region during the 
late nineteenth century. 
Chapter Two: Reformists’ Discourse on Muslim Women’s Societal Position: Educating the 
Educators of the Nation 
This part of the dissertation illustrates the Azeri reformers’ understandings of the desired 
societal order. It shows how their formulation of modernity through education and gender reforms 
was as much a result of the profound transformation of Muslim societies in the decades of imperial 
Russian rule as a response to it. It demonstrates how Islamic and traditional fundamental 
predispositions and predilections determined women’s position in society. It also compares the 
Azerbaijani discourse on women’s emancipation with similar movements in Turkestan and Iran. 
This chapter traces how the pre-revolutionary ideas about female emancipation later gained ground 
in Bolshevik policies. 
The chapter also examines the Azerbaijani intellectuals’ ideas on gender reformation 
through the introduction of public education for Muslim girls and young women, as well as ideas 
about the abolition of veiling and seclusion in the urban centre – Baku. It focuses on a specific 
project, the first public schools and female teacher training centre established by H. Z. Tagiev, that 
changed the societal position of urban Muslim women. I argue in this chapter that the modern 
public schooling program shaped a new generation of Muslim women who continued the policies 








Chapter Three: The Bolshevik Revolution and the New Bid for Women’s Rights in Azerbaijan 
This section of the thesis demonstrates the political transformation from colonial Russian 
Azerbaijan into Soviet Azerbaijan and examines the Soviet state’s method of changing Muslim 
women’s position. It also examines the transformation of many leading pre-revolution intellectuals 
into pious Communists and their central role in political and cultural life. I argue that they believed 
in adjusting their agenda for societal modernization to Bolshevik state policy and thus, creating a 
modern Azerbaijan.  
This chapter also focuses on women’s education as the main aspect of the Soviet gender 
emancipation program. The chapter argues that the program was an ideological continuation of the 
efforts of pre-revolution reformers, who had expanded their ideas about women’s enlightenment 
into the Soviet educational system. I also illustrate the steps taken by the Azerbaijani Women’s 
Division of the Communist Party, Zhenotdel, to empower Muslim women: organizing specific 
crisis centres for Muslim women to voice their problems, clubs (particularly the Ali Bairamov 
Club), and reading circles at bathhouses and private houses. 
Chapter Four:  Literature and the Journal “Sharg Gadini” as a Mirror of Gender Reforms in 
Azerbaijan 
This part of the dissertation focuses on the women’s journal Sharg Gadini, reviewing the 
journal’s appeal to Muslim women. I also compare the Azeri native journal’s message with the 
central all-woman journal Kommunistka official discourse to illustrate how native Communists 




Soviet Azeri-language literature arguing that the writers continued the pre-revolution reformists’ 
discussion on the importance of educated and unveiled women for the benefit of the nation.  
 
Chapter Five: The Thorny Road to Liberation 
This chapter focuses on the implementation of Soviet gender policies, arguing that their 
flow was never uniform because regional Communists had their own vision about gender 
reformation. The Azeri government and Communist Party leaders, in pursuit of legal equality, the 
abolition of patriarchal matrimonial traditions, and the ending of women’s seclusion and veiling, 
changed the course of the Soviet gender reforms and seriously debated the Moscow program. Thus, 
this chapter studies the debates and conflicts surrounding the implementation of gender policies 
during the construction of the socialist state in the late 1920s among the Azerbaijani gender 
activists, whose worldview stemmed from the pre-Soviet gender discourse, and the Moscow 
officials.  
This chapter also examines the outcomes, both the acceptance and the resistance, of the 
Soviet reforms of the 1920s that promised to elevate women’s status in Muslim society. I argue 
that this resistance stemmed mainly from the desire of the traditional patriarchy to preserve their 
power and social status rather than from hatred of Soviet colonialism. This part of the study 
investigates the causes of the murders of emancipated Azeri Muslim women and the effect of those 





Chapter Six: The Sky is Not a Limit  
In this chapter, I examine the Azerbaijani government project to introduce Azeri women 
to aviation as the highest point of Muslim women’s emancipation. I focus on the life stories of 
three Azerbaijani female aviators, two of whom were combat pilots during World War Two. This 
chapter also identifies how education and military service became the central mechanisms in 
making the “Liberated Muslim Woman of the East.”  
This chapter also demonstrates that Soviet policies on changing women’s status and social 
role as part of societal modernization during the interwar years were not unique. I compare Soviet 
emancipation policies, in particular in creating female pilots, with those enforced in Turkey and 
Iran, countries that had strong cultural connections with Azerbaijan. I aim to find out how 
distinctive the Soviet experience was by comparing how the governments dismantled the 
traditional patriarchal institutions and legal authority of Islam in their rush for modernity. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion summarizes findings on the late Imperial and Bolshevik gender 
emancipation policies. The epilogue provides some information about the long-term consequences 







 The Russian Muslim Society of Azerbaijan in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries 
 
In the summer of 1988, my father took me, a teenaged girl born and raised in Ukraine, on 
a trip across Azerbaijan, from Baku to his hometown in Mountainous Karabakh. We travelled for 
several days and visited Azerbaijani towns, such as Shusha, Khankendi, Barda, Agdam, Ter-Ter, 
and other places. We spent the nights at the houses of our relatives or in rented rooms in private 
homes. During that trip, my father introduced me to the history, geography, architecture, and 
people of Azerbaijan. Months later, he suggested to me that I read the books of Azeri writers to 
become familiar with the native literature. One of the first books that I read was the collection of 
novels by Dzhalil Mamedkulizade (1869–1932), a famous Azeri writer, who satirically criticized 
the archaic societal ills of the Azeri Muslim community such as clericalism, common illiteracy, 
gender segregation, veiling, and marriages to minors. In particular, the short story entitled Iki 
Balish Bir Birinin Ianinda, Two Pillows Next to Each Other, fascinated me deeply. The plot of this 
story reminded me of that journey with my father and allowed me to juxtapose my personal 
experience with the experiences of the main characters. 
 In the story, Mamedkulizade recalled a trip with his teenaged daughter from Karabakh to 
Zakatala, to enroll her into the boarding school at the Pedagogical College, in the early 1920s. 
During that trip they had to stay overnight at someone’s private house, because all the city’s hotels 
were under construction or full. Mamedkulizade described how the female hosts offered them one 




one pillow to a small couch several times, however, the hosts always put it back. Covering their 
faces as a sign of modesty, these women wonted them to enjoy themselves and offered more sweets 
for the night. After his explanation about their fatherly-daughter relationship and pointing out his 
old age, 58, he bitterly noticed that they did not believe him. Moreover, they assured him that many 
old Muslim men in this town had wives even younger than his lady. Mamedkulizade painfully 
concluded that as long as people considered every Muslim man and woman who appeared together 
in public as a couple and saw every underaged woman as an object for man’s pleasure, the nation 
would remain parochial and backward. “Shame on us,” he exclaimed.1  
The story deeply captivated my attention and I looked around to find any traces of the veil 
and cases of marriages with female minors. Finding no remnants of those archaic traditions, I 
started to think about the factors that had changed traditional Muslim society during the past six 
decades. Since that time, I directly and indirectly tried to find out who, when, and what was behind 
the significant changes that transformed one Muslim society from patriarchal into modern by 
granting women rights and freedoms, abolishing veil and female isolation, and introducing girls 
and women to secular public education. This work is the explanation of the factors that changed 
the societal position of Azeri Muslim women.  
Two factors played an important role in the transformation of the life of the Azeri Muslim 
community: one was Russia’s conquest and control of Transcaucasia in the early nineteenth 
century, and the other was the emergence of the reform discourse about nation, the reorganization 
of society, and women’s position. The incorporation of Azerbaijan into the Russian Empire 
stimulated the formation of a secular, educated, male elite that initiated societal reformation at the 
end of the nineteenth century. The tsarist government itself encouraged the emergence of this 
 




European-type intellectual cohort. However, the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Public 
Enlightenment who opened schools for Muslims, and the Muslim reformers who founded reformed 
maktabs, schools, had completely different agendas. The tsarist bureaucrats hoped for the ultimate 
Russification of the Transcaucasian Muslims, while the founders of reformed maktabs hoped to 
empower the Transcaucasian Muslims as Azerbaijani Turks to become culturally equal within the 
Russian empire and the whole Western world, distancing them from the allegedly “backward” and 
decaying Islamic civilization. 
Thus, this part of the work examines the transformation of traditional Azerbaijani Muslim 
society after its incorporation into the sphere of Russian civilization. This chapter builds its 
arguments on analysis of the writings produced by prominent Azeri intellectuals and Russian state 
directives on education reform. I first explain the formation of a new pro-European group of 
intellectuals by analyzing their ideas about what they believed had kept Muslim society behind the 
more advanced Western civilization. Then, I examine their views on improving the position of the 
Muslim community through the introduction of independent media and the adoption of usul-i 
jadid, a new method of education. I focus on the interaction between the native philosophers’ 
networks and the Russian state to demonstrate the existence of an autonomous Muslim intellectual 
domain within the Russian empire in the South Caucasian region during the late nineteenth 
century.  
 Azerbaijani Enlighteners in the Quest for Modernity:  Defining Backwardness 
through an Admiration for the West 
Enlightening our Muslims, who are dark and 
ignorant, will not come through one play or 
an article. We need to educate them 




books and fight against those harmful 
backward individuals, namely Islamic 
priests, who dominate in our homeland.  
Gasan Bek Melikov Zardabi, 1875.2 
 
 
Azerbaijan, which rests in the South Caucasus of Eurasia, has been in the orbit of Iranian 
civilization since ancient times. In the late eighteenth century, several self-ruling Azerbaijani 
khanates gained cultural and political independence from the Iranian state. In the early nineteenth 
century, the Russian Imperial government began its expansion into this region, seeking to gain 
control over the transit route to Iran, India, and Afghanistan.3 This expansion provoked two wars 
between Iran and the Russian Empire in 1813 and 1826–28. The outcome of the first war was the 
Treaty of Gulistan that effectively legitimized the Russian victory and the inclusion of modern-
day Azerbaijan, Dagestan, and Eastern Georgia into the Russian Empire. The second Russo-
Iranian War ended with the signing of the Turkmanchai Treaty in 1828 and further strengthened 
Russian presence in the region. It also resulted in the annexation of additional territories from Iran. 
Both treaties legitimized the division of Azerbaijani territory into two parts. The northern and 
smaller part of greater Azerbaijan became a part of the Russian empire and the larger 
approximately two-thirds of its former land, remained under Iranian control. At that time, the two 
empires established an official border along the Araz River, promising to respect this condition as 
a final agreement.4  
Since the early nineteenth century, therefore, Muslims of the South Caucasus had been 
subject to Russian imperial policies. The new authorities left the administration in the hands of 
Azerbaijanis and did not intervene in legal, economic, and administrative matters. The Persian 
 
2 G. Zardabi, “Tekhsilin faydalari khagginda,” Akinchi, November 4, 1875. 
3 V. L. Velichko, Russkoe delo i mezhplemennye voprosy (Saint-Petersburg: Tipografiia Arteli Pechatnogo Dvora, 
1904), 17–19. 




language was still the official language of local administration. As before the annexation, the local 
landowners, beks and aghas, controlled the life of the peasants, radzhbars, and the whole 
community.5 They were also responsible for tax collection.  Most of the population were peasants; 
however, there were also craftsmen and traders who lived in towns. Azerbaijani Muslims belonged 
mainly to the Shia denomination of Islam, with some Sunnis who lived mostly in the northern parts 
of the country. Sharia courts retained all power in domestic and communal conflicts.6At the end 
of the 1830s, the Russian government liquidated khanates and divided Azerbaijani territory into 
seven provinces under the rule of the military commander. In 1841, the government dismantled 
the military administration, partially because they could defeat the opposition of native peoples to 
Russian rule and, thus, introduced a civil type of administration. Two other legal changes 
pertaining to land ownership and authority followed in 1841. They deprived all existing 
landowners and the local aristocracy of authority over towns and tax collection, providing them 
with lifelong grants from the crown as compensation.7 
In 1845, the new administrative reorganization came to life: the Viceroyalty of the 
Caucasus. The viceroy was subordinated directly to the tsar and was responsible for the military 
and civil affairs of the region. The first viceroy Count Mikhail Vorontsov (1782 – 1856), believed 
in recognizing cooperative with the native elite rather than in assimilation and Russification. Thus, 
by a decree from 1846, the government recognized the rights of khans, beks, and aghas to private 
property and heredity. Moreover, to form loyal allies from the Muslim gentry, the regime eased 
the local nobility’s access to the civil service. However, this policy came to a halt with M. 
Vorontsov’s retirement in 1865 and the introduction of reforms that proposed total Russification 
 
5 Bek, aga, and khan are the titles of the landowners and aristocrats in pre-revolution Azerbaijan. 
6 Velichko, Russkoe delo i mezhplemennye voprosy, 9–11. 




and integration. At the end of the 1860s, the tsarist regime introduced the universal Russian court 
system and legal procedures in criminal cases. Family matters such as marriage and divorce 
remained, however, under the jurisdiction of the Sharia court.8 
In the mid-1860s, the native gentry lost many rights over the land. Moreover, the tsarist 
regime initiated the large-scale resettlement of Russian people in the country. The first Russian 
settlements came into existence in the 1830s and were mainly along the official border with Iran; 
the settlers had limited contact with the original inhabitants by living mostly in their own districts.9 
However, from the mid-1860s, Russian peasants, attracted by government promises to grant them 
free land plots, arrived in Azerbaijan in large numbers. By 1913, there were forty-four settlements 
in the central part of Azerbaijan, Shirvan, and they included 54,000 acres of high-quality irrigated 
land.10 Along with this, Russians occupied the leading positions in civil offices.  
Until the mid-1870s, the Russian authorities held the newly gained territory as a base for 
the extraction of raw materials and agricultural goods. In the mid-1860s, the Russian government 
initiated the cultivation of much-needed cotton and tobacco there, products that North American 
producers stopped exporting because of the Civil War in America.11 The production of cotton and 
tobacco spurred the emergence of textile manufacturing and the growth of agriculture. In the 
1870s, the abolition of various local monies and the introduction of an all-imperial, Russian 
currency, along with a universal system of weights and measurements, also contributed 
significantly to a revival of the regional economy. The Municipal Law of 1870, which allowed the 
establishment of self-ruling assemblies in all urban communities, helped to develop the 
 
8 Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 19. 
9 Velichko, Russkoe delo i mezhplemennye voprosy, 27. 
10 Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 16. 




Azerbaijani towns of Baku, Ganja, Kuba, Shamakhi, Nukha, and Shusha into trade, manufacturing, 
and administrative centres.12  
Until the mid-nineteenth century the traditional group of intellectual elites that prevailed 
in South Caucasian Muslim society consisted of the ulema, a community of male Islamic scholars 
who received spiritual education at the maktab and madrasah and who were generally the sons of 
Islamic scholars.13 The members of the ulema enjoyed strong authority in determining the way 
that a given Muslim community believed and behaved by interpreting the larger world and the 
doctrines of Islam. As contact with Russians increased, and familiarity with Western cultural 
norms spread, a new intellectual elite emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. Since the mid-1860s, 
this new intelligentsia had consisted of young men who had partially lost their connections with 
the traditional intellectual environment: they received elementary education at maktab, and they 
continued their education at Transcaucasian teacher seminaries in Gory and Tiflis, or at Russian 
and European secular universities. They skipped the traditional path of training at the madrasah. 
The rise of this new type of intelligentsia was a result of the involvement of the local 
Muslim gentry in the Russian environment that started admitting them to imperial civil and 
military service in accordance with viceroy Vorontsov’s projects. The tsarist regime strongly 
supported this process, aiming to neutralize any association with Iran and to foster loyalty to 
Russian rule.14 This new Muslim elite sent their sons to study in the Russo-Tatar schools that had 
developed in 1840s. 15 As a result, a new intelligentsia, obrazovannye, emerged.16 With time, this 
term was applied only to those men who were trained in Russian or European educational 
 
12 Muradaliyeva, 19-cu Esrin Sonunda Shimali Azərbaycan Shehərləri, 12–16. 
13 Maktab – Islamic elementary school. Madrasah – Islamic high educational institution to prepare religious and 
intellectual leaders. 
14 Audrey Altstadt, The Politics of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1920–40 (London: Routledge, 2016), 5. 
15 Until the end of the nineteenth century the Russian sources referred to Azerbaijanis as Tatars or Transcaucasian 
Muslims. 




institutions, whereas those who obtained education in traditional Islamic scholar centres were 
known by the Azerbaijani titles: medani, ziialar, or alimler. Although both labels illustrate the 
coexistence of the new and old-fashioned types of intelligentsia, only those who were trained in 
European educational centres were considered to be truly intelligent.  
The European-educated men proposed several projects by combining their traditional 
intellectual milieu with their newly acquired Russian values. These first projects designed to 
modernize the Muslim community to fit the more economically and educationally advanced West 
became evident in the mid-nineteenth century. Abass Gulu Agha Bakikhanov and Mirza Fatali 
Akhundov defined aspects that kept Azerbaijani Muslim society from progress. 17  Bakikhanov 
was the first to provide an examination of Caucasian Muslims’ position and proposed the plan to 
reform the educational system to make it free from religious dogma. His project stressed the need 
to establish schools for Muslim young men where science and law would prevail over religious 
studies, though he recognized the need for limited spiritual training for a balanced upbringing.18 
Akhundov went farther in his project to reform Muslim society: he blamed Islamic norms and 
outdated traditions for keeping his people behind the literate and industrial West. Imperial and 
later Soviet officials praised Akhundov for this discourse as the model Muslim intellectual who 
paved the road to modernism in the Caucasus region, but his anti-Islamic expressions prevented 
him from travelling to Iran to visit his relatives because of threats to his life, and his major 
philosophical works have never been published in Iran.19  
 
17 Abass Gulu Agha Bakikhanov (1794–1847) was also the son of the last Baku ruler and a translator during the 
Turkmanchai Treaty negotiations. Mirza Fatali Akhundov (1812–1878) was an Azerbaijani writer and philosopher. 
Akhundov was the founder of new playwriting, different from medieval Muslim literature, and the creator of the 
modern literary Azerbaijani language. 
18 A. K. Bakikhanov, Proekt uchrezhdeniia musul’manskogo uchilishcha sostavlennyi maiorom Abass-Kuli-Agoiu 
Bakikhanovym 20 fevralia 1832 goda (Baku: Elm, 1983). 




                
Figure 1. Abbas Kuli ogli Bakikhanov (1794–1847)     Figure 2. Mirza Fatali Akhundov (1812–1878) 
 
The formation of M. F. Akhundov’s worldview, which had a vital influence on Azeri intellectual 
discourse, occurred in 1832 when he became a student of Mirza Shafi Vazekh (1796–1852), the 
famous Azerbaijani mystic, poet, and calligrapher. Denouncing Shia clergy as dishonest people 
who used religion to keep their power among the ignorant commoners, he prevented Akhundov 
from becoming a clergyman. Akhundov described this transformation in his letters: 
One day, the honorable Mirza Shafi asked me why I wanted to study Islam. I answered that 
I have wished to become a clergyman. Mirza Shafi asked then whether I want to become a 
hypocrite and a charlatan. Such questions surprised and shocked me...Mirza Shafi looked 
at me and suggested not to waste my life by becoming a part of this monstrous group of 
people and to choose another profession. When I asked him about the reasons for his hatred 
of the clergy, he revealed the matters that removed the curtain of ignorance from my eyes. 
After this episode, I began to hate the clergy and I changed my intentions.20 
  
In 1834, Akhundov began a career as a translator of oriental languages (Arabic, Persian, 
and Turkish) in Tiflis at the Russian Imperial Viceroyalty under A. G. Bakikhanov’s supervision. 
 




In 1841 Akhundov became the chief translator and six years later he received a military rank, as a 
colonel in the Russian army, although he had never fought in any military campaigns.21 In Tiflis, 
Akhundov met a significant number of Muslim, Georgian, and Russian intellectuals who 
profoundly influenced his philosophical and political development: A. G. Bakikhanov (1794–
1847), a poet, historian, and diplomat; Khachatur Abovian (1809–1848), the Armenian teacher, 
ethnographer, and historian; Aleksandr Chavchavadze (1786–1846), the Georgian writer and poet; 
Giorgi Eristavi (1811–1864), the Georgian playwright, director, and actor; Friedrich Martin von 
Bodenstedt (1819–1892), a German poet who popularized Mirza Shafi Vazekh’s poetry in Europe; 
and two Iranian princes, thinkers, and diplomats, Mirza Yusef Khan Mostashar ud-Dovle and 
Mirza Jalal ud-Din ud-Dovle.22  
The literary influence of Russian writers, like A. S. Pushkin and M. V. Lermontov, and 
personal interconnection with political exiles, such as A. A. Bestuzhev-Marlinskii, Ia. P. Polonskii, 
A. Odoevskii, and T. Lada-Zablotskii, introduced Azerbaijani intellectuals to the European 
Enlightenment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1846, Mirza Shafi, Akhundov, 
Bakikhanov, Abovian, Chavchavadze, and others organized a society called Divan-i Aqil, The 
Society of Reason in Tiflis, where they discussed their views on the cultural development of 
Transcaucasia within the Russian Empire and denounced the Islamic world as an unenlightened.23 
During the meetings society members discussed the works of European philosophers, and such 
discussions influenced Akhundov’s worldview. Akhundov acknowledged that European 
philosophy, particularly the writings of John Hume, John Stuart Mill, Voltaire, Henry T. Buckle, 
 
21 D. Dzhafarov, M. F. Akhundov: Kritiko-biograficheskii ocherk (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1962), 21–
23 . 
22  Dzhafarov, M. F. Akhundov, 190–192. 




Ernest Renan, and the works of the Swiss economist Jean Charles Leonard de Sismondi, formatted 
his thoughts on the ultimate triumph of science over religion.24  
A critical part of his worldview was an awareness that harmful Islamic practices can be 
eliminated through the abolition of Arabic script.25 In 1857, Akhundov wrote Alifba-i Jadid, The 
New Alphabet, in which he argued that Arabic script was the principal cause of the high rate of 
illiteracy among Arabs, Iranians, and Turks, and this was the major factor that kept Muslims 
ignorant. He stated that its abolition and the introduction of Latin script would simplify learning 
of the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish languages and would substantially increase the rate of literacy 
among Muslim people. He provided his personal experience as an example of the disadvantages 
of the Arabic alphabet: despite the best efforts of his mother’s uncle, akhund Alaskar, it took him 
four years to learn reading alone.26 In 1863 Akhundov travelled to Istanbul to convince the 
Ottoman government, which introduced several reforms to modernize Muslim society, to adopt 
his proposed alphabet. There, he met the leading figures of the Tanzimat Era, the prime minister, 
Fuad Pasha, the minister of the Foreign Relationship, Ali Pasha, and Mehmet Munif Pasha, the 
head of the Ottoman Scientific Society.27 The Ottoman officials agreed that the Arabic script 
suffered from deficiencies and that its reformation would not violate Islamic norms, but postponed 
its implementation.28 
 
24 M. F. Akhundov, Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia (Baku: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk AzSSR, 1953), 187–
194.  
25 Akhundov, Alifba-i Jadid va Maktubad, 9–16.  
26 Akhundov, Alifba-i Jadid va Maktubad, 4.  
27 Akhundov, Alifba-i Jadid va Maktubad,77–85.  




In 1873, Akhundov introduced the Russian Imperial officials to his project which aimed to 
replace Arabic script with a new alphabet based on Latin characters, with some Cyrillic letters, 
that better matched the Turkic phonetics and would enlighten the Azeri Muslims:  
In striving to replace the outdated Islamic alphabet with a Latin one I pursue one aim: I 
want to carve a way to education, science, enlightenment, and civilization for people 
regardless of their social status and gender. One day all people, men and women, will 
become literate and civilized. We must put an end to our backward position behind the 
European nations in culture and knowledge. For this aim we must abandon the Arabic script 
and invent an alphabet close to our language and pronunciation.29 
 
Thus, Akhundov pointed out that the problem was not just a simple replacement of one script by 
another. There was a more fundamental task: to develop a system of schools and cultural 
institutions for Transcaucasian Muslims with compulsory education for children of both genders 
aged nine to fifteen.30 He believed that the Latin alphabet was a vital part of secularization and 
would free the people from backward Islamic clergy and help in finding a place among the 
advanced European peoples. Akhundov argued that Islamic culture always contradicted science. 
He claimed that science gave people the right knowledge about nature and society, while religion 
was the world of fabulous fictions that had little to do with real life, and even disorientated people:  
Our greatest mistake is that we always mix these two domains: science and faith. Our 




Akhundov was also the first to shape the discourse about the need for a Muslim cultural revival 
and moved it from the pages of his literary works to the pages of a newly-established independent 
media. This innovation brought more people to the debates and gave birth to Azerbaijani 
journalism.  
 
29 Akhundov, Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia, 345. 
30Akinchi 2, January 18, 1877. Akhundov, Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia, 296. 




In 1875–1877, the first newspaper in the Azerbaijani language, Akinchi, The Ploughman, 
came to life. Its founder, Hasan bek Melikov Zardabi (1842–1907), promoted societal 
modernization through the introduction of the first secular press; the establishment of a national 
theater; he also demanded education for girls, and he advocated for the gradual reform of Islam. 
Zardabi did not support Akhundov’s anti-Islamic position. Zardabi went against Akhundov’s idea 
of alphabet reformation, claiming that this would be a direct road to breaking traditional ties with 
the Islamic world, particularly Iran and those Azerbaijanis who stayed there after the Turkmanchai 
Treaty. During their debates Akhundov justified his position:  
In every issue of your newspaper [Akinchi] Zardabi tells us, “Muslims, study sciences, 
study sciences…”. Incredibly good… but tell us, where can we study the sciences, who can 
teach us and in what language? We could study the sciences in towns, but there are no 
modern schools in towns, only Islamic maktabs. You call us to establish them but where 
can we find teachers? We have neither modern teachers nor up-to-date textbooks in the 
Arabic language. All of Anatolia is totally illiterate. The whole of Iran is illiterate… I see 
the reason for this; it is difficult for people whose language is not Arabic, but Turkish or 
Persian, to study in alien Arabic script.32 
 
 
Zardabi was not only the first who issued a newspaper in the Azerbaijani language, but he 
was also the first who organized Western-style theater in 1873 as the means to propagandize the 
reforms. Ironically, the first play staged was the play of his ideological opponent, M. F. Akhundov. 
That play, Haji Qara, described in a satirical manner the blind adherence of a well-off peasant to 
Islamic norms of conduct that he had to follow under the strict supervision of the mullah. However, 
this devotion left him deceived and poor. Zardabi believed that staging such plays at the theater 
would be a powerful message to enlighten people.33 This and other cultural novelties, however, 
met strong opposition from the radical clergy who campaigned among commoners not to attend 
 
32Akinchi 2, January 18, 1877.  




this “satanic performance.”34 In 1914, the editors of the journal Mir Islama, World of Islam, 
explained the roots of this opposition:  
In the mid-nineteenth century the Muslim intelligentsia of the Caucasus consisted of beks, 
khans and aghas who were brought up in the spirit of Islamic conservatism and strict 
criticism towards people of lower classes and different origin. Those people considered 
Zardabi’s activity as a threat to the societal order on account of his liberal views, his 
popularization of the native language, his criticism of their agenda to keep peasants 
ignorant and humble. They also found a threat in the name of the newspaper, Akinchi, The 
Ploughman, that they assumed prioritized the needs of peasantry above the needs of 
aristocracy. The priests did not welcome the newspaper and theatre either, for the alleged 
imitation of the Europeans, and thus, the destruction of the traditional bases of Islamic 
society.35 
 
However, despite this criticism periodicals issued in the Azerbaijani language continued to be 
published, because they connected Muslim reformists both in Russia and the Ottoman Empire to 
one another. They became the platform to express the discourse of reform ideas among Muslims 
of the Turkic-speaking world, the one that also experienced a period of cultural reformation 
through the introduction of independent media in the Turkic language and a new type of education. 
 Since the end of the nineteenth century, Azerbaijani thinkers, like their Muslim Tatar 
counterparts from Crimea and the Volga region, became heavily engaged in debates on reconciling 
European culture with Islam. Islam as a language of communication, which reflected a system of 
shared values of the Muslim world, was not easily abandoned. If some reformers wanted to revise 
this relationship others planned to eliminate it from modern society and published their arguments 
in contemporary periodicals.  
 
 
34 Akinchi 1, July 22, 1875. 





Figure 3.  From left to right: Ismail bek Gasprinski, Hasan bek Zardabi, and Alimardan bek Topchibashev, Baku, 
1907. AAKFD photo. 
  
Since the mid-1890s, some Azeri men of letters, such as the brothers Seiid and Jalal Unsi 
zade, Ahmed bek Agayev, Ali bek Hussein zade, and others advocated for traditional Muslim 
culture. They called for rational interpretation of Islamic rules and argued for the preservation of 
true Islamic culture free from assimilation by the Western world. In 1894, Teimur Bairamalibekov, 
a well-known journalist and enlightener, showed in his article entitled Koran i Magometanstvo, 
The Koran and Mohammedism, that in Islam, like in all other religions, there were two domains: 
the spiritual, and a code of civic laws. He stated that the second one should be a changing domain 
reflecting real-life needs. However, religion remained the cornerstone for societal transformation:  
We need to look at the Christian faith, whose followers adjusted their doctrines to their 
societal needs through the reformation since the sixteenth century. Our backwardness is 




In 1899, Akhmed bek Agayev maintained that it was a mistake to consider Islam as an enemy to 
progress. He argued that true Islam and true Muslims did not exist without education and 
 




enlightenment; enlightenment and Islam are two interconnected philosophies.37 This group of 
modernizers found support from Ismail Gasprinski, a prominent leader who advanced the cultural 
transformation of Russian Muslims among Crimean and Volga Tatars. Gasprinski claimed that the 
statements to completely abandon Islam were harmful for Muslims because they destroyed every 
pillar of their faith and history.38  
Opponents of the moderate and traditionalist views of A. Agayev and T. Bairamalibekov 
were S. Mehmandarov, Muhammedaga Shakhtakhtinskii, Hussein Minasazov, Dzhalil 
Mamedkulizade, Nariman Narimanov, and Mirza Sabir.39 They believed in secularism, criticized 
the existing societal position, calling it backward, and tried to improve the unenlightened position 
of Transcaucasian Muslims by rejecting outdated Islamic practices. In 1892, S. Mehmandarov, in 
one of his articles published in Novoie Obozreniie, stated:  
How can Islam, with its draconian laws from the seventh century invented by the backward 
Bedouins of the desert, encourage Muslims from lands with rich pre-Islamic culture? 
Islamic doctrine is based on the essence of inequality between tribes, nations, social status, 
and gender.40 
 
Moreover, he argued that Koranic dogmas are in contradiction with the common sense of the 
modern world.41 Such statements fueled discussion about the role of religion in modern society.  
The debate over the role of Islam and the degree to which Muslims should adopt Western 
culture in the process of societal reformation divided the Islamic priesthood as well. The 
progressive clergy such as Abdulsalam Akhund zade, the Transcaucasian mufti Huseyn-effendi 
Gaibov, Molla Muhammed Pishnamaz zade, and Molla Abdurrahim Talybov, stood for the 
 
37 A. Agayev, “Islam i progress,” Kaspii, January 10, 1899.  
38 I. Gasprinskii, “Po povodu statei gospodina Mehmandarova (pis’mo v redaktsiiu),” Novoe Obozreniie, April 14, 
1894. 
39 Please note that some personalities’ first names were not mentioned in the original sources. So, I will use only their 
surnames in this work. Where I have the full names found in the original sources, I will provide them. 
40 S. Mehmandarov, “Prichiny otstalosti musul’man,” Novoe Obozreniie, December 5, 1892. 




reformation of classic Islamic canons and the promotion of secular education.42 The traditionalist 
clergy, in contrast, whose leader was Akhund Abuturab, declared that the happiness and progress 
of Muslims could only be reached through religion. In 1906, Abuturab expressed his opinion in 
the newspaper Hayat:  
Regardless of the amount of knowledge and skills the atheist person has, he cannot enter 
the kingdom of humanity and culture. Only Islam opens the doors to this domain. Only the 
Koran arms people with knowledge about good and evil, brings spiritual satisfaction and 
protects people from temptation and seductions. Western culture is harmful for Muslims 
who have a unique history and path within human civilization.43  
 
 
Such arguments gave the reform-minded intellectuals a chance to accuse the Muslim clergy of 
backwardness and xenophobia. Namely, Firudin Kocharli, a prominent public figure and a 
journalist, strongly criticized Abuturab’s statements on the “Muslims’ unique path in history” and 
his warning to keep far from Western influence.44 Other famous public personalities, namely 
Mamedkulizade and Nemanzade, criticized Muslim Shia clergy, denouncing them as pillars of 
immorality and cruelty, and as the men who were incapable of thinking beyond outdated religious 
writings. As Kocharli expressed in 1907: 
If a person does not gain culture and compassion through sciences and art, he will never 
acquire them from Islamic practices and Sharia norms. It is literature and science that 
enlightened humanity in their notion of empathy and human progress.45  
 
 
Another thinker who claimed the need to reform Islam and modernize society was M. 
Shakhtakhtinskii. He expressed his ideas in a collection of essays issued in Saint-Petersburg in 
 
42 Kaspii, February 23, 1905.  
43  “Medeniyet heyatinin muassir hadiselerine, Axund Abuturab ile ifade edilen, Islam din xadimlerinin fikirleri,” 
Hayat, 106, May 17, 1906. 
44 F. Kocharlinskii, “Kakiie nauki nam nuzhny?,” Zakavkaz’ie 72, March 29, 1907. 




1909. In one of his articles, he criticized Islam as the main obstruction on the road to social 
progress:  
Islam has become an embodiment of social stagnation for its imposition of theological 
dogmas on Muslims, depriving them of the establishment of secular laws different from 
Sharia, and killing in them freedom of choice. Muslims must realize that even Europeans 
had wrong scientific ideas, arguing in the past that the sun rotates around the Earth, but 
they overcame this ignorance with science and literacy. Thus, like Europeans, we can 
defeat our religious prejudices to gain a realistic vision of the world and public order.46 
  
The Azeri intellectual, Rashid bek Efendiiev, voiced another dangerous factor that 
prevented the spread of modern knowledge among Muslims since the end of the 1870s. He pointed 
out the number of self-appointed Muridists sheikhs, of Sunni denomination of Islam, who were the 
leaders of the Muslim community from the Northern Caucasus.47  Those sheikhs  promoted 
religious fanaticism against all kinds of secular education and enlightenment.48 Like Efendiiev, the 
essayist M. Mahmudbekov also acknowledged that the Muridists sheikhs had gained popularity in 
Azerbaijan because many local Muslims were disappointed in the local Shia clergy for perceived 
corruption of Islamic codes of conduct and thus sided with Muridism. In this situation, the 
Azerbaijani reformers felt a duty to spread modern knowledge in opposition to the reactionary 
religious influence of the local priests supported by Iranian Shia clerics and Sunni Muridists. Both 
factions allegedly prevented Muslims of the Russian empire from joining progressive 
civilization.49  
As the Azeri men of letters discussed different paths to advance their society to the level 
of Western progressive civilization, they began to define the notion of “culture” and “civilization” 
 
46 M. Shakhtakhtinskii, “Krizis musul’manskoi zhiznesposobnosti,” Turetskii Sbornik (Saint-Petersburg, 1909), 104. 
47 Muridism was the movement in the Northern Caucasus against the Russian invasion. Its leaders, also, claimed the 
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within an Islamic paradigm. The modernists, particularly Hussein Minasazov, believed that 
“culture” is a universal criterion that is fundamental to all nations; however, “civilization” is 
ascribed only to advanced European nations: 
Culture is the symbiosis of spiritual values produced by religion, science and art, important 
for moral and social relations among the people of one nation. Civilization is the 
combination of material values, legal and civil norms that allow nations to develop and 
succeed. All these qualities belong to prosperous European civilizations.50 
 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the new cohort of intellectuals, Mamed Emin 
Rasulzade and S. Mehmandarov, continued the discussion about getting culturally closer to the 
European world while simultaneously preserving some specific Azerbaijani cultural traditions – 
language, and to some degree, religion.51 S. Mehmandarov was among the first to propose the 
establishment of European-type schools and the abolition of women’s isolation that had been 
maintained by patriarchal tradition to keep Transcaucasian Muslim women veiled and publicly 
invisible. He considered this the best method to embrace Western civilization. Mehmandarov also 
believed that this method would awaken all Muslim society and not only some individuals who 
received training in Western educational centres.52 Some reformers proposed another path: to focus 
on Western philosophy that, in their opinion, guided the European public to more progressive 
human existence. In 1915, the essayist Minasazov compared the role of religion, particularly Islam, 
and European philosophy in the process of societal developments. He concluded that Western 
ways of thinking were more beneficial because of their progressive character:  
Descartes developed his ideas on Aristotle’s views, Locke grew on Descartes and Kant 
expanded Locke’s world-view. In this way they, unlike the Islamic conservative scholars, 
revolutionized the scientific way of thinking and social life.53 
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However, some reformers believed that Muslim culture could enrich progressive Western 
civilization as well. Mamed Emin Rasulzade, a prominent intellectual and a political leader, 
claimed that civilization was the combination of different cultures that contributed to accordance 
with their abilities. Thus, the marginalization of any culture was the death of that culture and 
consequently of that nation.54 He also considered Muslim isolation from the rest of the world as 
the direct outcome of Islamic stagnation implemented by a conservative clergy keen to preserve 
their own position in the Muslim community.55 Rasulzade, like other enlighteners, appealed to 
Western philosophers, like Schopenhauer, Goethe, Gutenberg, Luther, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Diderot, Montesquieu, and Voltaire, as high authorities whose theories gave the European people 
a sense of freedom and independence that he thought was impossible to develop within Islamic 
spiritual doctrine.56 Hence, the Azerbaijani European-educated reformers who admired Western 
civilization believed that the only correct path to modernize their community was through the 
adoption and use of Western philosophical and scientific principles on Muslim soil. 
The penetration of European values into traditional Muslim culture, however, often 
provoked cultural and generational tensions. Among the evidence is correspondence between M. 
T. Aliyev,57 a student of the Russian Petrovsko-Razumovskoi Academy, and his teacher Gasan 
bek Zardabi, the founder of the first Azerbaijani newspaper Akinci (1875–1877).  In these letters, 
Aliyev complained that his father considered him a lost man, itkin adam, and an infidel, giaour, 
for his adoration of Western lifestyles and for refusing to follow proper Muslim patriarchal 
traditions. The correspondence demonstrates that the tensions between father and son were so great 
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that the elder Aliyev opposed his son’s return to Azerbaijan from Russia and even wished for his 
death, before shame could spread through all the family.58 Aliyev also complained about 
depression and the deterioration of his health as the result of these family issues. Unfortunately, 
there is neither any evidence as to what his teacher suggested for him to do in this situation, nor 
information about his future. 
Rashid bek Akhundov (1854–1909), a graduate of the universities in Brussels and Paris, 
also went through many hardships and was similarly ostracized by his traditional community for 
his refusal to maintain proper Islamic and traditional practices. His suffering increased particularly 
after the death of his father, Mirza Fatali Akhundov, who was a prominent reformer of Azerbaijani 
alphabet and went against dogmatic Islamic practices, in 1878. The Muslim clergy of Tiflis refused 
to perform the proper funeral ceremony in accordance with Islamic norms for M. F. Akhundov’s 
anticlericalism.59 Eventually, feeling as though a pariah and being in a state of depression after 
years of police surveillance for his alleged connections to French socialists, Rashid bek committed 
suicide in 1909.60  
These real facts about the problematic position of the young men trained in the European 
style within the patriarchal society inspired Yousif Vezirov, the Azerbaijani writer and enlightener, 
to write a story entitled Kemal in 1907.61 It is a story about a family patriarch who sent his son, 
Kemal, to study at a Russian university. However, on his deathbed he changed his mind and asked 
his son to return home and become the family head in the traditional way. The father provided 
several arguments to convince his son to interrupt his education, claiming that during the good old 
 
58 “Pis’mo M. T. Aliyeva G.B. Zardabi,” (August 12, 1877) ARIM [Azerbaijan Republic Institute of Manuscripts], f. 
3, o. 1, d. 100, l. 1-2.  
59 D. Dzhafarov, M. F. Akhundov, 202) 
60 F. Qasımzadə, M. F. Axundovun həyat və yaradıcılıgı (Baku: AzGiz, 1962), 150. 
61 Yusif Mirbaba ogli Vezirov, Chamanzaminli, (12 September 1887, Shusha- 3 January 1943, Sukhobezvodnoie, 




days they all lived happily without any science. He blamed diabolical books brought by infidels, 
and sorrows created by young people who had forgotten their proper places and stopped believing 
in God. Kemal returned home but could not accept maintaining a traditional lifestyle. Kemal 
complained that his family criticized him for his “new way of thinking shaped in the Russian 
schools, for wearing giaour’s clothes, doing morning exercises and taking a promenade in the 
evening.”62  His reluctance to return to a traditional life posed conflict with the family and the 
whole local Muslim society, and led to his suicide.63 Thus, the absolute adherence to European 
norms of living often produced conflict between its followers and their traditional society.  
For the generation of graduates from non-Muslim traditional training centres, the Russian 
language became lingua franca in expressing their identity publicly as well as privately in diaries 
and correspondence. Yousif Vezirov used Russian to express his feelings and thoughts in his 
diaries of 1907–1909 that reminisced about his student life in Baku, Ashgabat, and Saint-
Petersburg.64 However, the acceptance of Russian culture by young Azerbaijani men did not bring 
them the absolute recognition of Russian society either. Vezirov, despite his pro-European 
worldview, felt, nevertheless, like an outsider in the Russian community. He recalled the instances 
when groups of Russian students and young ladies ignored him for his “otherness” and those 
situations led to his loss of self-confidence.65 Like Vezirov, Rashid bek Akhundov also had such 
an experience. In 1875, he wrote to his father, M. F. Akhundov:  
Russians, even those who were born in the Caucasus and educated here, behave in superior 
ways not by their cultural or intellectual qualities, but by their arrogance toward us, the 
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Such feelings of being in an underprivileged position and not culturally equal led to a realization 
of the barrier that separated Muslims from Russian European society and stimulated these and 
other educated young men to refine their views about societal backwardness. They began to 
propagandize ideas about taking important steps to improve the position of Transcaucasian 
Muslims through enlightenment. In 1907, Vezirov recalled in his diaries his correspondence with 
M. G. Mirtagiev regarding the required actions toward societal development:  
All those who went to the European Universities had to take a sacred mission – to bring 
knowledge to our nation, because this is exactly what our nation needs. Our humble nation 
puts great hopes in its students as the future defenders of its rights, faith and justice.67 
 
Thus, despite the strong opposition that many intelligent young Azeri men often faced from their 
traditional families and communities, nevertheless, they were inspired to serve their people to 
create an advanced nation, millat, by accepting the latest European scientific and artistic 
achievements. However, they debated just how much they should accept, and their views 
fluctuated from moderate to extremely enthusiastic. One of the leading intellectuals, A. Aidamirov, 
stated that it was dangerous to follow Western culture blindly because injustice dominated among 
the Europeans as well. He proposed taking on only their achievements in scientific knowledge and 
using them for the benefit of the millat, the new nation.68  
However, unlike these broad-minded young people, there were many others who only 
focused on the materialistic aspects of Europeanism: borrowing the Western type of home 
furniture, like tables and chairs, along with fashionable clothing such as cravats and high hats. In 
1916,  Azeri  writer Tagi Shahbazi Simurg (1892–1938), in his novel Alexander Evgen’evich 
introduced an image of a typical young man of that period: a graduate of the Russian university 
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who abandoned his traditional manners, original language, and name, Alihuseyn bek, and instead 
took the Russian name Alexander Evgen’evich. This man justified his deed by arguing that this 
tactic made it easier to be admitted into Russian society. Moreover, he stated that European ladies 
preferred to interact with a European man rather than with a “wild savage.”69 In this novel, 
Shahbazi criticized such principles, pointing out that this character, like many others, chose to 
satisfy his personal ambitions instead of using the knowledge and position he had gained to 
enlighten the people. Shahbazi concluded that, for truly progressive young people, 
Europeanization meant not simply changing clothes, manners, and the possession of material 
goods, but working for the benefit of their people. Such statements promoted the widespread idea 
of creating a new and advanced nation, a millat, through the proposed reformation of Muslim 
society by introducing modern education. 
 
Bringing Education to Young Muslim Men 
Like a mother who pays no attention to the 
scream of her child during bath time for the 
benefit of her health, so we must ignore the 
voices of those ill-willed conservatives in our 
struggle to make our children literate.  
G. Zardabi, Kaspii, February 15, 1900.70  
 
The Muslim reformers of the late Russian empire considered the transformation of 
elementary education as the best and fastest way to modernize Russian Muslim society in 
accordance with what they imagined to be the standards of the civilized world. They aimed to 
reform the maktabs, the Islamic institutions of elementary education. The reformers concentrated 
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their efforts on remodeling the maktabs according to new pedagogical methods. They hoped that 
the generation graduating from these new schools would not only read and write in their native 
Turkic language but would also acquire basic scientific knowledge and later would develop an 
interest in learning at modern Western universities. They believed that this much-needed 
knowledge would lead all Russian Muslims and their modernized new millat to progress. 
The reform of traditional education came because of disappointment with archaic training 
systems that they believed did not provide the skills that were necessary for success in the modern 
world. The crucial factors contributing to these alleged backward positions were an absence of 
unified teaching methods in maktabs and madrassahs, as well as the practice of assembling male 
students in one class, without consideration for their age and level of literacy.71 Another obstacle 
to effective education was a teaching method based on memorizing the names of the letters of the 
Arabic alphabet which led to unconscious reading and memorization of selective verses from the 
Koran. Maktabs provided knowledge about Islam, the history of Muslim rulers, calligraphy, and 
basic reading and writing in the Persian and Arabic languages. The instructors did not have a 
salary; their income depended on voluntary payment from the parents of shakirds, students. The 
maktabs could function in mosques and private houses of the priests or wealthy notables. By the 
end of the nineteenth century in Baku province, with a population of 826,716 people, there were 
245 maktabs with 4,915 students. In Elisavetpol’ province, with its population of 878,415 people, 
there were 268 maktabs with 4000 students.72 Traditionally these centres provided education only 
for male students.  
 
71 Maktabs were designed for male students 7–16 years old, and madrassah for male students 16–30 years old. 
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The first attempt to reform the Muslim educational system came from the Russian Imperial 
authorities who aimed to promote state interests by decreasing the Islamic clergy’s influence and 
fostering the emergence of a pro-Russian cultural elite.73 The promotion of Russian-Tatar schools 
for the Muslim gentry began in 1847, the year of the establishment of the first four-year elementary 
schools in different cities in Azerbaijan as an alternative to traditional maktabs. The primary goal 
of those schools was to convey to the local wealthy nobility practical knowledge of the Russian 
language that would enable them to perform commercial and administrative services within the 
empire. Also, such program of schooling aimed to gain trust from the Muslim community to send 
their boys to study at these new schools that provided basic literacy in the Turkic language and in 
Islamic studies.  
On November 22, 1873, the Russian Imperial Ministry of Public Enlightenment introduced 
“The Rules for Schools of the Caucasus District School Board” which gave the right for individuals 
of the Islamic faith to open Russian-Tatar secondary schools for Muslim students using municipal 
funds and private donations.74 In 1885, the Ministry of Public Enlightenment issued a decree 
allowing Muslim people to establish and to teach in Russian-Tatar private elementary schools.75 
Earlier, in 1874, the Imperial government had excluded maktabs and madrassahs from the formal 
jurisdiction of the public school directorate.76 Despite some criticism from local people over this 
reform, many Azeri Muslims welcomed this innovation for two reasons: first, they argued that 
through the absorption of the Russian language Muslims would gain access to Western education 
and culture. Second, the acquisition of Russian knowledge and skills would allow Muslims to 
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protect the interests of their community more effectively within the Russian empire.77 Thus, they 
demanded that the Russian authorities open more primary and secondary schools because of the 
benefits of a modern education and lifestyle.78  
The statistics from the 1897 all-Russian imperial survey prove that the non-Russian peoples 
of the empire had the lowest literacy rates. For instance, the literacy rate for both genders among 
Russian people was 22.9 percent, while the rate of the population of the Caucasus, including 
Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians, was 12.4 percent. The Central Asian region had 5.3 
percent educated people.79 In Azerbaijan, in the Baku province alone, there were 826,716 people. 
Among the 83.32 percent of Azeri Muslims, the literacy rate was 5.6 percent, while 37.6 percent 
of Russians, and 24.4 percent of Armenians were literate.80 
Zardabi was the first to voice the problem that Muslims fearing Russification did not allow 
their children to go to Russian schools and in this way left Muslim children without any education 
at all. In Akinchi and other local printing organs, he widely discussed the need for the introduction 
of secular schools using the Azerbaijani language as the only means to overcome backwardness 
and to modernize Muslim society. He stood for common education and for the organization of 
such schools for the lower classes, the most illiterate part of Muslim society.81 Zardabi wrote that 
literacy should even be introduced forcefully and that the combination of mental development with 
vocational training would prove the best method for the formation of the modern, intelligent man 
of strong will that was needed for a new nation, millat, culturally equal among other nations.82  
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In Azerbaijan, intellectuals who gained training at the Russian educational centres became 
leaders in the introduction of education reform. They were the active men of letters trained in 
engineering, trade, medicine, pedagogy, music composition, and other fields, and who were also 
fluent in Azeri, Ottoman Turkish, Persian, Russian, and some other European languages. Those 
intellectuals appealed to the native wealthy bourgeois for financial support to introduce the new-
method education that would increase the literacy of their people, particularly in the Turkic 
language. Remarkably, Russian authorities did not oppose the civic initiative in establishing new-
method schools. Since the 1870s, the native independent press helped to convince the Muslim 
community of the benefit of this new type of education.83  
In 1879, Muhammedaga Shakhtakhtinskii (1846–1931), a graduate of Leipzig and 
Sorbonne universities, introduced his ideas on cultural modernization through the reformation of 
the Arabic alphabet in the Russian-language press, Kavkaz, Tiflisskii Listok, Novoe Obozreniie, 
that circulated in among Transcaucasian Muslim communities at the end of the 1890s.84 In 1899, 
he became the chief editor of Russian-language newspaper Kaspii where he, along with other 
reformers, voiced the need to introduce new schools and to apply new methods in pedagogy. He 
also strove for the separation of religion from education, arguing that theological worldviews and 
archaic thinking were the main factors in Muslim backwardness. In his statements 
Shakhtakhtinskii articulated the purpose of the reforms: overcoming Muslim backwardness was 
the means to eliminate patriarchal traditions, to raise the cultural level of his people, and to develop 
a modern society that would be equal with the allegedly progressive Russian society.85 
 
83 Akinchi 11, June 11, 1876. 
84 M. Shakhtakhtinskii, “Ob uluchsheniiu alfavita i obrazovaniia u Musul’man,” Novoe Obozreniie, June 13, 1879. 




Seiid Azim Shirvani (1835–1888), was a poet and pedagogue. Shirvani founded the majlis, 
literary society, majlis Beyt-ul-Shafa, in Shamakhi. The majlis proposed an evolutionary change 
in the local Muslim community through the acquisition of Western knowledge and its application 
to Islamic values.86 He believed in overcoming the community’s decay through the introduction 
of new education that would give rise to a new generation of Muslim leaders who would put an 
end to an unenlightened existence.87 Another educator, Firudin bek Kocharli (1863–1920), claimed 
that Islam was not an obstacle to the progress of science and enlightenment: 
The Koran does not forbid Muslims from developing intellectually; it does not prioritize 
illiteracy over knowledge or prohibit Muslims from studying in any language or from being 
an enlightened person in the modern way. The Koran does not propagate any intolerance, 
immorality, or any inhuman concepts.88 
  
 
The rhetoric on the reformation of education prompted the emergence of the first new-
method school in 1875. The new-method schools were different from traditional maktabs: they 
functioned outside the mosques and were run by people who did not belong to the class of 
priesthood. The new-method of education provided literacy using the phonetic method of teaching 
instead of a letter-based method; a letter was pronounced not as a syllable but as a sound. This 
method accelerated the learning process. The new-method schools, unlike the maktabs, divided 
students by age and grouped them into classes that were equipped with desks, maps, charts, and 
graphs. The new-method schools abolished the corporal punishment that had been the key feature 
of the training process at maktab. M. F. Akhundov denounced the education at maktab as harmful 
for several reasons: 
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Educating children by caning and slapping them means to destroy their morality, to make 
them ill-natured and kill their kindness, free spirit, and determination. Shame on us, every 
maktab in our land has the felakke.89  
 
    
Figures 4.   The punishment of schoolchildren in Tatar, Azeri,      
 schools. A. Mishon, Baku, 1890s.  AAKFD photo.  
Image from the journal Molla Nasreddin, 1906.                      
 
 
Another key aspect of improving the training process was the modification of textbooks to 
address the demands of real life. In 1831, in his work Takhsibul-ahlak, Correction of Moral Values, 
Bakikhanov complained about the low standard of textbooks that showed poor language skills, 
character, contents, and did not match children’s psychology.90 Many reformers also remarked that 
traditional textbooks were so complex that many teachers themselves could not understand the 
long and disconnected texts. As F. Kocharli noticed:  
The main problem in Muslim society is the lack of connection between real life and 
education; both go by their separate ways. They did not know anything about each other, 
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  High demand for quality training materials prompted the emergence of a textbook market 
for the new-method educational centres. The new-type educational literature for the new-method 
schools was the symbiosis of two cultures: Russian and Azerbaijani. The native teachers used the 
Russian language textbooks by K. D. Ushinskii, Rodnoie Slovo, Native Word, and for 
Mathematics, The Collection of Arithmetic Problems by V. A. Evtushevskii. For literature and 
social studies they used works written in the Azerbaijani language by native authors such as Fizuli, 
Sabir, Shirvani, S. A. Velibekov, R. Efendiiev, Abdulla Shaiq, M. Mahmudbekov, and Abbas 
Sahhat.92 To teach students their own language the modern educators produced works about Azeri 
phonetics and grammar: in 1890, S.M. Ganizade published a two volume textbook entitled Istilahi 
Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani Dialect. By 1922 the book had six editions. In 1893 and 1894, Ganizade 
introduced Rus ve Turk Lugeti, Russian-Turkic Dictionary, and Rus va Turk Dilmanii, Russian-
Turkic Phrasebook to popularize the Russian language among Azeri population. Ganizade also 
wrote a Russian language textbook called Rus Dilinin Muellemi, Russian Language Tutor. In 1900, 
Ganizade, in collaboration with Ali Iskandar Dzhafar zade, published a Persian language textbook, 
Kilidiedebiiiat, The Key to Literature. In 1899 Nariman Narimanov issued another textbook 
entitled Turk-Azerbaijan Dilinin Muhteser Serf-Nehfi, A Concise Grammar of Turkic-Azerbaijani 
Language, and a Self-Tutorial on Russian Language. This new-method pedagogical literature 
significantly increased literacy among schoolchildren and gained wide popularity because those 
pupils trained in the new schools could read and write in their mother tongue after six months and 
in Russian after twelve months of learning, while those who were educated in the old method could 
not write their own names and read even after a year of studying.93 
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The first new-method school in a rural area came to life in the Salahli village of Kazakh 
district, Elisavetpol province, in January of 1875. Its founder, T. Mamleiev, an ethnic Tatar from 
Kazan, opened this school for twenty-seven students, four of whom were from poor families and 
got education for free. The curriculum included Koranic studies, reading and writing in the Russian 
and Azerbaijani languages, arithmetic, geometry, and gymnastics.94 The establishment of the first 
new-method educational centre in a big urban setting belongs to S. A. Shirvani, who opened the 
school in 1875 in Shamakhi city. The school lasted until the death of its founder in 1887.  
In 1892, poet and wealthy merchant Muhammed Tagi Safarov Sidgi (1854–1903) 
established a new-method school, named Akhtar, in Ordubad city. In 1894, he opened another 
school named Terbiie.95 In 1896, the state school board reorganized those schools into Russian-
Tatar educational centres for their outstanding achievements in spreading literacy, and transferred 
both to fall under the jurisdiction of the directorate of public schools.96 Since the mid-1880s, Sidgi 
also wrote several pedagogical books for the new-method curriculum. These included Qizlara 
Hadiesi, A Gift for Girls, and Oglanlara Hadiesi, Present for Boys. In the 1890s, he wrote a series 
of books called Maktab Hekaielar, The School Stories, which were the first non-religious literary 
works dedicated to young children in the Azerbaijani language. The series consisted of short moral 
stories about the school life Maktabe davam, Go on to Study in School; Qezuchokh Ushaqin 
Hekaieti, The Story of a Diligent Child; Yalanchı Ushaq, The Liar Child; Sekhavetli Ushaq, The 
Generous Child; and others. In 1882, Sidgi announced his ideas on new-method education in his 
work entitled Heykeli Insane Bir Nazir, A Glance at the Man, where he introduced an argument 
about the need to change the Arabic script into Latin. He stated that this measure would be an 
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important step toward decreasing the power of corrupt clergy; it did not, however, discard the 
whole Muslim faith. He argued:  
Why did the leader of the Muslim world (i.e., the Prophet Muhammad), divide science into 
secular and spiritual? Because he understood them as equal. Thus, it is not the religion of 
Islam, but the misinterpretation of corrupted priests, that brought to the Muslims ignorance 
in science and pitiful life.97 
 
Another new-method school operating since 1883 in Shusha was under the patronage of 
Safar Ali Velibekov (1861–1902). Velibekov popularized teaching in the Azerbaijani language 
and wrote, in 1888, the textbook Vatan Dili, Language of the Motherland. This school had twenty-
five students. Velibekov was not the only one in Shusha promoting the benefits of the new method 
among maktab teachers.98  
Among progressive educators who embraced this methodology was Mir Movsum Navvab 
(1833–1918). The founder of the literary club Majlis-i Faramushan, he also opened libraries and 
reading rooms. In 1890, he established a non-mosque school.  In 1899, to popularize his ideas, 
Navvab published the book Nasikhat-name, Book of the Recommendations, where he explained 
the outdated pedagogical traditions of religious schools.99 In Lenkoran, Akhundov Mirza Ismail 
Gasir (1806–1900) opened a new method school, which in addition to the native language also 
taught Russian, Arabic, and modern sciences.100 In September 1887, two Azerbaijani teachers, S. 
M. Ganiev (1866–1937) and H. I. Mahmudbekov (1864–1928), graduates of the Aleksandreievskiii 
Pedagogicheskii Institut, Pedagogical University named after Tsar Alexander, and Teachers’ 
Training Institute in Tiflis, founded a private Russian-Muslim school in Baku. Four years later, in 
September of 1891, they divided it into two secondary schools. Under Mahmudbekov’s 
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directorship there were thirty-five students, and under Ganievs’s supervision, there were forty-four 
students.101 By 1901 there were ten Russian-Tatar schools with 2249 male students in Baku 
alone.102 
However, the new-method schools varied in size, organization, and permanency, and 
always depended on financial and material support from native philanthropists. There was a 
shortage of teachers as well. The agenda to have a secure system of secular education was realized 
only in Baku and its surroundings under the patronage of the oil magnate Haji Zeinalabdin Tagiev.  
In 1908, Tagiev gave critical financial assistance to the establishment of Neshr-i Maarif, a 
philanthropic organization working to eliminate illiteracy among Transcaucasian Muslims. He 
paid tuition fees for the students at the Pedagogical educational centres along with their salaries 
when they became teachers employed by Neshr-i Maarif. As the Charter of the Neshr-i Maarif 
demonstrates, this organization used a different strategy to promote the new type of education. 
Unlike its proponents in the regions outside Baku who opened the brand-new Jadid schools and 
competed with the traditional centres, Neshr-i Maarif produced new-type teachers and supplied 
them to the traditional and government schools.103 This strategy was part of the agenda to promote 
literacy in the Russian and Azerbaijani languages for all Muslim community members regardless 
of social status, age, and gender. Also, this project promoted Azerbaijani as the native language 
rather than Tatar.104 This tactic did not meet opposition from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment, 
which continued to refer to those schools as the “Russian-Tatar” schools.  
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However, the state authority monitored the Neshr-i Maarif’s activity closely because of its 
intellectual independence that, in the government’s opinion, contributed to the rise of nationalism 
(the violent episodes of Armenian-Muslim wars in Azerbaijan) and the alleged support of 
Bolsheviks (industrial workers’ riots and printing of the first Bolshevik newspaper – Iskra, Spark) 
in the largest Azeri urban centre – Baku. Regarding that strategy, the Neshr-i Maarif society, in 
the first year of its emergence, 1908, established literacy courses for adults and three schools for 
young men in Baku alone. By 1911 the society had opened another eleven schools for boys in 
Baku and its surroundings.105 However, the most important achievement was the establishment, in 
1915, of the pedagogical seminary for young Muslim women organized for graduates of the first 
new-method public school for girls that had also operated under the patronage of H. Z. Tagiev 
since 1901. The foundation of this first public school and pedagogical training centre for Muslim 
young women in Baku planted seeds for transforming the traditional gender roles of Islamic 
society in this region. 
Thus, the incorporation of Azerbaijan into the Russian Empire created significant societal 
changes. One of them was the formation of a secular, educated, male elite that initiated a societal 
reformation at the end of the nineteenth century. The tsarist government itself stimulated the 
emergence of this European-type intellectual cohort. Even though the bureaucrats of the Ministry 
of Public Enlightenment opened schools for Muslims with the aim of promoting the ultimate 
Russification of Transcaucasian Muslims, they empowered Azeri Muslims in their pursuit of Azeri 
national identity and cultural equality within the Russian empire.  
The Azeri reformers who founded modernized maktabs worked in a relatively positive 
environment that helped them to create modern institutions of education, secular and bilingual, 
 




that raised many young men to become equally fluent in Russian and in Azeri Turkish. Those 
graduates of government Russian-Tatar schools for Muslims and reformed maktabs became 
intellectually closer to the educated societies of western European countries and the Russian 
Empire rather than to traditional Islamic culture. Their newly formed vision of civilized society 
inspired them to transform the broader Muslim population. The growing independent bilingual 
print media helped reformers link European culture with local traditions to modernize Muslim 
society in conformity with the requirements of the scientifically and industrially advanced West.  
The Azeri reformers’ view of the outdated educational system as a hallmark of societal 
backwardness prompted their efforts at educational reform; the result was the introduction of the 
usul-i jadid method. Modern non-religious training in the native language aimed to develop a 
Western-style society free from patriarchal traditions. This half-century-long discourse on 
enlightenment primed the mentality of many Azerbaijani Muslims to realize a project in the early 





 The Reformist’s Discourse on Muslim Women’s Societal Position 
 The idea that educating Muslim women would bring positive cultural changes began to 
travel across the Islamic world at the end of the nineteenth century. Muslim societal reformers, 
particularly in the Ottoman and the Russian Empires, formed a strong intellectual network and 
shared their publications on girls’ upbringing and education, and on women’s social roles.1 In 
Azerbaijan, since the mid-1890s, reformers had begun to voice their thoughts that women’s lack 
of education was the major factor that kept their millat, their people, behind the advanced nations 
of Western civilization. To remedy this situation, with the help of wealthy native elite, the 
reformers established a few modern schools to educate girls and young women, believing that 
educated mothers would revive their community. From the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Muslim elite women who gained modern training began to express their opinions in local 
periodicals and in the Ishig, the journal established by elite Azeri women, for Azeri women in 
1911. Also, they established several Muslim women’s associations to promote modern education 
and the end of female seclusion. Those associations, along with the first public schools for young 
women, promoted Muslim women’s views on male-female equality, and cultivated prominent 
activists who later welcomed the early Soviet gender reorganization project of 1920s.  
 This chapter examines the Azerbaijani intellectuals’ ideas on gender reformation through 
the introduction of new-method education for Muslim girls and young women, as well as the 
abolition of veiling and seclusion. It focuses on one specific project, the first new-method public 
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school and female teacher training centre established by H. Z. Tagiev, the Azeri oil magnate and 
philanthropist, that changed the societal position of urban Muslim women. I argue in this chapter 
that the modern public schooling program shaped a new generation of Muslim women who 
continued the policies for female emancipation after the Sovietization of Azerbaijan in 1920. I 
build my arguments on the critical examination of articles from contemporary periodicals, 
pamphlets, and books. This research also relies on documents from the Azerbaijani State History 
Archive, ARDTA, about the project to establish the first public schools for Muslim young women 
in Baku and its surroundings.    
 
The Reformist’s Call to Educate Women 
The mother’s duty is to bring up her children to make 
them citizens of the modern state. However, this is 
impossible to achieve if women are not free in their 
choices on education, marriage, and divorce; the 
choices that are legitimate in a civilized state.  
M. Shakhtakhtinskii, Novoie Obozreniie, November 
11, 1905.2  
 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century in Azerbaijan, as discussed elsewhere, the influence 
of Western culture changed the traditional concept of knowledge transforming it from Islamic 
models into modern, scientific, pro-European models. Another important shift was the emergence 
of the concept that literacy is a cornerstone of a modern society; this led to the introduction of the 
new-method schools for boys. Muslim modernists’ ideas on the importance of female education 
came significantly later. Moreover, the projects dealing with women’s enlightenment were always 
linked with motherhood and the fate of the imagined new nation, millat.  
 




Mirza Fatali Akhundov first introduced the idea of transforming women’s societal status 
by introducing female characters who played critical roles in changing the course of events. 
Between 1851 and 1855 he wrote several plays that presented strong-willed women instead of 
passive creatures. In his first play, Hekaieti Miusie Jordan Hekimi-Nebatat ve Dervish Mastali 
Shah Cadiukuni Məshhur, The Story of Monsieur Jourdan the Botanist and Dervish Mast Ali Shah 
Widely Known as a Magician (1850), female characters still acted as the representatives of 
traditional customs and as the main victims of superstitious beliefs. These female characters 
wished to prevent a young man, Shahbaz Bek, from travelling to Paris. Thus, they employed the 
charlatan, Dervish Mast Ali Shah, sincerely believing that his magical powers could change the 
course of events. In a satirical manner, Akhundov demonstrated how family traditions and customs 
prevented the intellectual development of a young Muslim man, and stopped him from studying 
foreign cultures and languages, instead urging him to marry his cousin.3  
In his play Lenkaran Khanının Vezirinin Serguzəshtleri, The Story of the Vezir of the Khan 
of Lenkaran (1851), he introduced another type of female character, the independent-minded 
female individual who refused to obey the authority of a corrupt, tyrannical, and polygamist man, 
the head of the family.4 In his stories Hikaiat-i Khirs-i Quldur-basan, The Story of the Bear that 
Caught the Robber (1852), and Sergiuzeshti Merdi-Khesis (Hacı Qara), The Adventures of the 
Miser (1853), Akhundov presented the Russian authority as the defender of Muslim women who 
strove to gain freedom in love and marriage. He showed the Russian state as the agent of 
modernization that would destroy the power of the traditional Muslim family. The Story of the 
Bear that Caught the Robber is about love between a young man, Bairam, and a young woman, 
Parizad, who cannot get married because their parents arranged their marriages with other suitors 
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for the benefit of their clans. Only the intervention of Russian authorities helped the young lovers 
to get married. The play ends with a speech by a Russian official, who pleads with the Muslim 
villagers to transform themselves from a savage people into a civilized one.5 In this play, 
Akhundov showed the conflict between the modernity of the rational West on the one hand and 
the superstitious beliefs and traditions of Muslim realities on the other. He portrayed the Russian 
authority as a modernizing force and liberator of Muslim society and Muslim women.  
In his writings, Akhundov identified Islamic clerics as the major actors who kept the 
oppressive rules against women and imposed veils on them.6 In his major philosophical work 
entitled Kemaluddovlə Mektublar, The Letters of the Prince Kamal, he attacked Islam as an 
oppressive religion particularly in its treatment of women and argued that Islam could not be 
compatible with modernity.7 He supported his arguments by analyzing the life and teachings of 
the prophet Muhammad in the context of the prophet’s personal, emotional, and sexual aspects 
that had a major impact on the Muslim perception of women and their role in society. 
 Akhundov divided the life of the Prophet Muhammad into two marked periods: the Mecca 
period (610–622 AD) and the Medina period, the Hijra, (622–632 AD). Akhundov argued that 
during the Medina period when the number of the prophet’s followers increased; he became so 
powerful that he could cover his “lust” for women using “divine revelations” to steal even married 
women from their husbands.8 As an old man with many wives, he offered several “divine 
revelations” to maintain his control over his women. This became clear after the affair with Aisha, 
the prophet’s youngest wife; this young woman was lost in the desert and spent a night with a man 
before returning to her husband. This event put her chastity under scrutiny. The existence of those 
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rumors forced the Prophet to impose veiling on his wives, to demand from the male members of 
the Muslim community to speak to the Prophet’s wives only from behind a curtain. Along with 
those regulations, the prophet prohibited any of his wives to remarry after his death.9 In 
Akhundov’s view the jealous nature of a Muslim religious leader who did not wish to lose his 
control over his wives even after his death caused Muslim women to wear the veil and to lose their 
basic rights and freedoms forever.10  
The restriction on Muslim women’s public visibility prevented them from attending school 
or learning the various arts and sciences, and thus, violated their basic human rights.11 Akhundov 
argued that the veil and seclusion also led to a variety of illnesses.12 Along with this, such gendered 
relationships made Muslim men corrupt and violent savages who could abuse their wives. 
Polygyny, in his view, legitimized the Muslim man’s right to have four wives and an unlimited 
number of concubines, and thus, oppressed the man’s first wife and caused conflicts between his 
children.13 Also, Akhundov stated that in accordance with Shia tradition, men could commit 
legitimized adultery by having temporary marriages, sigheh, to satisfy their sexual needs as many 
times as they could afford it physically and financially.14 So, Akhundov asked, how it was possible 
that this religion, which claimed to be egalitarian, treated half of human beings so unfairly?15 
Akhundov found the solution to improve Muslim women’s position in examples of the European 
societies’ history where women were treated equally, even allowing them to be the heads of states 
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and armies. He also noticed that Turkic women had such opportunities during ancient times but 
lost them with the Arabic invasion and Islamic indoctrination.16  
Akhundov became familiar with the Western European women’s position through Russian 
translations of Western intellectual writings and recently emerged Russian discourse on gender 
roles among the Slavs. The writings of Russian intellectuals concerning women’s position were 
part of the Western European socialist and feminist movements of the 1830s and 1840s. In 
particular, the voice of the French writer George Sand (Aurore Dupin Dudevant, 1804–1876) 
influenced the first generation of the Russian intelligentsia: Alexander Herzen, Vissarion Belinsky, 
Mikhail Bakunin, Nikolai Chernyshevsky, and Ivan Turgenev. Sand proclaimed freedom in love 
for both genders and criticized marriage based on traditional arrangements rather than on spiritual 
and physical harmony. She argued for woman’s right to choose a partner and to end a marriage if 
the union deprived her of the realization of her creative potential and diminished her status to the 
level of a servant.17  
Russian writers, being inspired by this philosophy and calling it “Zhorzhandism,” 
promoted her ideas of “liberation of the heart” in their writing.18 Akhundov’s philosophical 
pamphlets express his admiration for Russian literature about the improvement of women’s 
position in Russia as well. Nevertheless, Akhundov acknowledged that a Muslim woman could 
achieve the “liberation of her heart” only after her liberation from the Islamic norms of conduct 
between genders. He believed that such a task could be realized under the guidance of the Russian 
“civilized” power that represented European cultural values in Transcaucasia.19 
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From the end of the nineteenth century, many Azerbaijani intellectuals followed 
Akhundov’s discourse against religious doctrines on women, the veil, and seclusion. Azeri 
intellectuals, such as Dzhalil Mamedkulizade, Hamida Javanshir, Khadidzha Alibekova, and 
Akhmed bek Agayev argued that the practice of veiling was a fundamental issue and symbol of 
female societal isolation among Muslims.20  In Azerbaijan, veiling was culturally specific among 
certain parts of the Muslim population. Azeri women of urban communities wore a face and body-
covering veil, chadra. In contrast, rural and nomadic women who worked in the fields and moved 
the herds from summer to winter pasturelands neither covered their faces nor wrapped their bodies. 
They wore the head scarf, mostly kelagaia or orpak, as sign of modesty.21  
The subject of veil abolition had its supporters and opponents within the Muslim society 
of the Russian empire. Unlike the Central Asian Jadids who did not discuss the abolition of the 
veil and the end of gender segregation, the Tatar and Azerbaijani reformers argued that it was a 
symbol of women’s oppression and connected it to the backwardness of society that should be 
eliminated. As the Jadid discourse in Central Asia emerged primarily among the intellectuals of 
contemporary Uzbekistan, I will focus on the discussion of Muslim women’s position in this 
Central Asian entity within the Russian empire and later the Soviet Union and compare it to the 
Azeri discourse. 
  In 1867, the Russian army invaded three khanates: Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva, 
incorporating them into one province, Turkestan, under the rule of the Russian governor-general. 
Later, the Soviet authorities created the republic of Uzbekistan from these three entities. Russian 
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colonial rule brought significant changes to this region. Russians built railroads, cultivated cotton, 
and introduced European-style print media. In the 1880s, the tsarist government abolished the 
widespread institution of slavery. The legal changes made the local Muslims subject to Russian 
courts in criminal cases, leaving civil and family matters to Sharia law, while in Azerbaijan only 
family troubles could be solved with Sharia edicts.22  
Nevertheless, the tsarist regime did not promote the extensive assimilation of Turkestani 
Muslims as elsewhere in the empire. Adeeb Khalid stressed that the Russian conception of colonial 
rule in Central Asia was remarkably different from those that the tsarist regime introduced earlier 
in other occupied regions: it did not cooperate with local nobility and did not integrate the 
conquered population into the Russian social-cultural system.23 In Turkestan, the tsarist 
government recognized only Russian settlers as Russian citizens while in Azerbaijan all residents 
regardless of their religious belonging became imperial citizens from the start of its incorporation. 
Turkestanis could obtain citizenship only by providing exceptional service to the Russian state.24 
The local population remained “natives” within the multinational Russian empire.25 Turkestani 
nobility, unlike Azeri Muslims of noble origin, were deprived of the right to serve in the military 
and civil administrations. Such politics enlarged the gaps that separated the colonizers and 
colonized. Russians in Turkestan believed in their cultural superiority while the locals, fearing the 
perceived corruption of the traditional societal order, increased measures to keep their people from 
Russian influence. As Kamp argues, Uzbeks and other “natives” took active measures to shield 
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their women from any Russian influence: “the veil that urban women wore became a sign of 
identity as well as a physical barrier placed between the woman and the foreigner.”26  
In Uzbekistan, the response to Russian colonial rule was a mixture of resistance and reform, 
while in Azerbaijan it led to a profound assimilation of the urban Muslim nobility and 
intelligentsia. Those Uzbeks who choose the reformation of Muslim society were largely urban 
ulama and merchants who had interactions with Russian social institutions. The reformers, Jadids, 
advocated for learning modern knowledge from their rulers and simultaneously preserving their 
identities. The debates among Jadids on the degree of Russian culture adaptation gave rise to two 
opposite camps. One group stood for integration while the other group rejected it. However, as 
Khalid states, both groups criticized the practice of polygyny, women’s poor societal position, and 
a lack of female education as factors that kept their imagined nation ignorant.27 Jadids, building 
their arguments within the context of the Islamic realm, did not agree among themselves about the 
acceptable degree of female transformation. The progressives stood for the introduction of modern 
education and the reformation of Muslim laws about marriage and divorce. Their opponents, 
traditionalists, argued for simply teaching women Islamic law, aiming to empower Muslim women 
in the family and marriage but not to modify Islamic doctrines.28  
In Uzbekistan, Behbudi, Fitrat, Awlani, Hamza, and other intellectuals justified the benefits 
of science, female education, and a strong monogamous family required to foster a new civilized 
nation. They found inspiration in the discourse of the Tatar Jadids and those Tatars who lived in 
Turkestan.29 Tatar women were not veiled and led an active public life by establishing modern 
schools for girls and contributing to the women’s journals Alem-i Nisvan and Soyum Bike. They 
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were visible symbols of gender reforms in the Muslim world. The progressives faced strong 
opposition from traditionalists, who followed the Koranic prescription on gender roles to the 
letter.30 The traditionalists stood for the enforcement of the Islamic norms of living arguing that 
Tatar influence was harmful for Muslims because it propagandized the rejection of female chastity 
through the abolition of the veil and of changes in women’s status.31 Their voices were so strong 
and influential that they suppressed the discourse of the progressives making the impact of the 
latter group on the society very insignificant. In this situation, the progressives never explicitly 
raised the problem of veil abolition. As Khalid concludes, Jadid attitudes on gender problems in 
general were conservative and did not bring fundamental changes to Uzbek society.32 Hence, 
dissimilarities between the degree to which Azeris and Uzbeks were integrated into the world of 
Russian colonialists produced different discourses about Muslim women’s emancipation.  
In Azerbaijan, the discussion about the need to change gender roles began in the mid-1850s 
and did not face as strong opposition as Jadids faced in Uzbekistan. Azerbaijani men of letters 
published articles arguing against veiling and women’s segregation. Hussein Minasazov believed 
that a nation where a woman is secluded is like a human body with one paralyzed side; thus, 
involving women in public life was a step towards societal progress. He proposed the introduction 
of civil laws, other than Sharia, that would protect women from harassment and preserve all 
freedoms that were achieved. Otherwise, any discourse on female emancipation would only be 
meaningless bombast.33 Nevertheless, in Azerbaijan, like in Uzbekistan, the opponents to 
unveiling and to the end of gender segregation were Islamic religious authorities.  
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The Muslim clergy of both regions supported their arguments with the Koranic covenants 
that place man in authority over woman in her public role and dress. The traditional understanding 
of gender relations made women responsible for sexual impropriety within the societal order.34 
Islamic kinship categories regulated women’s social contact with men. Those who came under the 
category of mahram, first-degree male kin and milk brothers, could interact relatively easily with 
Muslim women. Those who belonged to the namahram category, all non-blood related males, 
qualified for marriage, and thus, should not have contact with Muslim females, who also had to be 
veiled in those men’s presence.35 Along with this, the traditional code of conduct in Azerbaijan 
made women responsible for family honor, namus, through their chastity and modesty. Namus was 
strictly under the guardianship of male family members and its violation brought the shame on the 
whole clan and could be atoned for only by the blood of its violator.36  
The role of Islamic and traditional norms of conduct became central to the discussion about 
changes in gender roles. In 1895, essayist Firudin Kocharli argued that Islam did not deprive 
women of freedom, but that mullahs, Muslim clergy, called the women najis, impure creatures, in 
their sermons, and thus promoted inequality. Kocharli argued that this position on women’s 
enslavement is alien to Islam; Islam strongly appreciates women’s dignity and grants them a wide 
range of rights. He stated that the Koran does not demand veiling, but only orders women to hide 
some parts of the body that can cause temptation.37 In another article, the author pointed to Iranian 
pre-Islamic traditions which kept women secluded, leading to Muslim women’s gradual retreat 
behind a screen and enslavement by their husbands.38 In 1902, the famous Azerbaijani essayist 
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Teimur Bairamalibekov, also attacked the misunderstandings of Islamic norms and 
misinterpretations of Sharia law that brought so much harm to Muslim women.39  
In 1901, the discussion on female enlightenment, unveiling, and the end of segregation 
gained a larger scale after Akhmed bek Agayev’s publication of Zhenshchina po Islamu i v Islame, 
Women According to Islam and in Islam.40 Written in Russian, the book was the first unified work 
that evaluated the causes of Muslim women’s underprivileged position and argued that the specific 
repressive institutions that limited women’s status in the Muslim society did not exist in Islam and 
even contradict its true spirit. Agayev claimed that the Prophet Mohammed granted many rights 
to Muslim women. In his opinion, the pre-Islamic traditions, which became part of Muslim culture 
after the incorporation of new lands into the khalifate, ruined the true Koranic norms and affected 
the female position adversely. This incorporation led to cultural stagnation over time and resulted 
in women’s subjugation. Moreover, the prophet Mohammed always cared about the weak and the 
helpless, particularly Muslim women, and thus, he took special steps to protect them. The Koran 
recognized women as equal to men in their rights in administration, inheritance, and property 
ownership.41  
Agayev did not define women’s rights within the Koran regarding companionate marriage, 
divorce, and the right to live independently without male custody. However, he attacked polygamy, 
veiling, and seclusion, again pointing out that these practices were introduced by host cultures after 
Arabs advanced into newly-gained lands.42 He also introduced the idea that, unlike harmful pre-
Islamic Iranian traditions, the old Turkic nomadic culture allowed women to be free and to act as 
the masters of their lives.  
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Agayev stated that Turkic traditions regarding female freedom permitted women to be 
socially and physically active, and thus, led to the birth of strong and freedom-inclined people.43 
However, later the old Persian and then the mistaken Islamic traditions isolated women and 
became the main factors in the emergence of the morally enslaved Turkic people. With this 
statement the author, like other intellectuals, connected motherhood with the health of the nation.44 
Furthermore, to improve this situation he proposed looking at models in the Western world where 
gender segregation does not exist, where educated mothers are active in children’s upbringing and 
where both genders are members of their community and value their sense of liberty. He noticed 
that the level of female literacy and public mobility is a mirror of societal progress and liberalism. 
Also, clearly understanding that education is usually unavailable to lower-class women, he 
proposed encouraging upper-class members of society to educate the lower strata of their 
community. In this way, through the total enlightenment of Muslim women, he hoped to end 
gender segregation and veiling. Thus, a progressive society of individuals who share the same 
collective identity – Muslim and Turkic – would develop someday.45  
Another account of how women’s position kept the nation ignorant belonged to Yousif 
Vezirov. In his diaries, he recalled with admiration the days he spent in Russia witnessing young 
ladies freely expressing their ideas on politics and culture, playing piano, and reciting poetry to 
the public. Vezirov noticed with bitterness how much he and his nation had lost because of gender 
segregation among Muslims. He stated that a nation where women are free to get an education and 
where they have the choice to marry would prosper: 
Every fashionable topic of conversation between young men and ladies saddened my soul. 
I often asked myself why I did not come from an enlightened nation and educated family. 
Why did I not meet these people earlier? Why? Why? This question rang in my ears and 
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ran through my body, making me shiver. I was grieving and mourning. Where, where did 
those twenty years of my life pass? 46 
 
  




Figure 6. Yusuf Vezirov with his family. Shusha, 1906. AAKFD photo. 
 
 
 Vezirov also examined women’s roles in society in a chapter titled “How women have influenced 
me?” He maintained that women’s influence is a vital part of balanced individual development. 
He described how two Russian young ladies, Olechka and Verochka helped him to realize this:  
 




Two ladies have played an important role in my life. I state without hesitation that these 
women have been the reasons for my important moral development. The first one, Olechka, 
saved me from moral decadence and the sins of adolescence. She gave me a sense of life. 
She introduced me to European literature and female roles in Western society.  I learned 
about women’s emancipation, which is important for every human being, especially for 
me, as a Tatar person whose nation hides its women. The second lady shaped my social 
life. She, Verochka, introduced me to Russian societies, clubs, and dances: things which 
were unimportant and unattractive before I met her. Thus, communication with these 
elegant ladies taught me that female creatures can be pure, poetical, and moral.47 
 
 
 Experiencing such feelings, he concluded that his traditional Muslim family where women had 
been isolated was reactionary, and he denounced it as a graveyard of human hopes. Also, he 
criticized all of his female relatives for their caustic language in their interactions with each other, 
their fights, their hypocrisies, and their intolerance towards each other. Thus, he proposed keeping 
only one memento from his home: “the family’s group portrait, where they are so kind, beautiful, 
good, and without…. souls.”48 Vezirov became an ardent proponent of Muslim women’s 
emancipation:  
I wait with impatience for women’s liberation as the only way to change my and other 
families’ lives. Emancipation will allow us to freely send our sons and daughters to school 
and make us civilized.49  
 
This negative description of the Muslim family was part of an already existing discussion on the 
role of the mother; this discussion focused on the norms of her upbringing.  
In traditional Muslim society, the concepts of family, woman, and mother are described 
through the prism of a proper man: the man is the head of the community, the family, and is in 
charge of educating the sons as future leaders in the family and community; the biological mother 
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is not essential as the caretaker of the child.50 However, as education became the subject of national 
progress reformers came to define the family as the nucleus of the nation. Thus, women became 
the foundation of the nation; their intellectual development or underdevelopment corresponded to 
the level of development of the nation. The male intellectual elite produced and translated the vast 
literature on women’s training in motherhood, scientific child-rearing, and housekeeping. In doing 
so, they had one aim: to make family a nucleus of the millat, and to have the whole society in turn 
prosper and become civilized. Publications on women’s education and childrearing methods 
marked an important moment in Islamic society. This was the moment of intervention by male 
intellectuals into traditionally female domains. Previously, all knowledge on children’s upbringing 
and girls’ education had been passed orally from elder women to younger ones, leaving this 
knowledge within the boundaries of the Islamic gender specific roles.51 The entry of male authors 
into this domain was a direct result of modernist discourse about the upbringing of a new man and 
the creation of a new nation.  
In Azerbaijan, the fundamental works on this subject were two bilingual books, in Azeri 
and Russian languages. In 1900, the modernist Shia cleric akhund Youssef Talyb-zade published 
a book entitled Gadinlara Hadiie – Podarok Zhenshchinam, A Gift to Women. In 1901, M. Ganiiev 
released a book Galin uchun Nasikhat - Pamiatka dlia Nevesty, The Instruction for a Bride. The 
first book provided guidelines on modern educational, spiritual, and physical methods for raising 
children. It also gave advice on scientific approaches to pregnancy, and on keeping the body clean 
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by following hygiene routines and physical exercises. The author supported his arguments with 
quotations from the works of European philosophers, pedagogues, and doctors.52 Ganiev’s book 
emphasized the role of the biological mother in her children’s lives and the strong need to become 
a modern woman for the good of the nation. It encouraged each woman to consider her house as a 
kingdom and to learn to run it well by applying modern knowledge and high moral standards: 
honesty, humanity, responsibility, punctuality, good manners, strength in the face of difficulties, 
and a desire to learn and to teach. These were all the qualities much needed for bringing up a 
modern and civilized generation of a new millat.53 It is worth mentioning that the graduates of the 
first secular school for girls, Tagiev school, received these books as a gift during the convocation 
ceremony. 
This dialogue on women’s role in the family and in society echoes the discourse that the 
reformers of neighboring Iran promoted it in the specific gender-related literature. Along with this, 
the important works on Muslim women’s emancipation by Qasim Amin, The Liberation of Women 
(1898) and The New Women: Two Documents in the History of Egyptian Feminism (1899), were 
translated into Persian in Iran in 1900 and into Russian in 1912. The Iranian modernizers of the 
end of the nineteenth century also introduced a new kind of wife and mother. M. A. Kermani, in 
Sad Khtabah, One Hundred Discourses (1892), and Y. Ashtiani, who translated and significantly 
modified Qasim Amin’s book Liberation of Women for Iranian society, emphasized the role of 
educating mothers in the process of the formation of a modern nation. They also gave many 
suggestions about scientific child-rearing and modern womanhood and motherhood.54 Like 
Azerbaijani reformers, the Iranians also claimed that Muslim women should have more autonomy 
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within the family and public life. Kermani called Iranian women “the living dead,” describing 
them as passive victims of the morally corrupt society that deprived them of all freedoms installed 
centuries ago by the inferior Arabs. He criticized polygyny, which caused a lack of love and 
friendship between spouses. Kermani, like Akhundov, also criticized temporary marriages, sigiah, 
common among Shia people, that were the causes of venereal diseases and prostitution. This 
rhetoric echoes the discussion about the negative sides of polygyny among the Azeri reformers. In 
1907, M. Shakhtakhtinskii, the noticeable public figure and journalist, pointed to the issue of 
polygyny and women’s seclusion as the principal causes of Muslim societal stagnation:  
Polygyny was responsible for depriving women of rights converting them into the slaves 
of tyrannical men. Women’s oppression harms the physical and intellectual power of a 
nation. Forced and underaged marriages are social immoralities.55 
 
 
M. Shakhtakhtinskii also compared the status of Muslim women to the position of their European 
counterparts and concluded that in Europe a woman had more freedom within the family and 
society and could realize her ambitions as a helper of her husband and children.56 
The important feature of the Iranian discourse was that unlike Azerbaijani enlighteners, the 
Iranian reformers were concerned with the fate of Iran as a nation-state and promoted an image of 
a new perfect man – an Iranian citizen raised by the enlightened mother.57 As Camron Michael 
Amin illustrates, this process began in the late nineteenth century in the pages of the first women’s 
print media Danesh, Knowledge, and Shokufeh, Blossom. These publications conveyed the image 
of the modern Iranian woman, which was modelled on the European female image, and contrasted 
it with backward traditional womanhood. Both women’s journals also heralded the image of an 
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educated wife and mother who was able to enter a companionate and monogamous marriage, the 
vital factors to foster free citizens of modern Iran.58  
Similarly, Russian society went through the reorganization of the female position 
beginning in the early nineteenth century.  The growth of maternal feminism in Russia may have 
been due in part to the rapid expansion and empowerment of the Russian empire after 1830s in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia and, since 1870s, on the Balkan Peninsula.59 The Russian state 
propagandized that Russian and other Slavic women to have more children since they were 
surrounded by inorodtsy and suffered from the long-lasting Muslim occupation of the Balkans.60 
The state introduced such rhetoric as part of the official ideological doctrine Orthodoxy, Autocracy 
and Nationality by the Russian emperor Nicholas I (1825–1855). In this triangle doctrine 
Orthodoxy and Autocracy stood for the power of religion and a strong, autocratic, absolute 
monarch that were the unconditional bases of the existence and strength of Russia on the mainland 
and in the newly-gained territories. Nationality postulated the necessity to follow national Slavic 
traditions and to fight any foreign influence, in particular the Western.61 
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In Russia, the feminists of the early 1800s argued that love and purity, the values of home, 
should become the guiding principles of every Slavic woman. However, since the mid-1860s the 
discourse on female roles in Russian society changed due to the advance of the era of liberalization 
that resulted in the abolition of serfdom in 1861, and the emergence of independent print media 
and some civil liberties. In Russia, many prominent people and particularly notable writers began 
to argue for increasing the power and independence of women in their society and supported the 
growing concern for gender equality outside the traditional family. Among them were: A. I. 
Herzen, Who is to Blame (1847); N. G. Chernyshevsky What is to be Done (1863);  I. Turgenev, 
A Nest of Gentlefolk (1859), On the Eve (1860);  L. Tolstoy Family Happiness (1859), Anna 
Karenina (1877), Resurrection (1899). These writers not only described the parochial character of 
the traditional family life that suffocated women, but also embodied the new feminist ideas of 
future utopian societies with equality among the sexes.  
Azerbaijani writers such as Eyneli Sultanov (Turk Qizi, Turkic Girl, 1892), Sultan Ganiev 
(Goncha Khanum, Lady Goncha, 1906), Dz. Mamedkulizade (Danabash Kendinin Ekhvalatlari, 
The Events in the Village called Cattle Heads, 1894; Bakhadur va Sona, Bakhadur and Sona, 
1896), Y. Vezirov Chamanzaminli (Soiug Opush, Cold Kiss, 1907; Qizlar Bulagi, Girls’ Creek, 
1908), and many others followed their Russian counterparts and introduced the image of women 
subordinated to patriarchal traditions with a strong desire to end them even by sacrificing their 
lives. Azerbaijani men of letters also crafted an image of a new woman: the gentle wife and the 
scientific mother who could give birth and raise only future state leaders, lawyers, doctors, 
scientists, and lawful citizens, and nothing less.62 
 




 For this purpose, writers gave advice about the methods to look after sons and husbands 
to prevent them from pursuing useless pastimes at the teahouse, and instead to keep them at home 
with family. A good woman had to give them an opportunity to read a newspaper or play chess 
with each other, while she read a book or entertained her family by playing the piano.63 Thus, 
women became responsible for providing a positive environment for personal development and 
for preventing their husbands and sons from engaging in bad behavior. Uneducated and ignorant 
women became unsuitable as spouses and mothers for modern educated men: many young modern 
Muslim men refused to marry ignorant and secluded Muslim young women and instead dreamed 
about wives as life companions, not as unenlightened breeders.64 In this way, the modernists 
promoted a new definition of motherhood. First, children would benefit when both parents were 
educated and worked in unison on the children’s upbringing. Second, these well-trained children 
of both genders would become the future generation to live in the modern state and would continue 
to educate their children according to modern norms. Third, the nation, united by unified modern 
knowledge, would be free from old patriarchal traditions and prejudices. The conception of new 
types of mothers as the foundation of the proposed millat brought new social norms for gendered 
relationships. In the press, the reformers voiced their arguments for granting Muslim women 
greater independence from conventional hierarchies within family and society.  
Incidentally, some intellectuals from the Russian cultural establishment supported Muslim 
women’s liberation from patriarchal traditions. On February 29, 1900, the Imperial administration 
founded a society called Obshestvo Vostokovedeniia, The Society of Oriental Studies, under the 
supervision of the Imperial Ministry of Finance. In 1900, Ol’ga Lebedeva, a female Russian 
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advocate for Muslim women’s enlightenment, described the society’s mission to support the 
Russian Muslim women’s struggle for liberation from a backward existence in her work entitled 
Ob Emansipatsii Musul’manskoi Zhenshchini, About Muslim Women’s Emancipation.65 Lebedeva 
argued that society’s most important goal was the promotion of modern schooling for young 
Muslim women who someday would become mothers and continue to teach their children in 
accordance with modern standards of education. To implement this agenda, the society looked at 
the Soiuz Vostochnykh i Zapadnykh Zhenshchin, The Union of Oriental and Western Women, 
established in Egypt under Princess Nazli’s patronage, as a model. Similarly, the Russian union 
aimed to promote friendship between the two cultures though the Western-style enlightenment of 
young Muslim women.66  
Lebedeva stated that the female population of the Islamic world were slaves to the ignorant 
and fanatical Muslims who violated the Koranic accords on woman’s societal equality.67 Lebedeva 
blamed Muslim clergymen for ruining the Koranic covenants that granted women rights in 
education and marriage. She supported her claim with the examples from the history of the Abbasid 
and Cordoba Caliphates, when women led an active public life. However, the war with European 
crusaders and the invasion of Mongol-Tatars destroyed the old city culture and brought a decline 
in the level of common literacy and thus, knowledge became consolidated in the hands of the 
Islamic priests. Muslim women gradually lost all privileges and rights. However, since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century the advance of French culture into Algeria and Tunisia brought 
enlightenment to Muslim women there. Becoming enlightened in a European manner, they 
changed the way of living in their communities and convinced men to support them in this 
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endeavor.68 Lebedeva pointed to the similar awakening of Muslim women of the Ottoman empire, 
particularly in Syria and Egypt where English and French missionaries taught Muslim women 
modern knowledge, benevolence, and the norms of public life. Also, Muslim women of Istanbul, 
Aleppo, and Kairo established print media where they voiced their concerns and argued for the 
equality with men. Hence, like their French and English counterparts, Russians brought 
enlightenment to the Muslim East. 
Lebedeva highlighted that some Muslim men stood for the reformation of gender roles in 
the Islamic world. She cited Qasim Amin as the most prominent advocate for female liberation 
through European-type education and upbringing, through freedom of choice in marriage, and 
through the abolition of polygyny. She concluded that the cooperation advanced by the Obshestvo 
Vostokovedeniia would emancipate Muslim people from the corrupt clergy, revive true Koranic 
prescriptions on female roles, and liberate Muslim women from ignorance.69 Admittedly, the 
Obshestvo Vostokovedeniia proposing to work with Muslim societal reformers for their mutual 
benefit propagandized the colonialism that aimed to civilize the dark corners of the empire by 
revitalizing the true Islamic canons. 
The discourse on granting Muslim women rights to voice their thoughts came to fruition 
in the early 1900s when Azeri women could become writers and journal owners in the booming 
print media world of the Russian Muslim society. They followed their Tatar female counterparts 
from the Crimea and Volga regions who issued Alem-i Nisvan (1906–1910) and Soyum Bike 
(1912–1916), journals designed for Muslim women and by Muslim elite women. In these women’s 
journals, women had opportunities to express their needs to fit better in the modernizing society. 
An independent female mass media became an important part of the dialogue on the societal 
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modernization. In 1911–1912, upper-class Azerbaijani women, the editor Khadidzha Alibekova, 
and the wives of prominent enlighteners, such as Khanifa Melikova Zardabi, Sakina Akhundova, 
Amina Efendiieva, Saltanat Amirdzhanova, Rakhila Efendiieva, Shargia Akhundova, and Rakhila 
Hadzhibababekova published the first journal entitled Ishig.  
The journal aimed to explain their rights to urban, literate Muslim women in the 
Azerbaijani and Russian languages.70 In its first issue it appealed to “Muslim Mothers” to become 
the enlightened mothers of the future generation as the main purpose of the female life.71 Yet, 
despite the rhetoric on educated women as the foundation of the nation, the child that they had to 
raise was always a male child. The woman had to nurture the sons of the nation, millat, and this 
was clearly depicted: the cover page of every issue had a picture of a mother in an open-faced 
chadra showing her little son a sun-lit road to the bright horizon. 
 
Figure 7. The cover page of the journal Ishig, 1911-1913. Baku. Photo by author. 
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From 1912 on, educated Muslim women wrote article after article about their rights in 
marriage, divorce, and alimony within Islamic law.72 The editors expressed their ideas on 
motherhood and women’s right to modern education while striving for further equality with men 
in their rights. They also criticized those Muslim men who, instead of enlightening their Muslim 
wives, chose to live with Russian mistresses and spend all the family money on their clothing and 
fancy apartments; in this way men, destroyed not only the family financial security but also the 
morality of their sons by setting such examples.73 Furthermore, the Ishig editorial also discussed 
the process of unveiling and the steps to protect those women who propagandized it. The journal 
editorial chose a more careful position than the male reformers who advocated for the rapid veil 
abolition. Women writing in the journal editorial column argued that Muslim society was not yet 
ready for such novelty and there were no laws that ascribed punishment for harassment of unveiled 
women. So, female correspondents noticed that for safety reasons it was better to go unveiled in 
Baku or in the Russian urban centres, but maintain veiling in the smaller regions.74 In line with 
advances in women’s education and rights, the journal also shaped new consumerist tastes by 
advertising European goods (soap, gramophones, clothing), photo ateliers, and theatres. It also 
promoted the new type of marriage based on the couple’s common interests and affection instead 
of their guardians’ preferences.75 
The rhetoric advocating the new woman gave Muslim women social space and nurtured 
them as publicly visible and vocal members of local societies. They began to establish associations 
and charitable societies, such as the Muslim Women’s Benevolent Society, which consisted of forty-
five educated Azeri women of noble backgrounds, with headquarters in Tiflis. The society, 
 
72 The editorial column, Ishig 5; 7; 9, 1912. 
73 The editorial column, Ishig, 3; 20, 1911.  
74 The Editorial column, Ishig, 10, 1911. 




established in 1906, promoted financial assistance and literacy courses for women in need. In 1914, 
Azerbaijani women established the Baku Muslim Women’s Benevolent Society, which had a similar 
agenda but focused its benevolence on the female population of Baku and its outskirts. Headed by 
Liza Mukhtarova, the wife of oil-tycoon Murtuza Mukhtarov, the association consisted of the 
wives of other local wealthy men.76 In 1915 Sona Tagieva, Gul’bakhar Akhreieva, Begum 
Safaraliieva, and Seiiara Akhmedova established the society to help young Muslim women gain 
free education at the Tagiev school.77  
 
 





76 “Nashi Musul’manskie zhenchiny blagotvoritel’nitsy,” Kaspii 8–9, 1915.  
77 “Ustav obchshestva vspomochshestvovaniia nedostatochnym uchenitsam Bakinskogo russko-musul’manskogo 





Figure 9. Azeri female members of Caucasus Muslim Women Benevolent Society. Baku -Tiflis, 1910. AAKFD photo. 
 
 
It is important to admit that Azeri women expressed their opinions on female public 
education not only in women’s independent print media, but also in the newly-emerged children’s 
journals. As examined earlier, the Azerbaijani press developed at the end of the nineteenth century, 
focusing first on the issue of Muslim backwardness preserved by outdated Islamic traditions and 
education. Newly established children’s print media, Dabistan (1906–1908), Rakhbar (1906–
1907), Maktab (1911–1920), Tuti (1914–1917), followed modernist discourse, educating Muslim 
youth as the main actors in a modern society. These children’s journals dedicated their pages to 
the issues in boys’ education that prevented Muslim society from entering the Western developed 
world. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, these children’s journals began to cover the 
issue of female illiteracy as one of the main obstacles to societal progress. These journals 
introducing the image of ‘girl,’ gız, to the strictly gendered Muslim society brought a new 
definition to the stage between childhood and womanhood, describing girls’ position and needs.78  
 
78 Sidgi, Present for Girls, 1901; Suleiman Sani Akhundov, Tutuqushu, 1909; Qorkhulu nagıllar: Ahmad va Maleika, 




In the first decade of the twentieth century, authors shifted from emphasizing boys to 
emphasizing girls in the children’s journals. Girls began to appear next to boys as the main 
characters, and more importantly, there was an emergence of didactic literature on girls’ 
schooling.79 However, the image of a girl never appeared on any journal cover. Childhood had 
been perceived as synonymous with boyhood in pre-revolution Muslim Azerbaijani society. 
Nevertheless, children’s journals advanced two important themes for discussion: the first was the 
girl-child deprived of modern education. The second was a critique of the traditional household 
education that Muslim girls received; it also stressed the necessity of public schooling. An 
important aspect within those debates was a recognition of the need for female teaching personnel 
in Muslim public schools and modern female doctors in hospitals. Also, the editors pointed to the 
need for educated Muslim female administrative workers, summoning young women to learn how 
to become telephone operators and typists.80 The outcome of the discussion on the period between 
female childhood and womanhood was that the adult and children’s journals spread ideas on 
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Bringing Young Muslim Women to Education 
 
A young woman must use freedom, granted to her by her 
community and education, without bringing shame to her 
family and society.  
A. Agayev, on the establishment of the first school for 
Muslim girls in Baku. Kaspii. October 5, 1901.81  
 
We must keep faith in one hand and progress in 
another. 
H. Z. Tagiev. Kaspii, October 22, 1905.82  
 
 
To understand the nature of gendered change in education, it is important to understand the 
realities of Muslim women’s lives in the upper-class households of Baku and other major cities by 
the twentieth century. We need to focus on the life of upper-class women because the daily life of 
peasant and working women is less known. Furthermore, due to Islamic norms of conduct 
discussed elsewhere, even the position of women from the noble families in Muslim society 
provides insufficient information. What is known is that before the establishment of girls’ public 
schools, elite families provided unsystematized homeschooling for their female offspring. The 
girls’ education was structured around age hierarchies: older women, mostly with religious 
training, educated younger women and girls.83 The subjects introduced to female students included 
basic grammar in Azeri Turkish, the study of the Koran, basic arithmetic, and an introduction to 
the literary works of the Persian and Turkic poets. The important parts of education were 
housekeeping and handcrafting: making carpets and embroidery were considered principal life 
skills regardless of women’s societal status. These self-made pieces of art were the valuable part 
 
81 A. Agayev, “V Baku gospodin H. Z. Tagiev postroil pervuiu v Muslul’manskom mire svetskuiu shkolu dlia 
devochek Musul’manok,” Kaspii, October 5, 1901. 
82 H. Z. Tagiev, Kaspii, 22 October 1905. 




of a young woman’s dowry.84 Considering the pro-Russian influence on Azerbaijani culture, some 
upper-class families employed European governesses and tutors to educate their daughters.85  Even 
so, this was a continuation of the home-schooling method. As a result, for instance, in Elizavetpol’ 
province alone only 1.70 percent of Muslim women were literate while men’s literacy rate was 
7.35 percent. City dwellers had the highest percentage: 28.33 percent for men and 10.06 percent 
for women. In the regions, the numbers were 4.97 percent for men and 0.75 for women who had 
knowledge of reading and writing. This educated strata of Azeri society were mostly clergy and 
nobility.86 
The first attempt to bring young Muslim women to public schooling was the Russian 
administration’s Ministry of Public Enlightenment. In 1874, the government opened the 
Bakinskaiia Mariinskaiia Zhenskaiia Gimnaziia, Baku Women’s School named after the Empress 
Maria Feodorovna, designed for all girls from aristocratic families. However, Muslim families did 
not welcome this innovative educational centre, and in 1900 alone the number of Muslim girls in 
this school, mostly Tatars, was 6 out of 283.87 In 1885, state authorities established another 
educational institution for girls, called Uchilische Sviatoi Nini, Saint Nina’s School, in 
Elisavetpol’. The school provided training in the Russian language for government officials’ 
daughters. In 1897 alone, there were 320 students, including 153 of Russian origin, 109 
Armenians, 19 Jews, 17 Germans, 11 Georgians, 5 Poles, 9 Greeks, and only 3 Azeri Muslims.88 
In 1900, in Baku, there were three private schools run by V. Zotikova, Z. Tutova, and N. 
 
84 Azerbaycan Etnoqrafiyası, 1: 450–453. 
85 F. Heyat, Azeri Women in Transition: Women in Soviet and post-Soviet Azerbaijan (London: Routledge, 2002), 
67. 
86 N. A. Troinitskii, Naseleniie imperii po perepisi 28-go ianvaria 1897 goda po uezdam, Elizavetpol’skaia Guberniia, 
8. 
87 “Bakinskaiia Mariinskaiia zhenskaiia gimnaziia,” ARDTA f. 317, o. 2, d. 3, ll. 13–18. 




Khomentovskaiia for girls of different social and religious backgrounds. However, they were not 
popular among local Muslims either.89  
The low number of Azeri Muslim female students in all government and private learning 
centres was a result of their families’ reluctance to send their daughters to the mixed Russian-Tatar 
schools because of fear of Russification and loss of namus, female traditional norms of morality. 
However, modern, educated Muslim parents demanded progressive-type schooling for their 
daughters, both realizing the importance of women’s education to the construction of a new millat 
and for a pragmatic reason: to marry their daughters to educated and prosperous young men. At 
the end of the 1890s, Hasan bek Zardabi, the pedagogue and the editor of the first Azeri newspaper, 
introduced the project of modern Muslim female public schooling. However, its realization 
belongs to Haji Zeinalabdin Tagiev, the oil-magnate and enlightened philanthropist, who 
established the first Russian-Muslim school solely for Muslim girls in Baku in 1901. H. Z. Tagiev 
(1823–1924), who came from a poor family, began his career as a casual laborer. Despite being an 
illiterate person, he made a significant contribution to the development of secular education for 
Azerbaijanis.90 He was also a patron of many charitable societies. He donated a significant part of 
his capital from the H. Z. Tagiev Company, which was the fourth highest in the oil industry after  
the Nobel brothers, the Rothschilds, and the Caucasus Association, for charity.91  
 
89 “Chastnyie Bakinskiie gimnazii,” ARDTA f. 526, o. 1. d. 1, ll. 1-3. F. 525, o. 1. d. 3, ll. 2–6. 
90 H. Z. Tagiev (1823–1924) was an Azerbaijani oil industrialist, businessman, and philanthropist of very poor origin 
known for his wide support of the numerous enlightenment projects. He had a nickname, “Eleven sticks,” for using 
ten vertical and one horizontal strips as his signature. Tagiev hired special people as readers to deliver him the latest 
news from the newspapers and familiarize him with world literature.    






Figure 10.  Haji Zeinalabdin Tagiev (1821 – 1924). AAKFD photo. 
 
 
Tagiev’s project to educate young Muslim women at modern public schools was part of 
the modernizing discourse of the progressive intellectual and industrial elite. However, it met 
strong opposition from the Shia religious authorities who violently opposed even its discussion; 
they pointed to Islamic doctrines that allegedly forbid the education of female students outside of 
the family. To overcome this religious opposition, Tagiev sent several emissaries, akhunds, to the 
Islamic spiritual centres—Mecca, Medina, Istanbul, Mashhad, and Karbala— to obtain written 
permission that granting girls education did not contradict Islamic doctrines. The opposition was 
also fueled by the fact that the land plot chosen for the first school’s construction had previously 
been considered as a place to build the largest mosque in Baku.92   
The criticism did not disappear even after construction of the school: many conservative 
men attacked schoolgirls in the streets, and the students’ families faced hostility from the Muslim 
community as well. Between 1901 - 1903, the religious authorities continued to criticize the school 
 




during sermons at mosques, thereby stimulating social turmoil. The city’s authorities declared that 
they would not interfere in religious matters.93 Dzheiran Bairamova, a graduate of the Tagiev 
school, a future Communist and a prominent activist for Soviet gender reformation, recalled that 
even in 1910s, several years later after the school introduction, the members of her Baku 
neighborhood community, mahala, and relatives ostracized her father for sending his daughter to 
school. Thus, he stopped sending her there for some time and burned her books.94 Thus, despite 
the decades-long discussion on the benefits of female education for the nation, harassment of 
young women attending modern school and social conflicts around the school were a significant 
part of Baku cultural life that continued until 1920 and beyond.    
The modernist project to open the new-method public school for Muslim girls did not gain 
recognition from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment either. The tsarist administration did not 
allow the establishment of the school, pointing to the existing modern public schools for all young 
women in the Transcaucasian region. Thus, establishing a training centre for Muslim girls only 
took a decade of Tagiev’s petitions directly to Tsar Alexander III and busy correspondence with 
bureaucrats from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment.95 The petitions from H. Z. Tagiev to the 
Imperial officials illustrate, only after the death of Alexander III in 1894 and the succession to the 
throne of Nicolas II, could Tagiev achieve his goal. In 1896, for the royal family’s coronation, 
Tagiev proposed considering the establishment of the school as a gift, also promising to name it 
after the tsarina Alexandra Fiodorovna.96  Permission to open a school came in 1898 assigning to 
found and run the school solely with Tagiev’s money. Tagiev invested 150,000 rubles into this 
 
93 Heyat, Azeri Women in Transition, 67. 
94 Dzheiran Bairamova, Vospominaniia Lichnyi fond Dzheiran Bairamovoi (Rukopis’, March 3, 1972) ARDA f. 
2734, o. 2, d. 7, ll. 2–3. 
95 On Tagiev’s active correspondence see: ARDTA f. 309, o. 1, d. 780. 
96 “Materialy o deiatel’nosti Bakinskogo zhenskogo russko-musul’manskogo Aleksandrinskogo uchilishcha (otchet i 
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project, allocating 25,000 rubles from that amount to the building’s construction.97 The school 
opened its doors in 1901 and had 58 students, 35 of whom came from the poor families and 
received a four-year education free of charge along with the opportunity to live at the school.98 
The school, which had the official name Bakinskoie Zhenskoiie Russko-Musul’manskoie 
Aleksandrinskoiie Uchilische, Baku Female Russian-Muslim School named after Alexandra 
Fiodorovna, however, very quickly became known as the Tagiev school.  
The new educational centre became distinct from the state public and private schools 
because of its student composition: only Muslim girls had the right to study there. Also, the school 
proposed to implement the Azerbaijani reformers’ agenda to educate female students, who would 
someday become civic servants for the nation, on the meaning and practice of Western but not 
Islamic civilization. Nevertheless, some similarities between the state Russian-Tatar schools and 
the Tagiev school remained: they were both oriented towards raising good housewives and 
promoting traditional roles for the young Muslim women.99 Also, this first school for Muslim girls 
kept certain patterns that prevailed in the household education of girls, which is reflected in the 
lists of courses in the Educational Program: students had handicraft classes two lessons a week.100 
The school did not go against traditional culture either, by emphasizing the value of the female 
skills needed by future wives and mothers. Instruction in the Koran for three lessons a week, 
 
97Rouble was the currency of the Russian Empire. In the Russian black-soil region between 1889–1913 a cow cost 34 
roubles and a horse cost 45 roubles. Rossiia 1913 god. Statistiko-dokumental’nyi spravochnik, 94; “Zaiavleniie 
Bakinskoi pervoi gil’dii kuptsa G. Z. Tagieva v Bakinskuiu gorodskuiu upravu,” (April 29, 1896) ARDTA f. 309, o. 
1, d. 780, ll. 30–32. 
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provided by reformist male priests, also suggests that there was no plan to break ties with Islamic 
norms of conduct and local family Muslim traditions. In fact, the religious study gradually 




Figure 11. Bakinskoie Zhenskoiie Russko-Musul’manskoie Aleksandrinskoiie Uchilische, Baku Female Russian-
Muslim School named after Alexandra Fiodorovna, known as the Tagiev School, 1920. AAKFD photo. 
 
 
101 “Materialy o deiatel’nosti Bakinskogo zhenskogo russko-musul’manskogo Aleksandrinskogo uchilishcha 
(protokoly, zasedaniia pedagogicheskogo cobraniia, perepiska i drugoie),” (September 13, 1914) ARDTA f. 309, o. 






















 Nevertheless, this project of girls’ schooling was clearly part of a secular program, not a 
religious one. The modern-type curriculum included mathematics, science, and geography.102 The 
languages of education were Russian and Azerbaijani. French language was taught as a separate 
subject. The stress on mathematics, science, and languages, which students learned every day in 
all years, once more emphasizes the modern aspect of education.103 Students of all levels also had 
music and dance classes. The school had its own theatre and cinema which the teachers used to 
familiarize the female students with the latest scientific, educational, and cultural achievements.104 
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The school was also innovative for its introduction of male teachers and a male doctor.105 
The school had a Western-type dress code: European-style mid-length dresses in dark blue or black 
with a white apron, European-styled shoes, and girls covered their heads with scarves only during 
religious lessons. Also, the school required students to keep hygiene norms: to brush their teeth 
and to take a shower with cold water. The school’s doctor and nurses provided physical 
examinations of the female pupils once a month.106 The students also had outdoor recesses and 
were required to play active games with a rope and a ball. The teenaged girls performed this 
activity in the school’s unfenced side yard and attracted the attention of the public. Usually, a male 
crowd came to look at the female students and to express their negative judgment about the 
violation of the traditional norms on women’s upbringing.107  
Despite this negative opinion from the conservative Muslims, the Tagiev school soon 
gained popularity among the progressive members of the Islamic community, and not only from 
residents of Baku but also from people in other Russian urban centres such as Tiflis, Vladikavkaz, 
and Tashkent who wished to send their daughters there. School authorities denied their requests 
because of limited space.108 Consequently, in 1913 and 1915, this demand encouraged Tagiev to 
open two more schools in Baku for 400 Muslim girls in total; those girls came from local Azeri 
 
105 The school’s doctor was Nariman Narimanov (1870–1925), a writer, intellectual, and political leader. In the late 
1890s, he, like many other young men, received full financial assistance from H. Z. Tagiev to study medicine at the 
Russian university and later worked as a doctor at his school. Later a prominent Communist, he became the head of 
the government of Soviet Azerbaijan, the chairman of the Union Council of the Transcaucasian SFSR. He also chaired 
the Party Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Being a high-ranked Soviet official, he helped Tagiev and his 
family to escape arrest and to keep a house outside Baku after the total expropriation of all Tagiev’s businesses, 
properties, and capital by the Bolsheviks. 
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zhenskogo russko-musul’manskogo Aleksandrinskogo uchilishcha,” (April 10, 1913–January 5, 1919) ARDTA f. 




families as well as from the North Caucasus, Central Asia, and Volga Tatar regions.109 By 1918, 
1,737 Muslim girls gained education at those schools.110 The schools operated until March 1918, 
the period of the Armenian atrocities committed against Azerbaijanis all over Azerbaijan. These 
events destabilized civil life and affected the well-being of all students and boarding schoolgirls 
particularly, thus, the schools stopped functioning. Tagiev himself insisted on closing the schools 
and keeping young women at home, pointing to the unsafe environment and the schools’ inability 
to provide meals to students due to the abrupt end of food supplies to Baku.111  
It is important to note that several years before the schools’ liquidation, these educational 
centres faced the problem of a lack of Muslim female teachers to instruct the girls. The first 
teachers were women of Tatar origin or the wives of intellectual leaders, like Khanifa Melikova 
Zardabi, and male instructors of Muslim faith and high societal reputation.112 However, the strong 
need to have native teaching staff paved the road for the emergence of the first pedagogical 
learning centre, a teachers’ college. The correspondence between Tagiev and the bureaucrats from 
the Ministry of Public Enlightenment revealed that this task also met strong opposition from the 
Russian government authorities. The official resistance to Tagiev’s project to establish the 
pedagogical college forced Tagiev to attract some high-ranked personalities, like duchess E. A. 
Vorontsova-Dashkova, to lobby for his project and to obtain permission for the foundation of the 
 
109 For documents on the establishment of two more schools see: ARDTA, f. 309, o. 1, d. 816. ARDTA f. 309, o. 1, 
d. 860, ARDTA f. 309, o. 1, d. 1275. 
110 “Svedeniia o kolichestve shkol i uchashchikhsia za 1919/20 uchebnyi god,” ARDA [Azerbaijan Republic State 
Archive] f. 57, o. 1, d. 1125, l. 42.   
111 “Protokoly zasedaniia pedagogicheskogo soveta. Perepiska, ustav, spisok uchitelei o deiatel’nosti Bakinskogo 
zhenskogo russko-musul’manskogo Aleksandrinskogo uchilishcha,” (April 10, 1913–January 5, 1919) ARDTA f. 
309, o. 1, d. 947, ll. 63–64. “Izveshcheniie Popechitel’skogo soveta uchilischcha”, “Materialy o deiatel’nosti 
Bakinskogo zhenskogo russko-musul’manskogo Aleksandrinskogo uchilishcha (protokoly, zasedaniia 
pedagogicheskogo cobraniia, perepiska i drugoie)” (September 1915–March 1918) ARDTA f. 309, o. 1, d. 947, l. 92. 
112 “Materialy o deiatel’nosti Bakinskogo zhenskogo russko-musul’manskogo Aleksandrinskogo uchilishcha 
(protokoly, zasedaniia pedagogicheskogo cobraniia, perepiska i drugoie),” (January 19, 1902) ARDTA f. 309, o. 1, d. 




new institution. In one of the letters to the duchess, from February 1913, Tagiev presented himself 
as a loyal servant of the Russian state and used humble language in the description of his Muslim 
people. He also stressed the need for such an institution and appealed to the Romanov’s 300-year 
anniversary of their accession to the Russian throne: 
 
Your excellence, 
With this letter I would like to confirm one more time my eagerness to serve the Tsar and 
the Fatherland. All my life, I have done my best to bring Russian and Muslim people closer 
to each other; this will be possible to achieve once the Muslim woman becomes literate. 
To realize this, I ask you to support and promote my project on the establishment of two-
year pedagogical courses within the successfully operated Bakinskoie Aleksandrinskoiie 
Zhenskoiie Russko-Musul’manskoie Uchilische, the Baku Female Russian-Muslim School 
named after Alexandra Fiodorovna. The new school’s mission is to prepare female teachers 
who will bring light, which is much needed, to Muslim girls – future wives and mothers. 
Moreover, the educated Muslim women will become better sisters to enlightened Russian 
women.  
I believe that this project will pave a road to a closer interconnection of my people with the 
Russian nation, so beloved by my heart. With the foundation of this new pedagogical 
school, I solemnly mark the 300-year anniversary of the Romanov royalty, the glory of all 
loyal Russian and Muslim citizens.113   
 
In 1913, Tagiev obtained permission to establish the pedagogical college under his full 
financial support of 100,000 rubles.114 He also covered teaching costs and material supplies for 
scientific laboratories – 7,500 rubles per year.115 The new pedagogical centre trained the students 
in Sharia, history, geography, handcrafting, and housekeeping for two hours a week. Subjects like 
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science, mathematics, and languages required from seven to ten hours of training per week.116 This 
curriculum shows a modern approach to knowledge designed to prepare the future teachers for 
young female Muslim students in the modern educational system. 
 
 
Figure 15. Azeri female teachers, the graduates of the Pedagogical College, at the Neshr-i Maarif office.  Baku, 1917. 
AAKFD photo. 
 
The first students at this college graduated in 1915 and worked as teachers in girls’ schools 
throughout Baku and its surrounding areas.117 The total number of graduates was approximately 
twelve each year and they became the major employees of the Neshr-i Maarif, the Society for 
Illiteracy Elimination, founded in 1908, which functioned with Tagiev’s sole financial support. 
The importance of this pedagogical college is that it changed the traditional education system of 
the Muslim community significantly and gave rise to young Muslim female teachers who worked 
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along with Muslim men and non-Muslim female teachers. Hence, it contributed to the destruction 
of the traditional gender and age-based hierarchies. 
Customarily, in Azerbaijan, girls entering puberty were regarded as women; they had to be 
properly covered by headscarves–hijab, or full a body veil–chadra, and were considered suitable 
for marriage. In the Elizavetpol’ province alone the statistical data on the number of Muslim 
married girls aged 15–16 indicates that 62.64 percent of them were married, while for married men 
of the same age it was only 3.70 percent. The proportion of young married Muslim women from 
age 17 to 19 was 86.79 percent, while the number of married men of same age was 15.52 percent.118  
However, the graduates of the pedagogical college were the first female generation who, as the 
result of the new forms of education, delayed their marriages and having children As the petitions 
written by the female teachers to the  Nesh-i Maarif show, those Azeri women, regardless of their 
family background, became financially and socially independent.  
Furthermore, the societal positions of young educated women varied significantly from 
that of older women. This contrast between the status of two groups of women is clearly evident 
in the petitions that modern female teachers wrote to Nesh-i Maarif, asking for salary increases, 
for relocation to better workplaces, for improvements to working conditions, and for extended 
vacations.119 The letters to various local government agencies from elderly women and those not 
trained at the modern educational centres describe them as old women in need, left without any 
support, and too old to find any work.  Moreover, many of those women recorded their petitions 
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with the help of hired petition-writers at the market squares to fill the forms properly.120 Unlike 
those illiterate or traditionally educated women  the graduates of the school and college were 
always able to write about their needs and demands in the Russian and Azerbaijani languages using 
both the Cyrillic and Arabic scripts.121 Thus, the changes in women’s public education broke down 
generational hierarchies and female roles in traditional education and culture and led to the loss of 
elderly women’s status in Muslim society, leaving many of them outside of public life. 
  The new school system also changed the traditional social order of the urban centre. The 
social composition of the school and the college was diverse: the half of the female students came 
from lower social strata and were the first generation who received education because of Tagiev’s 
policies to cover tuition fees and living expenses for students from underprivileged families. 
Previously, as discussed, traditional education was available only for upper-class girls who were 
not required to be the helpers in their households or to become breadwinners from an early age. 
Also, the first government public schools were available only to girls from rich families.  Unlike 
these, the Tagiev school and the pedagogical training centre for Muslim young women provided 
education for girls of different social statuses and incomes. The Ishig journal, for example 
advertised not only the school but also offered a sample of how to write a letter to enroll parentless 
girls or those from poor families in the school.122  These girls were all boarding students, and thus, 
they sampled the fruits of modernist philosophy without any intervention from traditional family 
values. Hence, by providing schooling to these underprivileged young women, who had no 
traditional family support, both teaching institutions spread new ideologies and worldviews on 
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female roles in society and pioneered a modern educated female elite. These new cultural 
characteristics, however, were not coincidental. They reflect the new urban culture that, unlike the 
patriarchal countryside, needed female professionals in the educational, spiritual, and health 
spheres.  
Meanwhile, modern, educated Muslim women had adapted to the new modernizing 
discourse on female public roles and began to invest in public education even outside Baku. The 
traditional female activity for upper-class Muslim women was often to establish or repair the 
religious centres. There are some examples of this traditional practice: in the thirteenth century 
Barakat khanum donated a large amount of money for the construction of the Mardakian fortress 
and mosque; Tuba Shakhi khanum established a mosque in 1482; and Gevkher-aga khanum and 
Sakina khanum, the latter a widow of A. G. Bakikhanov, founded two mosques in the 1850s in 
Shusha and in Guba respectively. An outstanding position belonged to Nabat khanum 
Ashurbekova who established the reformed mosque in Baku in 1905; this centre, unlike traditional 
mosques, had two divisions for ritual services that allowed men and women to worship 
simultaneously.123 It is the last known case when an Azerbaijani Muslim woman founded or 
renovated a religious centre. Since the early 1900s, the elite Azeri women preferred to be part of 
the process for secular enlightenment by establishing educational centres at their estates or 
sponsoring existing ones for children of diverse social statuses.  
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Figure 16. Hamida Javanshir. AAKFD photo. 
 
In 1908, Hamida Javanshir (1873–1955) established a coeducational school on her family’s 
Kizlyar estate in Karabakh, a region situated far from modern and industrial Baku. There were 
thirty boys and ten girls at the school who studied a single curriculum, irrespective of gender. This 
was a progressive approach at that time, when girls’ education usually had a less scientific and 
more applied household curriculum. However, the school operated only for one year even though 
Hamida khanum provided clothing and writing supplies for them. The villagers did not send their 
daughters to the school preferring to keep them as the helpers in their households. Also, the school 
operated only when Hamida khanum was physically present at the estate; when she was absent the 
male and female students missed classes because of being busy at the families’ farms.124  
Although the school’s enlightening activity did not meet violent opposition, Hamida 
Khanum’s other two projects on Muslim people’s enlightenment outside the capital met with 
strong criticism. This negative attitude clearly showed the place of modern women in the 
patriarchal community. In 1907 Javanshir, a widow with two children, decided to marry to Dzhalil 
Mamedkulizade, the famous writer, enlightener, and editor of the satirical journal Molla 
 




Nasreddin. However, both her relatives and her gentry neighbors from the Karabakh region 
expressed their opposition, declaring that a woman from a rich and prominent bek family could 
not marry a poor divorcé also known as atheist, giaour. They organized a military gang to open 
fire when her bride-groom’s cortege approached the borders of their district and prevented him 
from entering the district, thus postponing their wedding ceremony.125 Hamida khanum was not 
free in her charitable activity either. In 1906, as the organizer of the society for poor relief in the 
Karabakh region after the famine of 1904–1905, she was not allowed to attend the conference that 
discussed measures to overcome the famine’s consequences. In February 1907, the local beks and 
clergy, even though they eagerly accepted her vast financial donations,  banned her from the 
conference, pointing out that women should stay at home, leaving all important matters for men to 
decide because, after all, they were the only authorities in their communities.126  
 
Figure 17. Nazli Nadzhafova. AAKFD photo. 
 
 In 1912 another enthusiast of female education, Nazli Nadzhafova (1890–1971), a graduate 
of the Tagiev school, established the first new-method school for Muslim girls in Nakhichevan, a 
region situated at the border with Ottoman empire and far from multi-cultural and industrially 
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developed Baku. Nadzhafova’s initiative immediately sparked violent opposition. The local people 
threw stones at teachers and the school building. There were several attempts to abduct the female 
students. In this situation Nazli khanum hired bodyguards. However, this measure did not stop the 
organized harassment and after several cases of arson and an attempted murder Nazli khanum left 
the town and moved to Baku where she began to teach at the modern Tagiev school.127 She returned 
to Nakhichevan only after its Sovietization, in the 1920s, and became a prominent leader of the 
Soviet campaign to emancipate Muslim women until her arrest during the period of the Stalinist 
purges, in 1937.128 
 
 
Figure 18. Maryam Bairamalibekova. AAKFD photo. 
 
Maryam Bairamalibekova (1898–1988), who was the daughter of Azerbaijani reformer and 
journalist Teimur Bairamalibekov, met similar hostile opposition. Being a graduate of the Tagiev 
school and Saint Nina Secondary Boarding School, she was admitted into Moscow State 
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University’s Department of Medicine in 1917.129 However, the Russian Revolution’s events 
destroyed her plans to continue her education and she returned to her hometown, Lenkoran, a 
border municipality with Iran. In 1917, she opened the first all-girls secular school there, named 
Unas, Girls. Education was in the Russian language and the curriculum included drama, choir, and 
music. In 1919, Bairamalibekova founded the Lenkoran Women's Charity Association. However, 
her activity was not widely appreciated; the school closed its doors after a year of existence and 
the society ceased to exist several months after its foundation.130 She welcomed the Soviet-type 
emancipation program and worked as a teacher and a promoter of the Soviet campaign to eliminate 
illiteracy among Muslim women before her arrest in the mid-1930s. After 1950, she continued her 
teaching career.131  
 
 
 Figure 19. Sakina Akhundova. AAKFD photo. 
 
Female writing activity was not approved of in the areas outside modern Baku either. Not 
surprisingly, the example of Sakina Akhundova’s (1865–1927) life shows how it was dangerous 
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for Muslim women to promote female rights outside Baku. Being the daughter of poet Hedat bek 
Akhundov Fedaii, she received a good education at home and began to write plays about the 
ignorant position of Muslim women. Later, she received support from her husband to perform them 
on stage in her hometown, Cuba. However, her activity was met with aggressive disapproval and 
physical attacks against her family for the violation of patriarchal norms of conduct. In 1906, 
during one of those attacks, a religious fanatic named Ali murdered her husband. Sakina khanum 
was able to hide in Baku.132 Soon, she became a teacher at the Tagiev school and organized a 
troupe from among the school girls who performed her plays.133 The most staged play was Elmin 
Manfaati, The Benefits of Science, written earlier, in 1904.134 After the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, 
Sakina khanum returned to her hometown, Cuba, and helped to establish a modern theatre and 
printing house there. In 1923, she became a co-author of the new Turkic alphabet based on Latin 
script.135  
 
Figure 20. Shafiga Efendiieva. AAKFD photo. 
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Another female writer, Shafiga Efendiieva (1882–1959), who in her literary works argued 
that Muslim women’s minor position was a direct result of seclusion and a lack of education, faced 
hostile opposition as well.136 In the period from 1903 to 1917, she wrote for the journals Dabistan, 
Maktab, and Achig Soz about the need to improve Muslim women’s societal roles. Along with this, 
she gave advice on child-rearing and education. She was also a teacher at the Tagiev school and 
was the highest paid female instructor with a salary of 1100 rubles a year, while others received 
around 700.137  
Outside the school, Efendiieva popularized ideas about women’s education and women’s 
rights, and she took part in the first Congress of Muslim Teachers in 1906 and the Congress of 
Muslims in Transcaucasia in 1917. In both cases, she broke the social norms of Islamic society by 
attending meetings without a veil and giving a speech to the male audience. Such acts provoked 
negative reactions towards her and other female activists. After 1920, she cooperated with the 
Soviet regime and acted as an activist for women’s emancipation. Efendiieva became an active 
leader in quest for Muslim women’s enlightenment. She worked at the “Ali Bairamov” Club 
supervising projects for illiteracy elimination. She continued her writing activity, contributing to 
the journal Sharg Gadini and being the head of the fiction department and the journal’s executive 
administrator. The Soviet government praised her highly and called her the first Muslim woman 
journalist and philologist. Until 1932, the Soviet authorities assigned her to represent all Azeri 
Muslim women at the various conferences and congresses in Baku, Moscow, and other Soviet 
cities. From the mid-1930s, she led a quiet life in Baku, working at the public school until her 
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death on July 29, 1959. Unlike many other Azeri activists with pre-revolution achievements, she 
was not purged and did not perish during the years of Great Terror in the 1930s.138  
These examples of female activity outside the modern urban environment, including Baku 
and other cities, illustrate that the new trends in women’s education that made them agents of 
modernity did not bring them universal recognition from traditional Islamic society. In 1911, 
Nariman Narimanov, a doctor at the Tagiev school, a writer, and a leading Communist, explained 
the reluctance of rural Muslim communities to accept the changes in women’s societal position as 
the direct result of the elitist nature of gender reform performed by the Baku-established reformers, 
mostly through the Russian-language print media: 
In the last several years we have witnessed the emergence of men of letters who, in their 
preaching, try to educate our nation. These intellectuals go from one radical position: to 
abandon religion and traditions, to another one: to fight giaour influence. In this essay I 
want to highlight the position of those who aim to modernize our society. These 
proselytizers tell us that our nation is not civilized. They proclaim that our women are not 
good enough to raise decent children. However, after reading all these articles I want to 
ask a question: to whom do they address their thoughts? To the illiterate peasant? To the 
old-fashioned priest, who considers all modern ideas as punishment sent by the devil for 
our sins? To the centuries-long deprived Muslim woman? If they write to 20–30 educated 
male Muslims, then, I want to assure them that this part of the nation understands the 
gloomy realities of our society. However, concentrating their activity in the Baku and Tiflis 
salons, they distanced themselves from the common people by articulating their opinion 
solely in the Russian language.139  
 
 
In another essay published earlier in 1896 in the newspaper Kaspii, Narimanov proposed 
measures to improve women’s position through the total enlightenment of the Azeri population:  
To enlighten our illiterate nation, we need to promote our thoughts in the popular 
Azerbaijani language, we must go to people with short pamphlets and explain to them the 
negative role that traditions and the spiritual influence of some radical priests play in our 
society. We need to enlighten commoners regarding women’s modern education first and 
then open schools and throw the chadra from women. We must instruct them endlessly not 
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from the salons in an alien language but by becoming a part of their communities and 
showing examples of an enlightened life.140 
 
 
Thus, this chapter has demonstrated the modern ideas about female education to bring 
Azerbaijani Muslims to the level of progressive Europe associating modernity with European 
civilization. It also examined the project, realized by the enlightened philanthropist and oil-tycoon 
H. Z. Tagiev, that pioneered a new type of education for Muslim young women. The Tagiev school 
and other training centres shifted traditional female education from homeschooling into modern 
public education and nurtured female teaching mentors for modern-type female schools. These 
modern training institutions prepared young Muslim women to work in pro-Western rather than in 
traditional Islamic environments.  
The innovations contributed to ending generational and gender hierarchies that prevailed 
between women in homeschooling and the whole Muslim society. The school boarding system for 
underprivileged female students broke the societal order by mixing the representatives of all 
classes. Also, it unified them by importing modern common knowledge and work experience. 
Thus, the innovations in female education changed urban Muslim young women's societal roles 
and promoted them as the new agents of societal modernization. The mass media actively 
propagandized the image of a well-schooled Muslim woman as an instrumental political actor 
towards societal transformation to create a new millat. However, modernist rhetoric, controlled by 
the male intellectual elite, articulated only the revolutionized household roles for women, giving 
them autonomy only within the family. Azerbaijani Muslim women did not gain much power to 
control their lives and continued to act in accordance with societal expectations.  
 




Along with that, the discussion about women’s education did not change gender roles in 
the local Islamic community for several reasons. First, print media’s target was mostly the urban 
and Russian-educated strata of Azerbaijani society that supported the image of a “new woman.”  
Second, as discussed, the short life of all women’s and children’s print media left Muslim women 
without an arena to voice their concerns and opinions, concentrating it again in the hands of the 
male intellectual elite. Thus, Muslim women did not gain considerable authority because they had 
an arena to express their voices only for a noticeably short period: the life-span of both the 
women’s journal, Ishig, and the children’s journals rarely exceeded one or two years. Third, to 
voice their thoughts, Muslim women always had to rely on male patronage that granted them the 
desired freedom of expression at the modern educationl centres of Baku. These educational 
institutions became islands of enlightenment, while the rest of Muslim society remained hostile to 
their activity. This regional antagonism towards the new Muslim women’s activity can be 
explained by the fact that the Azerbaijani modernizers expressed their ideas on Muslim women’s 
enlightenment and on the end of seclusion mostly in independent Russian-language print media 
that was never published and rarely distributed outside Baku. Hence, the discussion of the 1890s–
1920s on women’s enlightenment and the abolition of patriarchal traditions was limited only to 
Baku and its surrounding areas. The wider traditional Islamic society did not recognize the 





 The Bolshevik Revolution and the New Bid for Women’s Rights in Azerbaijan 
 
Not a single bourgeois republic, not even the most 
advanced one, has given the feminine half of 
humanity either full legal equality with men or 
freedom from the guardianship and oppression of 
men… Freedom and equality for the oppressed sex! 
 Lenin V. I., Pravda, 249, November 6, 1919.1 
 
On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, October 1917, the question of the necessity of 
educating Muslim girls and women had been the important societal factor to overcome the 
assumed cultural backwardness. Didactic literature and new print media played a critical role in 
shaping the pre-revolutionary discourse about the benefits of women’s education. The introduction 
of modern public education changed the gender and age hierarchies in traditional urban Muslim 
society. After sovietization, although the pre-revolution discourse became excluded from the 
official Muslim women’s emancipation program, the main arguments about educated women as 
the nucleus of the enlightened millat continued to shape Azeri’s new Soviet discourse about 
women. 
This chapter demonstrates the political and cultural transformation from colonial Russian 
Azerbaijan into Soviet Azerbaijan. It examines the Soviet state’s methods in changing Muslim 
women’s position after the brief period of independence of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic 
between 1918 and 1920. It also studies the transformation of many leading pre-revolution female 
activists for Muslim women’s emancipation into loyal Communists, and their central role in 
political and cultural life. The Bolsheviks proclaimed mass education as an important Communist 
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Party agenda for social transformation. Moreover, the Bolsheviks stressed that Muslim women’s 
education was a major factor in conquering common illiteracy and ending patriarchal traditions 
and thus, modernizing Muslim society. This Soviet discourse echoed the late-Imperial Azeri 
reformers’ program. I argue that the Azeri male and female intellectuals and politicians believed 
in adjusting their pre-revolution agenda for societal modernization to Bolshevik state policy and, 
thus, creating a new Azerbaijani millat. 
 
 Azeri Women during the Period of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic  
 
Love for a motherland begins with love to a mother! 
A mother is the first person to show to her sons(!) the 
beauty of their country, but if a woman is a slave in 
her community, she will foster slaves who are 
ignorant to the fate of their country. Those who 
oppose Muslim women’s efforts to obtain and defend 
their rights are traitors to Azerbaijan and its millat.2  
Shafiga Efendiieva, Azerbaijan 211, June 25, 1919. 
 
The Russian Revolution of February 1917 brought not only an end to the Russian empire 
but also promises of religious, cultural, and political freedoms. The new Russian government, the 
Provisional Government, introduced the right to vote and to be elected to women and men equally.3 
In Azerbaijan, the collapse of colonial rule gave full rise to many political organizations that 
emerged earlier during the period of liberalization after the first Russian Revolution of 1905. Those 
parties, Hummet, Adalat, and Musavat, advocated ideas of progress on the platforms of European 
and Russian social democracy. By 1917, Musavat, under the leadership of Mamed Emin 
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Rasulzade, was the largest party in Azerbaijan. Baku, with its large proletariat population 
employed in the oil industry, was an important political centre of the Bolshevik Party. Bolsheviks 
established a branch in the city along with the only publishing house to issue the party’s newspaper 
called Iskra, Spark.4 Consequently, between December 1917 and August 1918, the power in Baku 
belonged to the Bolsheviks who organized Bakinskii Sovet, Baku Commune. Headed by the 
Armenian Communist Stepan Shaumian, the Baku Commune consisted of 35 commissars mostly 
of Armenian and Russian ethnicity. Two of the commissars were the Azeri Communists Meshadi 
Azizbekov and Mir Khasan Vezirov.5  
For the Azeri population of Baku such political power, represented by the distinct political 
and ethnic culture in their own land, produced significant troubles. The situation also worsened 
when hundreds of Russian soldiers and officers returning from the First World War fronts settled 
in Baku, trying to escape from or to form an opposition to the Bolshevik power in Russia. Those 
unemployed, single, and homeless men significantly increased the already large number of city 
dwellers who suffered from food shortage and insecurity.6 These political and economic hardships 
provoked ethnic tensions. In March 1918, the Baku Commune’s military forces used heavy 
artillery to attack the Azeri neighborhoods of Baku because of a perceived plot to overthrow 
Bolshevik power and for hiding Russian White officers. This attack was followed by killings, 
lootings, and burnings of the Muslim part of Baku’s population by the Armenian Dashnak military 
gangs.7 The three days of massacres, now known as the March Days, resulted in thousands of 
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Azeris losing their lives or fleeing the city, leaving it and its surroundings under the absolute 
control of the Baku Commune.8 
Meanwhile, in May 1918, Azeri political and cultural leaders established a government 
under the leadership of the Musavat Party in Ganja, an ancient city of predominantly Azeri 
population. The government proclaimed the establishment of an independent state, Azerbaijan 
Khalg Jumkhuriieti, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic [ADR].9  In September 1918, the ADR 
government moved to Baku, which had been liberated from the Bolsheviks by the united military 
forces of the Ottoman and the British governments. Between 1918 and 1920, ADR leadership 
worked under strong pressure from various external and domestic forces. The British military 
army, under the command of General Thomson, remained in Azerbaijan and tried to gain control 
over the oil industry and a transit route to Iran. In 1918, the newly formed Republic of Armenia 
invaded historical Azeri lands in Karabakh, with support from Bolshevik Russia, killing and 
displacing thousands of Azeris.10 Thus, in July 1918, the ADR government announced the 
introduction of martial law in the territory of the republic.11 Also, the Red Army, fighting with the 
remnants of the White Army in the North Caucasus, threatened the Northern borders of Azerbaijan. 
Moreover,  the Bolsheviks actively intervened in the internal affairs of the ADR by having many 
active Communists in Azerbaijan who even worked as undercover agents at the Parliament.12 
Eventually, in April of 1920, the Red Army entered Azerbaijan, defeated the Musavat government, 
and established Bolshevik rule.   
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Nevertheless, during its brief existence the ADR regime realized many of its ideas about 
societal transformation. The Musavat government introduced the Azeri language as the official 
language.13 In September 1919, it established the first higher education centre in Azerbaijan, Baku 
State University.14 The young republic opened a four-year college in Baku,  to train women as 
civil servants.15 Along with this, the Musavat government established a Zhenskaiia Uchitel’skaia 
Seminaria, Female Pedagogical College, in Baku.16 In January 1920, the government sent one 
hundred male students to study and receive a higher education at European universities.17 The 
government kept control over civic affairs, leaving to Sharia the responsibility to control Muslim 
family and women’s rights. However, the discourse on women’s changing societal roles was not 
the political agenda of the ADR administration. The Musavat government did not issue any 
resolutions to end veiling, polygyny, child marriage, or female seclusion.18 Women’s rights were 
not an important subject for the Bolshevik members of the short-lived Baku Commune, December 
1917–August 1918.19 Thus, since 1917, Azeri women alone continued their pre-revolution struggle 
for their rights and freedoms. 
Between May 1–11, 1917, Muslims of the former empire organized the All-Russia Muslim 
Congress in Moscow to discuss their political and cultural future. Tatar Muslim women were the 
active advocates in the promotion of their rights and freedoms at this congress. Month earlier, on 
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April 23, 1917, the Tatar female activist organized the All-Russia Muslim Women’s Congress in 
Kazan. The female delegates focused on discussion of their rights within Islamic law. They issued 
a proposal entitled Zhenskii Vopros, The Woman Question, and sent it for discussion at the All-
Russia Muslim Congress. The proposal included many important improvements in Muslim 
women’s social and cultural positions. They argued for better protection for women in marriage 
and divorce. The female activists strove to grant women the right to initiate divorce. They also 
tried to abolish child marriage, indicating that physically and psychologically undeveloped girls 
die or give birth to weak and ill babies which is a tragedy for families and for the nation as a whole. 
They demanded a change to the minimum age for marriage to sixteen.20  
The most important problem that the Women Question’s authors addressed was polygyny, 
which they considered a harmful aspect of Muslim social life that should be eliminated.21 Another 
important question that the female delegates addressed was how to implement the right to vote for 
Muslim women. Clearly understanding that exercising the recently granted right to vote was 
problematic in the gender-segregated Islamic society, they called for separate male-free booths, so 
that women and men would not mix. Nevertheless, the Congress did not introduce any regulations 
to implement this practice for gender-segregated spaces.22 The General Congress of Muslims of 
Russia recognized women’s right to equality with men in its final resolution: this document, 
however, did not legalize the ban of polygyny, early marriages, and veiling.23 
Azeri intellectuals and political leaders from Baku, such as Ali Mardan bek Topchibashev 
and Mamed Emin Rasulzade, played active roles at the Congress. They did not propose any 
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projects about Muslim women’s emancipation, instead, they focused on the political matters that 
separated All-Russia Muslims at the Congress. There were two groups that emerged at the All-
Russia Muslim Congress. One group stood for a unitary Russian state, which included all entities 
of the former empire. Another group supported federation, meaning that the Russian Empire would 
be divided into autonomous but federated entities. Rasulzade called for territorial autonomy, 
basing his arguments on the national and cultural peculiarities of Russian Turkic peoples. He 
argued that Turkic peoples could easily administer their own internal affairs.24 Thus, focusing on 
political matters, the Azeri delegation did not make any contribution to the discussion about 
Muslim women’s emancipation. 
There is no archival or periodical evidence that Azeri women participated in this All-Russia 
Muslim Congress. However, the periodical material of this period demonstrates that Azeri women 
were inspired by this movement and defended their rights at other socio-political meetings. On 
March 11, 1917, the Baku Muslim Women’s Benevolent Society organized a public event to 
discuss methods of implementation for the newly acquired civil and political rights of women in 
Muslim society. Sakina Akhundova, a famous dramaturg and a teacher at the Tagiev school, was 
the keynote speaker at this event. In her speech, she highlighted the issue that Muslim women were 
forced to withdraw from any public activity by the radical clergy, who, like many other political 
and social groups, became very active after the February Revolution that brought freedoms of 
expression to the Imperial population.25  
From April 15–20, 1917, Shafiga Efendiieva, Sara Vezirova, and Sara Talishinskaia 
participated in the First Congress of South Caucasia Muslims in Baku. They aroused hostility by 
announcing their agenda to end women’s societal isolation, polygyny, and veiling by appearing 
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without veils. In their speech, they described the ignorant position of Muslim women. Particularly, 
Efendiieva argued for change by suggesting the introduction of more modern schools for all young 
women and a theatre that could serve as a forum to condemn the societal ills. These unveiled 
female delegates also demanded equal rights with men in social and political life to work for the 
benefit of their nation. Their speeches, as noted, being delivered by unveiled Muslim women, 
stimulated strong criticism from Baku Islamic priests headed by the Baku’s qazi, a judge of a 
Sharia court, Aga Muhamad Karim, who denounced them as morally corrupted. The clerics also 
demonstrated opposition to the Congress’s resolution to discuss the female question. However, 
those men who supported gender reforms and their female advocates stood guard over these 
women. They interrupted the radical priests and escorted Efendiieva, Vezirova, and Talishinskaia 
to their houses for safety reasons.26   
Nevertheless, the conservative members of Azeri society, inspired by the radical clergy’s 
proclamations that the Congress legalized abolition of the veil, interrupted the Congress’ activity 
for several days. Moreover, these members of the radical religious opposition organized protest 
marches. The protests resulted in street fighting, broken glass windows in public buildings, and 
physical attacks on Muslim women in the streets. During those April days, fanatics threw stones 
at every unveiled Muslim woman. The movement’s main characteristic was to forcefully remove 
European-style shoes from every Muslim woman as a symbolic act to end the hegemony of 
Western culture.27 As Ayna Sultanova recalled, in a panic, Azeri women bought traditional shoes, 
wooden clogs, and chadras in order to continue to go to their places of  work and study.28  
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However, despite the extreme opposition they faced, Azeri women continued their public 
activity. On May 21, 1917, for the first time, Azeri Muslim women exercised their right to vote in 
the campaign to elect members to the Baku Food Supply Committee. The Committee was 
responsible for food distribution among city dwellers. Baku, like many other places of that time, 
suffered from food shortages because the events of WWI and the February Revolution resulted in 
a ruined economy. During that election campaign, Muslim women, for unspecified reasons, elected 
only the Azeri male candidates and neglecting the female candidates of Russian origin. This act 
disappointed the city’s Russian feminists, who claimed that historically women were better at food 
distribution because they had experience allocating food in their households. This criticism 
produced fierce debates between Russian and Azeri female activists on the pages of the newspaper 
Kaspii. The Russian feminists  blamed Muslim women for their passivity and called them “an 
ignorant flock.”29 The Muslim female activists defended themselves, pointing to numerous 
violations during the election campaign, such as late notifications, the lack of access to monitoring 
of the election process, the deficiency of information about the agenda of the Baku Food Supply 
Committee, and insufficient support from the “civilized Russian feminists.”30 This debate 
illustrates that the female activists of Baku city were separated by their ethnicity and religion and 
thus did not coordinate their work towards equality with men. In July of 1917, the Muslim women 
also voted to elect members to the Committee of Baku Public Associations. However, among the 
thirty-three newly elected members, there were no female representatives either, even of Russian 
nationality.31 
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Shafiga Efendiieva, a prominent journalist and a teacher at the Tagiev school, wrote article 
after article encouraging Muslim women to exercise their right to vote. In her writing she supported 
the appeals of those Muslim women who demanded the right to vote granted by the Provisional 
Government by establishing male-free voting stations.32 Particularly, she increased her pressure 
on the authorities after the establishment of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, stressing the 
pivotal role of every educated woman participating in socio-political life during the time of 
national independence.33 In October 1917, Efendiieva strongly criticized the passivity of many 
Muslim women and appealed to their consciousness in one of her articles: 
If we, Muslim women, do not take the future of our lives and social well-being into our 
hands we will regret it, because we will again have a life of those walking dead.   It is time 
to proclaim that we know what to say, we know how to reform our public life and future. 
We are not only men’s comrades, spouses, mothers, and the guardians of their homes. We 
are human beings! The nation’s development is in the revival of femininity. Our nation will 
never prosper without granting freedom to Muslim girls and women. The future of our 
millat depends on the recognition of our rights by the state.34 
 
Efendiieva connected women’s rights with the freedom and fate of the ADR. She wrote that only 
free women could raise free citizens. Efendiieva, in her article entitled Islamların, Turklerin, 
Islamic, Turkic, appealed to Muslim women to awaken and demand their right to education as the 
only road to freedom. She compared women’s traditional  role with women’s position under Islam 
and argued that Islam does not violate traditional women’s equality with men by allowing Muslim 
women to have access to education.35 In 1919, Efendiieva wrote, in an article entitled Yol 
Esnasında Giorduklerim, I have seen them on the road, about the urgent need to continue the 
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practice of female public education that was interrupted by recent events in the country. In this 
article, she recalled her schooling at her father’s private school named Tekamul, Evolution, in 
Sheki. She described many Muslim girls’ desire to become educated by studying at her father’s 
school. However, there was not an adequate number of modern-trained female teachers to instruct 
them. As a solution, Efendiieva’s father employed her as a teacher at the age of fourteen. She 
concluded that the state should pay attention to this shortcoming and promote female education.36 
Efendiieva praised the establishment of the ADR as a democratic power that would 
abandon old traditions and would pave the road to an egalitarian society.37 Like many other Azeris, 
Efendiieva left Azerbaijan to escape the series of devastations in March 1918 and found a safe 
place in the Ottoman empire. She returned in 1919 when, with the help of the Ottoman military 
forces under Nuri Pasha’s command, Azerbaijan became free from the Armenian bands raiding 
across the country and Bolshevik power in Baku.  
Efendiieva argued that women played the important roles during that period of political, 
military, and economic catastrophe. By establishing many charity organizations, women reduced 
the hardships faced by their people and also united the nation, setting an example of true patriotism 
for men. She stressed that Azeri women had proven their importance during that time of socio-
economic crisis and thus, must be fully liberated from political and religious restraints.38 She 
supported this claim by providing information about several charitable organizations established 
and run by Azeri women. For instance, since 1916 the Muslim Women’s Benevolent Society of 
Ganja helped those Muslim families whose male members were at the front of WWI.39 Since 1919, 
Efendiieva herself was a member of the Baku Muslim Women’s Benevolent Society. She wrote 
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that the society’s mission was to support orphans and help them to have access to education. In 
one of her articles, she wrote that during the winter of 1919 alone, the society helped to provide 
clothing and shoes for 102 parentless children.40 
In the years between 1918 and 1920, Efendiieva also was an active member of the Muslim 
Women’s Society Esirgeme Derneii, The Society of the Guardians. The society helped the 
displaced Muslim women and children of Azerbaijan and the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman 
empire to settle in the territories of Azerbaijan and Anatolia after they escaped the massacres 
performed by Armenian and Balkan Christians. The Esirgeme Derneii society, being under the 
patronage of the wife of Enver Pasha, princess Naciie Sultan, provided food and shelter and helped 
find jobs for the displaced women to support their families. Efendiieva, like other prominent 
members such as Sitar khanum Agayeva, the wife of Akhmed bek Agayev, Shafiga Gasprinski, 
the wife of the Prime Minister of the ADR Nassib bek Usubbekov, and others thrived while easing 
the hardships of female lives and to benefit their millat.41 Hence, long before the Sovietization of 
Azerbaijan in April 1920 and the organization of the Communist Party’s Women’s Division, 
Zhenotdel, established in October 1920, Azeri women had a history of founding women’s 
organizations and a record of struggle for equal rights with men. With the establishment of 
Bolshevik power, Communist leaders welcomed those female activists to join the Women’s 
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 The Advance of the Soviet Azerbaijani Woman 
 
By attracting Muslim women to schools, we 
will water the [cultural] deserts of Azerbaijan 
and turn it into a civilized country. 
Azerbaijan will be a model republic for the 
whole East.42 
M. Guliyev, the Commissar of 
Enlightenment. September 6, 1929. 
 
The Bolsheviks’ pursuit of ethnic and gender equality supplemented with ideological 
indoctrination secured them support among various segments of the former Russian Imperial 
population. One of the first legal acts issued by the Bolshevik regime was to grant women equal 
rights with men across the former Russian empire. When one thousand female delegates met at the 
First All-Russian Congress of Worker and Peasant Women in Moscow in November 1918, 
Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Party, personally welcomed the delegates and 
emphasized the role of women in ongoing societal transformation. The Congress introduced the 
Women’s Sections, Zhensektsii, that were subordinated to the Russian Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks) [RCP(b)], under the leadership of Aleksandra Kollontai, Inessa Armand, and Varvara 
Moirova.43 On 2 October 1919, the Bolshevik government reorganized the Women’s Sections into 
the Women’s Department of the Secretariat of the RCP(b) Central Committee, Zhenotdel, headed 
by Inessa Armand. The local sections of the new department had to carry out female emancipation 
reforms. 
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 Zhenotdel supervised the most important aspects of women’s lives: from political 
indoctrination and legal assistance to the private spheres of female health, education, running of 
households, and childcare. Zhenotdel sought to convey the Bolshevik message of female 
emancipation to all women regardless of their educational and social status. Zhenotdel coordinated 
the women’s journals, such as Kommunistka, Rabotnitsa, and Krest’ianka,44 organized public 
rallies and women’s clubs, and sent female representatives for a three-month apprenticeship at the 
Zhenotdel’s centres in Moscow where they learned how to become effective liaisons between those 
centres and the female residents of their home communities.45 
The Azerbaijani Zhenotdel, organized in October 1920 at the Second Congress of the 
Azerbaijani Communist Party [AzCP(b)], was under the umbrella of the Zhenotdel of the Caucasus 
Bureau [CB] of the Communist Party, which in turn was subordinated to the central All-Union 
Zhenotdel. The Azeri Zhenotdel had to fulfill two major missions in the framework of Muslim 
female emancipation.46 First, it had to organize Zhenotdel branches at the district level that would 
open women’s clubs running primary education and vocational training. The clubs also had to train 
Muslim female activists to work alongside other women: the lack of native Azeri functionaries 
and limited interactions of Muslim and non-Muslim women were two major challenges on the 
road to Bolshevik-style emancipation. Second, with the establishment of the women’s journal 
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Sharg Gadini, Woman of the East, in November 1923, Zhenotdel enhanced the spread of political 
propaganda and the promotion of a new socialist culture.47  
Zhenotdel’s agenda was to integrate Muslim women into the economic, political, and social 
life of the socialist state and end female seclusion, veiling, legal inequality, and illiteracy. Sharg 
Gadini became the herald of Azerbaijani Zhenotdel in its task of enlightenment with the mission 
to drag the Azeri women from oppression and expose conservative men who erected various 
obstacles to female emancipation.48 In her speech on 7 September, 1920, delegate Khavar 
Shabanova-Karaeva warned members of the Congress of the People of the East, held in Baku, that 
all Muslim women would face various hardships while challenging the male interpretation of 
female emancipation.49  
To adapt policies formulated by Moscow to the local context, the Azerbaijani Zhenotdel 
recruited women of various nationalities and social backgrounds. Although Russian and Jewish 
functionaries Klavdiia Ishkova and Viktoria Tseitlin played leading roles in the Azerbaijani 
Zhenotdel, since the first days of its establishment in January 1922,  Muslim Azeri women – Ayna 
Sultanova, Khadidzha Azizbekova, Dzheiran Bayramova, Khavar Shabanova-Karaeva, Shakhria 
Zeynalova, Gulara Kadyrbekova, Natalia Tagiyeva, Mina Mirzoeva, Shargiia Gadzhieva, and 
others – held key positions at various Zhenotdel levels.50 Those Azeri women in the majority had 
attended and taught in pre-revolutionary public schools, had worked outside their homes as 
teachers, and were married to men who were members of the Communist Party. These Azeri 
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female activists, who struggled for Muslim women’s liberation long before the Soviet gender 
emancipation movement, became an important asset for Moscow as they could break the barriers 
of traditional society more easily way than outsiders, due to their ethnic and religious background, 
family connections, and knowledge of local customs.51  
By 1925, the number of Azeri female functionaries in Azerbaijan already comprised 63% 
of all female employees at the Zhenotdel in comparison with 59% in Tatarstan, 35% in Central 
Asia, 50% in Dagestan, and 34% in Crimea.52 Zhenotdel and Sharg Gadini activists came primarily 
from two backgrounds: the well-connected, reformation-influenced Azeri families, such as A. 
Sultanova, Kh. Azizbekova, G. Kadyrbekova, Kh. Shabanova, Dj. Bairamova; and others, such as 
N. Tagieva, M. Mirzoeva, and Sh. Gadzhieva – commoners who benefited from collaboration with 
the communists. These functionaries helped the central authorities transform the culture of Muslim 
women along the lines set by the Communist Party. The communist gender policies found positive 
responses among many Azeri women and men because the ideas of gender equality in education, 
voting, and companionate marriage resonated with the discourse of Muslim societal modernization 
from the turn of the twentieth century.53  
The Bolsheviks sought to emancipate all women, but women in Azerbaijan were not a 
homogeneous group: they lived in various cultural settings and required specific tactics to ease the 
transition from their secluded lifestyles to political and social participation. Therefore, the 
Bolsheviks introduced a network of Zhenotdel clubs designed specifically for Muslim women that 
 
51 “Instruktsiia raz’’ezdnym instruktoram Zhenotdela,” (January 28, 1922) RGASPI f. 64, o. 1, d. 222, l. 10. This 
instruction demands the hiring of more Azeri women as Zhenotdel activists to work with the Muslim female population 
because of the perceived fear of russification among Azeri people. Azade-Ayshe Rorlich, “The Ali Bayramov Club, 
the Journal Sharg Gadini, and Socialisation of Azeri Women, 1920-30,” in Central Asian Survey , no. 3–4 (1986): 
221–239, 225. 
52 Seifi, “O rabote na Vostoke i nashem kadre,” Kommunistka 4 (March-April 1925): 75.  
53 M. Kamp, “Women-initiated Unveiling: State-led Campaigns in Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan,” in Anti-Veiling 




sought to involve Muslim women in the Soviet modernization program. In Azerbaijan, the first 
club for Muslim women began to function in its capital, Baku, in June 1920. The history of this 
club began with the initiative of Dzheiran Bairamova (1896–1987), an enthusiastic advocate for 
gender equality. Her biography is an excellent example of a transformation of a pre-Soviet Azeri 
female activist for Muslim women’s liberation from patriarchal traditions into a prominent 
Communist.54  
        
  
Figure 21. Dzheiran Bairamova ot the XXX Congress of the Communist Party of AzSSR, Baku, 1981. AAKFD photo. 
 
 
According to the official biography narrated by Dzheiran Bairamova in 1972, she was born 
into an impoverished family – her mother baked bread and her father sold it in the streets. She had 
one sibling: a sister, Mesme, who died in her early years. Thus, Dzheiran was the only child in the 
family. She recalled that when she was 15, her father engaged her to a man significantly older than 
her. However, Bairamova strongly opposed the marriage and ruined the proposed union, bitterly 
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noting that her father had never forgiven her for this act.55 Her official biography notes the 
remarkable fact that she was illiterate until age 15, and like other Muslim girls, learned to 
memorize fairy tales at home. She stressed that she had a strong desire to become an educated 
person and thus, instead of marriage, she chose school.56 In this official biography, Bairamova 
claimed that she was introduced to public schooling at age 15 when one of her friends told her that 
there was a learning centre in one of the houses in their neighborhood, mahala, where girls could 
learn to read. Despite the fear of her parents’ disapproval, she went there and was accepted by the 
head of one of the Tagiev schools, Rakhila Gadzhibekova.57   
Gulara Kadyrbekova in 1936 in her book Bir Saraiin Tarikhi, The History of One Palace 
also stressed the difficulties that poor Muslim girls faced in obtaining the education.  Kadyrbekova 
stated that Bairamova went to the third of the Tagiev schools whose principal was Rakhila 
Gadzhibekova, because she was denied admission into the other two Tagiev schools on the basis 
of her humble origin, cherekchi gizidir, the daughter of a bread seller.58 This episode highlights 
two Soviet official discourses: first, that education in the pre-revolution period was available only 
for the children from the rich families; second, that Azeri Soviet politicians and intellectuals tried 
to distance themselves from any project initiated by the Azeri cultural and industrial elite of the 
pre-Soviet period as dangerous factors for their careers and lives in the Stalinist epoch. 
Bairamova recalled that she began to articulate her ideas about the need for education for 
Muslim girls in 1915.59 In 1918 she married Ali Bairamov, a Communist, who encouraged her in 
this initiative. Bairamova joined the Communist Party in October 1919. During the period of the 
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ADR she and her friend from the Tagiev school, Azeri Communist Zeinab Rizvanova, worked at 
the ADR’s Parliament. The government office needed literate stenographers knowledgeable in the 
Azeri and Russian languages to keep records of the parliamentary sessions’ minutes. Bairamova 
stated that she was assigned by the local Communists to spy on the Musavatist leaders and to 
inform the Bolsheviks about all political and military decisions of the ADR government.60 On 
March 19, 1920, she was arrested by the Musavat government along with her husband, mother, 
and other relatives. On April 7, 1920, her husband was executed.61 
In June 1920, to honor the memory of her late husband, in two rooms of her three-room 
house Bairamova organized a club to train Muslim women in basic literacy and sewing. As all 
women had children, she also opened a daycare called Sunbul, The Spikelet, for their kids in 
another room. Establishing this club, Bairamova aimed gradually to end illiteracy among Muslim 
women and help them to acquire some skills to become financially independent. The club received 
the name Baki Merkezi Ischi Musul’man Gadinlar Klubu, The Central Club for Toiling Muslim 
Women of Baku. At first, the club had ten members. Bairamova was the principal of the club, and 
Khavar Shabanova-Karaeva, also a graduate of the Tagiev school and the wife of the prominent 
Communist and political leader Ali Gaydar Karaev, was a vice-principal.62 By 1922, the authorities 
recognized the club for its contribution to Muslim women’s socialization and assigned the club a 
new building, the former palace of a pre-revolution oil tycoon, Murtuza Mukhtarov, where 
between 1916 and 1920 his wife Liza Mukhtarova hosted the Baku Benevolent Muslim Women’s 
Association. The Bolsheviks named the club after the prominent revolutionary, Ali Bairamov, D. 
Bairamova’s husband. The “Ali Bairamov” Club played a leading role in the process of Muslim 
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women’s emancipation.63 In 1922, the second club, the “Ibrahim Abilov” Club, also named after 




Figure 13. The picture of the former Murtuza Mukhtarov’s palace where his wife, Liza Mukhtarova, hosted the Baku 
Woman’s Benevolent Society. Former building of the Ali Bairamov Club. Modern Saadat Sarai, Palace of Happiness, 
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The clubs gained popularity among the Azeri population because women, regardless of 
their social status, perceived them as the cradles of culture, enlightenment, and justice, Medeniat, 
Maarif va Hugug. The clubs introduced all Muslim women to secular events that traditionally were 
not affordable to Muslim women from lower social strata, such as the theatre and musical 
performances, educational lectures and films. By 1935 the “Ali Bairamov” Club alone offered 599 
educational meetings and provided 222 lectures, 307 excursions to museums and industrial 
laboratories, 503 theatre performances, 231 concerts, 357 film presentations, and 51 business trips 
to the villages to propagandize Soviet-type female emancipation programs. 65 The data for the “Ali 
Bairamov” Club alone indicates that by 1935, the club had trained 446,743 Azeri women in total 
at the educational and various vocational courses. From 1920–1923, there were 47,270 graduates; 
from 1924–1928, the club graduated 143,609 Muslim women; from 1929–1932, the club educated 
100,786 students; and from 1933–1935, the number of graduates reached 155,078 women.66 
 
 
Figure 23.  Azeri female students at the Ali Bairamov Club, Baku, 1923.  AAKFD photo. 
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Figure 24.  Azeri female students at the Ali Bairamov Club, Baku, 1928.  AAKFD photo. 
 
  It is important to admit that the clubs, until the end of the 1920s, did not violate the ethnic 
and cultural identity of Muslim Azeris in the multinational community of Baku and other places. 
Also, the clubs offered literacy to women who historically had never had access to education, such 
as nomadic, village, and impoverished women, thus promising them social promotions within 
society through education. This tactic resonated with the old-imperial discourse about the 
enlightenment of all Muslim women for the benefit of the nation and equally attracted reform-
minded activists and ordinary women. The clubs were also successful because they offered free 
childcare. The clubs’ activists stressed the mutual benefits for a mother and child: a mother would 
become literate and acquire some skills to work in the public sector; a child would learn to think 
of the collective needs rather than of personal. Children also would acquire literacy, discipline, 
and nutritious meals that many parents in the 1920s could not have afforded due to the destruction 




the clubs were popular supporting her argument with the data: 125,439 infants and 127,181 
toddlers attended the club’s kindergarten between 1920 and 1935.67 Also, all clubs had a 
consultation centre to provide legal aid for Muslim women to defend their rights. This tactic helped 
to attract Muslim women and spread Bolshevik ideas to the Azeri female masses. The government 
monitored the condition of the clubs with great seriousness, exposing every problem. Documents 
also revealed that unlike the “Ali Bairamov” Club, the clubs in the regions suffered from a lack of 
adequate funding, unprepared workers, and corruption of personnel that led to a low rate of women 
and children enrolled at the clubs and kindergartens, respectively.68 
Kadyrbekova called the club Medani Inglab Odzhagi, Hearth of the Cultural Revolution, 
and Insan Fabrikasi, The Human Factory that shaped the new woman. Famous Communists and 
revolutionaries, such as Klara Zetkin, Sergei Kirov, and Maria Ul’ianova, Lenin’s sister, were 
among the honorable guests to see the club’s achievements in Muslim women’s emancipation.69 
The club successfully delivered its program to liberate Muslim women by empowering them 
through the introduction of common literacy and full employment to the All-Soviet public.70 The 
“Ali Bairamov” Club appealed to Azeri people from the Party tribune, public meetings, and private 
houses. However, clearly understanding that the target audience was isolated by Islamic gender 
norms, the club’s activists went to the strictly female spaces in the Azeri community, such as the 
communal bathhouses.71  
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In the traditional Muslim environment, the bathhouse was more than a spa. Rather, it was 
a salon or a club where women could socialize, discuss, and arrange their life-circle events. These 
places had saunas, massage rooms, cafés, and music and poetry circles along with corners where 
the matchmakers worked.72 The Zhenotdel activists dynamically used this traditional place for 
female socialization to convey the Bolshevik message of women’s emancipation by reading 
decrees, issues of the journal Sharg Gadini, and proclamations about the benefits of enrollment 
into the clubs. The official instructions released by the central Zhenotdel in Baku demanded that 
its activists neither encourage Muslim women to throw off their veils nor to enter the Communist 
Party. Rather, they were required to propagandize the benefits of education Muslim women would 
receive at the women’s clubs.73 
However, this approach produced the first tensions over the pace of gender reforms 
between the Moscow-based and Azerbaijani Zhenotdel. Moscow officials demanded the full and 
prompt end of gender segregation in accordance with official Party regulations, while the native 
female activists emphasized the local realities that would have first required them to organize 
Muslim women, separately from men, at the less-politicized women’s clubs. The local activists, 
regardless of their nationality, recognized this tactic as the only effective way to attract Muslims 
to Bolshevik-style female emancipation.74 Nevertheless, the Moscow officials criticized this 
approach as a deviation from the official Party policies that they believed could result in the 
superiority of feminist interests over class concerns.  
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The Moscow-based functionaries underlined the danger in organizing women outside of 
party structures, thereby fostering bourgeois feminism. Party officials stressed the need for 
systematic guidance based upon class perspectives. The centre accused Azeri activists of “Muslim 
Feminism,” of turning men into women’s enemies, and of aloofness to class struggle.75 This 
denunciation directly echoed the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b)’s official discourse that 
emphasized the threat of prioritization of gender reforms above issues of class solidarity in Russia 
as well.76 The Azeri-native reform functionaries pointed out that only non-Muslim women in 
Azerbaijan could publicly interact with men; therefore, only their indoctrination could be 
conducted in accordance with Party principles. The Azerbaijani Zhenotdel leaders had to defend 
their method for achieving Muslim gender-segregated agency and argued that this was the only 
method able to make an initial change among Muslim women.  
Moreover, the centre accused the Azerbaijani Zhenotdel of ethnic segregation by banning 
non-Muslim women from the clubs. It is true that to avoid accusations of a feminist agenda the 
Azeri female activists prevented non-Muslim women from attending the clubs. The only roles 
allocated to women of non-Islamic background were as clerks or instructors running the clubs.77 
The Azeri Zhenotdel workers claimed that the Muslim population viewed the Soviet policy of 
blending Muslim and non-Muslim women in the clubs as a threat to their cultural identity. They 
stated that such an approach would provoke hostility and turn Muslim women away from those 
clubs. The Zhenotdel officers acknowledged that Muslim women did not interact with different 
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ethnic and religious groups, non-Turkic and non-Muslim, however, they proposed that over time 
the clubs would someday gradually bring the culturally diverse women of Azerbaijan together.78 
For the Azerbaijani Zhenotdel activists, the clubs for Muslim women were not the only 
means to expand the boundaries of Muslim women’s everyday life. They also organized, under 
Moscow’s supervision, craftsmen cooperative workshops, artel’, and cooperative stores that sold 
goods produced only by female artisans exclusively to women at prices lower than at the regular 
stores owned by male traders. In 1921, there were 21 women’s artel’s across the republic: 11 in 
Baku and 10 in other regions with nearly 4,000 Muslim female members in total.79 These were 
women-only businesses, and an ideal space for propaganda purposes, not only for Bolshevik 
ideology and women’s rights, but also for everyday issues: child-raising, health care, and 
education.80 Unlike clubs, which also maintained gender segregation, these stores and clubs’ 
artel’s received undisputable approval and support from the centre as the path to women’s 
liberation through employment outside the home and the conversion of private, unpaid work 
performed within the household to paid work in the socialist sector of the economy. Therefore, in 
accordance with Marxist theory, both of these conditions would provide the basis for complete 
gender equality.81 
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In her book, Bir Saraiin Tarikhi, Kadyrbekova emphasized the low employment rate 
among Azeri women before Sovietization, the factor that deprived Muslim women of financial 
and social independence. She supported her argument by providing the example of the Tagiev’s 
textile factory that had only 250 Muslim female employees whose salary was half as much than 
that of male workers. Kadyrbekova highlighted the achievements of the Turk emekchi gadin, Turk 
toiling woman, under Soviet rule. In her opinion, the advance of Soviet power gave Azeri women 
true liberation by granting them access to education, full employment, and equality in rights.82 
Kadyrbekova described the different paths that brought Azeri women to the Muslim 
women’s clubs. Particularly, she illustrated the case of the “Ali Bairamov” Club, admitting that all 
women were united in their desire to end gender segregation, and to become literate and 
independent. She presented the most prominent leaders along with the commoners who helped to 
achieve the task of Muslim women’s emancipation through primary education and vocational 
training – midwifery, nursing, telephone operation, sewing, and weaving. She recalled D. 
Bairamova’s determination to change the lives of Muslim women from a position of ignorance to 
entitlement by applying her profound education, skills, and family support.83 
 Kadyrbekova also introduced another prominent activist, Mina khanum Mirzoeva, who 
was in her fifties when she became a club member and then one of its leaders. Kadyrbekova 
illustrated Mina khanum’s struggles to feed her children, left without her husband’s support, by 
working as a laundress during the turbulent days of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath. 
Without mentioning the freedoms to vote granted by the Provisional Government and her 
experience exercising this right during the period of the ADR, Mina khanum stated that for the 
first time she voted to elect members for food distribution committees in early 1918. However, she 
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bitterly noted that because of strong opposition from the Islamic radical clergy and their male 
supporters, she, like other Muslim women, could not obtain any seats on those committees and, 
thus, make any changes. Mina khanum was never satisfied with the traditional female role as a 
domestic servant and glorified the Bolshevik revolution that emancipated Muslim women.84  
Another club activist, Zeinab Rizaieva, described her life before joining the club as a series 
of misfortunes. She recalled that her father, of a low social status, had married her forcefully at 
age 12. Experiencing many hardships in that union, she ran from her husband. However, she was 
forced into another marriage at the age of 15 to a well-off jewelry store employee. The second 
husband treated her better but kept her within the house walls. So, she did not know about the two 
revolutions and about the existence of the ADR. One day, on her way to the public bathhouse, she 
met a female friend who told her about the club for Muslim women and its enlightening role in 
women’s lives.85 Rizaieva joined the “Ali Bairamov” Club despite her husband’s disapproval, 
although later he became satisfied that she had learned some literacy and sewing skills which 
helped her to find a job at the club and bring home an additional income.86 By narrating these life-
stories, Kadyrbekova highlights how Azeri women found their freedom when they began to attend 
the clubs, which were the conductors of the Communist Party’s politics of societal transformation 
through female mass education across all Soviet Union.87  
The history of female mass education in Soviet Azerbaijan began with the Bolsheviks’ 
proclamation of universal education as a top priority just two weeks after accession to power on 
April 28, 1920. On May 12, 1920, the newly established Commissariat of Enlightenment declared 
the introduction of nine years of free obligatory schooling in the native Azeri language. The 
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Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, Azrevkom, was responsible for the implementation of this 
program .88 The Commissariat of Enlightenment first appropriated existing teaching resources and 
training institutions, turning them into Soviet educational centres.89 The new regime also 
eliminated the teaching of religion at school and abolished the Ministry of Spiritual Affairs, thus 
proclaiming Bolshevik Azerbaijan a secular republic.90 
Two years earlier, in 1918, the Bolsheviks introduced similar reforms to education in 
Turkestan. However, the reforms, which included seizing religious property and shutting down 
religious educational centres, such as maktabs and madrasah, provoked war with the emerging 
militant opposition, Basmachi. In 1921, because of this severe resistance, the Turkestan 
Communist Party had to stop interfering into religious affairs and in 1923 the government returned 
all properties traditionally belonging to religious educational institutions. As a result, in Turkestan 
in 1923 alone, there were 5,600 maktabs with 70,000 male students that functioned along with the 
Soviet-type schools.91  
In Azerbaijan, this reformation of education did not meet widespread opposition from the 
population because the pre-revolution discourse about reformed education, practically supported 
by the network of modern schools for boys and girls, desacralized knowledge and separated 
religious leaders, ulama, from education. There is no evidence about the number of maktabs and 
madrasah for Muslim male and female students that functioned in Azerbaijan in the 1920s. 
However, there were many government and Party reports from the 1920s that Islamic religious 
leaders organized the reformed schools to compete with the state educational system. As the 
 
88 “Tsirkuliarnoe pis’mo Narkomprosa AzSSR uezdnym revkomam ob organizatsii pri nikh otdelov po 
prosveshcheniiu,” (May 15, 1920) ARDA f. 57, o. 1, d. 9, l. 15.  
89 “Kopii i proekty dekretov Azrevkoma. Narodnyii Komissariat Prosveshcheniia,” (May 26–December 1, 1920) 
ARDA f. 57, o. 1, d. 144, l. 29.  
90 “Dekret Narkomprosa AzSSR ob uprazdnenii musavatskogo Ministerstva Veroispovedaniia i otmene prepodovaniia 
religioznykh uchenii v shkole,” (May 1920) ARDA f. 410, o. 1, d. 3, l. 11.  




reports came from the opponents of this reformist movement, the Soviet agency, the numbers of 
students in this alternative to the Soviet schools is difficult to summarize too. Along with this, 
there is compelling evidence that the struggle for women’s souls between the Soviet and religious 
reformed teachings in Azerbaijan was intense, and its apogee was in 1927–29, during the Soviet 
anti-religious campaign. 
  The Islamic clerics of the Soviet Union argued that the Bolshevik gender reformation was 
radical and aimed to separate a new female generation from traditional culture. Realizing that 
women were the only societal strata that would be able to retain traditions, they began a campaign 
to turn Muslim women away from the Soviet gender movement by introducing them to reformed 
Islamic doctrines.92 These moderate religious reformers continued their late-Imperial discourse, 
arguing that the Koran did not require face covering or polygyny and called for modern female 
education. Moreover, they undermined the canonical interpretation of mosques as male-centric 
institutions by allowing women to pray there and even become ministers.93 In the late 1920s, in 
Azerbaijan, the Bahá’í “The Women’s Progress Society” was a particular threat to the Soviet 
program for women’s emancipation. In 1927, there were several literacy societies in Baku alone. 
In the rural regions, along with literacy courses, Bahá’ís also organized centres for poverty relief 
for impoverished peasants during the period of famine in 1924–1925, giving women an 
opportunity to attend literacy classes.94  
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The Soviet policy pursuing purely secular emancipation undermined the position of those 
clerics who were involved in women’s emancipation, particularly the Bahá’ís.95 Along with this, 
Moscow officials considered the debate on methods of women’s emancipation as an extension of 
the pre-revolution all-Russia Jadids discourse on women’s societal roles within the religious 
reformation.96 Party agents chose not to cooperate with the reform-minded clergy because the 
socialist government aimed to transform society by replacing any traditional authority and 
knowledge with its own.  
In Azerbaijan, the Leninist Great Cultural Revolution demanded the elimination of 
illiteracy among Muslim women to make Azerbaijan a “civilized country.”97 This goal echoed the 
call from the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Liquidation of Illiteracy, Likbez, 
newly-created on June 19, 1920, which declared that literacy was a cornerstone of the Communist 
Party’s program for societal transformation.98 From their tribunes in Moscow and in Baku, the 
Party leaders described all Muslim women as “universally illiterate” and thus diverged from the 
pre-revolutionary history of education of young Muslim women and girls in Azerbaijan.99 
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Moreover, the Communists, seeing themselves as bearers of the light of modernity, criticized the 
education provided by reformed schools and teachers for their alleged harmful influence.  
Ishkova and Tseitlin, the leaders of Azeri Zhenotdel, were the most prolific authors of 
Russian-language publications about Azeri women. Along with official reports for the Party’s 
Central Committee, they wrote articles for the Zhenotdel journal, Kommunistka. They conveyed 
to Russian readers that before the revolution the majority of Azeri women, Tiurchanki, were 
deprived of education and were surrounded by walls of religious fanaticism, superstition, and dark 
traditions. In their reports and publications, both authors focused on the politics of education, 
available only to girls from noble and rich families, in reformed schools rather than Soviet schools. 
They argued that the old schools gave education only to the children of wealthy people, rejecting 
the facts that the majority of the female students of the Tagiev schools were boarding pupils of 
humble origins. Also, they contrasted the missions of the two educational systems: the old one 
prepared students from elite families to lead a petit-bourgeois life-style, while the Soviet system 
offered education to all people regardless of their class background and trained them to build a 
society of equals. Moreover, by providing religious education, the old schools enforced the 
patriarchal traditions, which were responsible for Muslim women’s ignorant status, while the 
Soviet schools, by rejecting religion, liberated Muslim women.100 
The leading Azeri activists followed such discourse. Kadyrbekova juxtaposed the Soviet 
and Musavat approaches to female education. She denounced the Musavat leaders of the ADR as 
elitist and non-progressive, stating that they indoctrinated women in religion, thus enforcing 
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patriarchal traditions.101 Kadyrbekova also criticized the old school system that left the majority 
of young females unenlightened. Statistical data from the ARDA supports this statement, 
emphasizing the importance of the state rather than the initiatives of several rich individuals in the 
attempt to spread common literacy among the population. 
 
Table 1. Statistical table on the number of Azeri girls and boys enrolled in elementary public schools between 1914  



































































































Kadyrbekova also depicted young Azeri women and girls of the pre-Soviet period as 
backward, ignorant, and left without any hope for enlightenment by the corrupt clergy and 
bourgeoisie. Those who received any education were the daughters of local wealthy people, but 
still their training gave them little freedom and left them dependent on men. Kadyrbekova traced 
Azeri women’s struggle for modern education to an awakening that began solely with the advance 
of new life brought by Bolshevik brothers and sisters. She emphasized that by entering the “Ali 
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Bairamov” Club and other Soviet organizations for Muslim women’s emancipation, Azeri women 
and girls liberated themselves from their old life. By presenting herself as entirely unacquainted 
with learning, she, like the authors of the Sharg Gadini, totally denied that many of her cohort 
were well-educated long before sovietization.103 
                             
Figure 25. Gulara Kadyrbekova, Baku, 1930. AAKFD photo. 
 
Gulara Kadyrbekova (1903–1942) was born to the family of a progressive akhund, in 
Sheki. She received education at home and at one of the local schools run by modern teachers that 
provided instruction in the Russian language. In 1920 she graduated from a pedagogical college in 
Sheki and worked as a schoolteacher until the mid-1920s. Her good education and knowledge of 
the Russian language equipped her well to work as one of the leaders of the Azeri Zhenotdel from 
the mid-1920s. Between 1930 and 1937 Kadyrbekova supervised the “Ali Bayramov” Club. 
Between 1931 and 1937 she was the editor in chief of the journal Sharg Gadini. Until her arrest, 
on July 23, 1938, Kadyrbekova supervised several political organizations. She was arrested as a 
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perceived Musavatist who planned a coup against the Soviet powers along with her husband Asaf 
Rakhmanov, a Communist and the executive official at the Azeri branch of the NKVD. 
Rakhmanov was arrested and executed earlier in January 1938. In 1939, Kadyrbekova was 
sentenced to 10 years and sent to the one of the GULAG camps in Siberia where she died in 
1942.104  
 
 Figure 26.  Ayna Sultanova, Baku, 1937. AAKFD photo. 
 
The pre-Soviet educational experience of another prominent Azeri female communist, 
Ayna Sultanova (nee Musabekova, 1895–1938), supports my argument that old-Imperial 
schooling advanced by the Azeri reformers helped her to become a high-ranking officials in the 
Soviet state. Ayna was born and raised in Pirabedil’ village of Kuba district. She came from a well-
off family. Her father, Makhmud Musabekov, sent his two daughters, Ayna and Iakhshi, to study 
at the school for Muslim girls in Baku. Between 1906 and 1912 both girls gained education at the 
Tagiev school in Baku. In 1912, at age 17, Ayna began to work as a teacher at one of the public 
schools for Muslim girls. Sultanova worked there for six years along with her former teachers, 
 




such as Shafiga Efendiieva and Sakina Akhundova, the famous female Azeri writers and 
journalists.105 Being disappointed with the societal and gender inequality in the Azeri community, 
she and her brother Gazanfar joined the Communist Party in 1918. After that period, Sultanova, 
by implementing her knowledge and skills, worked to end gender isolation, veiling, and illiteracy 
with the support of the Bolshevik state.106 She was the first editor in chief of the journal Sharg 
Gadini. Until her arrest and execution, she was a high-ranking politician. From 1930–1932, she 
held the post of the Commissar of Public Enlightenment.  
Between 1934–1938, Sultanova was appointed as a Chair of the Supreme Court and a 
Commissar of Justice of the AzSSR. Her brother, Gazanfar Musabekov (1888–1938) was a doctor 
and a politician of Soviet Azerbaijan before his arrest and execution in 1938, as an “enemy of the 
people.” Musabekov graduated from the Medical Academy named after Saint Vladimir in Kiev 
(now the capital of Ukraine). Along with his university peers and close friends, such as Dzhalil 
Mamedkulizade (future writer and editor of the satirical journal Molla Nasreddin), writer Yusif 
Vezirov (his diary and novels are an important part of this research), and other intellectuals aimed 
to reform Azeri society through the introduction of common modern literacy. Musabekov was a 
leading Azeri Communist who realized the sovietization of Azerbaijan. He was a Chairman of the 
Central Executive Committee of AzSSR (1922–1930), Head of the Transcaucasian SFSR (1925–
1938), Commissar of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry (1922 - 1929). 
Ayna Sultanova’s husband, Gamid Sultanov (1889–1938), a graduate of the Polytechnic 
University of Leipzig, Germany, was a leading figure in Communist Party of Azerbaijan. In 1918 
they both fled to Bolshevik Russia, Astrakhan, to escape arrest by the Musavat government for 
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their Bolshevik activity in Azerbaijan. After the sovietization of Azerbaijan, Gamid Sultanov was 
a Commissar of Internal Affairs, NKVD, between 1920 and 1921. From 1925, he was the 
Chairman of the Council of the People’s Commissars. The Sultanovs had three children: Gamid 
(1920), Nazanin (1927), and Vladlen (short for VLADimir LENin, 1929). There is no information 
about their children after 1938.107  
The leader of the Azeri Zhenotdel, Ishkova, from the Party tribune in Moscow, praised 
Ayna Sultanova’s achievements in Muslim women emancipation. Particularly, she emphasized 
that Sultanova propagandized the benefits of education for Muslim women and the nation as a 
whole.108 Sultanova, like her counterparts – Kadyrbekova, Bairamova, and other female Azeri 
communists in turn credited the Soviet state for granting Muslim women the right to education, 
abolishing all Islamic norms and patriarchal institutions, and, finally, allowing the Azeri people to 
have their state – the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. This rhetoric was part of the official 
discourse that stressed the enlightened and liberated mission of the Bolsheviks in the backward 
Muslim East. Its advocates argued that pre-Soviet education did not make any contribution to 
modern education, that it served only the wealthy, and that it was responsible for absolute illiteracy.  
Nevertheless, the Commissariat of Enlightenment, despite the Bolshevik rhetoric about class 
enemies and absolute separation from “old world” culture, quickly realized that it was far easier 
to train already literate Muslim women who had studied in the pre-revolution educational centres 
as Zhenotdel activists and teachers than to train illiterate females.109  
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The Soviet system needed teachers and thus recognized those teachers with pre-revolution 
experience without question until the end of the 1920s.110 Along with this, the Bolsheviks invited 
female teachers from Turkey, emphasizing the benefits of their training at European teaching 
colleges.111 The Bolsheviks did not have time and recourse to fully train the students in modern 
subjects, teaching methods, and Communist ideology, and then to supply them to the Soviet 
women’s clubs and schools. However, the strong need for female Muslim teachers, the conductors 
of the Bolshevik ideology, produced the strategy to train as many women teachers as quickly as 
possible.112 To implement this strategy the Commissariat of Enlightenment, with the help of the 
Zhenotdel, established brief, three- or six-month training courses to turn already literate women 
into teachers for those literacy courses that offered the most basic form of education. Along with 
this, on October 9, 1921, the government issued a decree that announced the establishment of four-
year pedagogical colleges across the republic to train female teachers in the Azeri language.113 
The need for female teachers in girls’ primary schools and women’s literacy courses at 
women’s clubs was so great that students also performed teaching responsibilities while they were 
still in school themselves. The courses took place at the clubs for Muslim women’s emancipation. 
The age of the female students varied from teenage girls to middle-aged women. The “Ali 
Bairamov” Club was the central organ that carried out the program to produce female Muslim 
teachers. In total, the club trained 4396 teachers. Between 1920 and 1923, 158 teachers graduated 
from the club; from 1924–1928, 1021 teachers; from 1929–1932, the number was 1546; and from 
1933–1935, the number rose to 1671.114  
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In 1926 alone, the statistical data about the number of the female instructors in the republic 
indicates that the number of the female Azeri teachers was small in comparison to the number of 
male Azeri and female Russian and Armenian teaching staff. 
 
 Table 2. Statistical table on the number of Azeri female teachers in 1926 in Azerbaijan.115 
       Azeri male teachers % 
               63.3 
    Azeri female teachers % 
         15.2 
      Russian male teachers % 
              11.0 
    Russian female teachers % 
         43.4 
     Armenian male teachers % 
            13.8 
  Armenian female teachers % 
          24.0 
 
Through the eradication of illiteracy, the clubs for Muslim women aimed to socialize and 
politically mobilize the female Azeri population. The data about the number of the graduates from 
the “Ali Bairamov” Club alone indicates that between 1920 and 1923, these classes were attended 
by 1105 women. From 1924–1928, the number of graduates was 2586. From 1929–1932, 1985 
students finished those courses. In the years between 1933 and 1935, the number of graduates was 
2379.116 This  statistical data also demonstrates that Muslim women of Baku preferred to end their 
illiteracy studying at the gender segregated women’s clubs than at the public courses, Likbez, 
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Table 3. Statistical table on Azeri women’s enrollment in courses for illiteracy elimination, Likbez, Baku 1921–
1927.117  
 
            Years               Azeri men         Azeri women 
       1921–1922               2010             53 
       1922–1923              4129             15 
       1924–1925              5558            437 
       1925–1926              715             301 
        1926–1927              542          No data 
 
 
Given this fact about traditional Islamic culture, the gender-segregated clubs were more successful 
than the gender-mixed Likbez in the mission to educate and socialize Azeri women.118  
Since the first years of the Bolshevik program on gender reformation, the Zhenotdel’s 
agents began a campaign to end female illiteracy in the countryside. The movement sprang from 
the pages of Azeri print media that depicted the villagers as ignorant religious fanatics who stood 
as the guardians of Islamic dogmas about women’s humble position. To implement the project of 
ending illiteracy among rural women, the Party decided to send the recent graduates of pedagogical 
courses to work at the educational centres established for this purpose at the communal centres, 
such as  Kirmizi Kosha, Red Corners, for the rural sedentary population and Bilim Yurt, Tent of 
Knowledge, for the nomadic women.119 To spread literacy to women in rural areas, the 
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Commissariat of Enlightenment established a City-Countryside Solidarity Society that worked by 
recruiting literate and skilled village women who had recently moved into cities to spend some 
time (usually during the summer months) in their home villages to propagandize Soviet gender 
reforms and achievements. Also, secondary schoolgirls went to the homes of illiterate women and 
taught them individually. This tactic was particularly widespread since the mid-1920s when a new 
cohort of urban girls received Soviet-style education.120 
The Party also established training centres in the cities to train village women to become 
teachers in their communities after graduation. However, the Progress Reports from the 
pedagogical colleges illustrate that this Party appeal to train female teachers from the region and 
then place them to work in their rural communities was not realized in the 1920s for several 
reasons.121 First, village dwellers did not send their daughters to study and live in cities alone 
unless they had relatives who could guard their female offspring there. Another problem was that 
those young rural women who went to study in cities refused to return to “dark” villages after 
experiencing the benefits of urban life. Also, those female teachers of urban origin who came to 
the rural regions to work faced many hardships that slowed the process of ending illiteracy there. 
Their families considered sending their daughters and wives to work alone in remote areas as an 
immoral act that would bring shame on their family reputation. The villagers, in turn, considered 
such women to be dishonored and thus, treated them as sexually frivolous. Hence, despite all the 
efforts of many zealous female activists who went to the regions to convince women and girls to 
enter the village schools, the process of enlightening rural girls and women went very slowly.122 
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The situation changed only in the 1930s when the Soviet government introduced mixed-
gender schools with male teachers of rural background who could freely study in the city and were 
more likely to return to their home village.  
 
Table 4. Statistical table on the number of Azeri girls and boys enrolled in the elementary public schools between 




































































































The Azeri Soviet gender reformers and teachers, being deeply committed to Azerbaijan’s 
modernization, extolled the universal affordability of Soviet new-style education that nurtured the 
new Soviet woman. As discussed elsewhere, the First All-Baku Party Conference in 1920 
approved employment of the old intelligentsia for the benefit of the nation, but under strict 
Communist Party control.124 However, over time, the Party position on this matter changed when 
in 1925, school curricula came increasingly under state control and supervision. Along with this, 
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by the mid-1920s, the Azeri Soviet educational centres issued the first cohort of graduates who 
received four-year elementary training in the Soviet style. These female students immediately 
became literacy and elementary teachers.  
After 1921, the Party organized 40 courses in Azerbaijan alone that aimed to prepare 237 
future executive officers including 15 women.125 By 1924, the share of the new cultural and 
political elite of Azeri origin increased from 16.8% to 60% among all state bureaucrats.126 In 
March, 1926, TsIK AzCPb passed a special directive that required annual reporting on native Azeri 
intelligentsia promotions, emphasizing this as a state priority.127 In 1927, only 37 people with 
university education and 267 with secondary education degrees gained before the Revolution 
remained among 27,058 Party members and candidates as compared with 1,000 in 1921.128 The 
so-called vydvizhentsi, young specialists, nurtured within the Soviet system, replaced the members 
of the old intelligentsia.129 Due to the official politics, the Commissariat of Enlightenment under 
the Communist Party’s supervision began the crusade against teachers with any association with 
the religious and bourgeois past. 
In 1927, the Communist Party of Azerbaijan declared an end to cooperation with the “old-
regime associators,” demanding the end of the use of Azeri old intelligentsia in cultural-
enlightenment work among women. The Party instructed Zhenotdel’s workers to reduce the 
numbers of old-style influential women in the women’s clubs and to attract young women of 
humble origin, kesabchi, batrachki i bedniachki, from the regions.130  After 1927, many members 
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of the old intelligentsia, including teachers and officials of the Muslim women’s clubs and 
Zhenotdel, fell victim to intra-Party conflicts: they were accused of “petit-bourgeois bias and 
nationalism” and were expelled from their positions. The teachers that emerged in the early years 
of Bolshevik rule and particularly those whose world-view was formed by the old-Imperial 
reformist discourse had been gradually replaced by the new generation of educators. 
 
In conclusion, the education of Azeri girls and women, along with the struggle for gender 
equality, began two decades before the Soviet movement for ending female illiteracy and the 
introduction of women’s associations. The Soviet rhetoric of the 1920s on women and girls’ 
education and empowerment had several similarities to Azeri late-Imperial reformist rhetoric. Like 
the Azeri reformers, the Soviet activists advocated for education for women and girls so that they 
could be good mothers, bringing up children in an enlightened way for the benefit of the nation. 
However, the most attractive argument for the Azeri liberal intellectuals was that the Bolsheviks 
referred to the need to establish public schools for girls as a state priority. As I argue elsewhere, 
the Azeri pre-revolution modernist discourse to promote innovative schooling, a didactic press, 
and societies for enlightenment, succeeded only in ethnically diverse Baku and its surroundings. 
The absolute lack of support from the Imperial government and dependency on oil-magnates’ 
goodwill were the main reasons for the failure of the reforms in Azerbaijan.  
For the Bolsheviks, the elimination of illiteracy among the Azeri female population was 
imperative for effective political indoctrination and thus, for political mobilization. In the early 
1920s, the Soviet government educational apparatus accepted any literate person as a teacher to 
implement the politics of illiteracy elimination and to attract Azeri people to the Soviet 




the Soviet discourse that described old educational centres as the refuge of old capitalistic culture, 
and the previously-educated teachers as traditionalists, these educators were, nevertheless, the only 
literate agents of the Soviet project for enlightenment in the 1920s. However, since end of the 
1920s this cohort of teachers and activists disappeared from the ranks of educators. Print media 
bolstered the image of educated at the non-Soviet schools female activists as unimportant. Thus, 
those who had connections to the old-imperial training began to deny any associations with the old 
system because of the risk of unemployment and imprisonment as an alien class. The new legion 
of Azeri Soviet instructors, who had no connections to the pre-revolution education system, 
acquired the central roles.  
During the late-1920s, the numbers of Azeri girls and women in Soviet public schools rose 
spectacularly. One of the most important factors in this achievement was the foundation of public 
schools for girls with instruction in the Azeri language. Another factor was success in the program 
of illiteracy elimination among women at the women’s clubs, bathhouses, private houses, and so-
called corners of knowledge established for rural and nomadic women. The clubs were particularly 
successful because they not only trained women in literacy, but also produced teachers and 
activists who became deeply committed to Soviet modernization and equality for women. These 
Azeri women, such as A. Sultanova, D. Bairamova, G. Kadyrbekova, S. Efendiieva, and many 
others, formed the core of the Muslim female emancipation movement that brought an end to 










Literature and the Journal “Sharg Gadini” as a Mirror of Gender Reforms in 
Azerbaijan 
 
On the road to Azeri Turkic women’s 
liberation there are many obstacles, such as 
parochial old customs, nasty clerics, 
confrontations with the bourgeois 
Musavatists and passivity of the peasants. We 
need to employ the print media and literature 
to overcome these obstructions and to spread 
the seeds of the Communist values. 
The AzCPb’s instruction about propaganda 
work among the Azeri population.1  
 
 
In Azerbaijan, the Soviet gender discourse of the 1920s resembled the modernist ideas of 
the old-Imperial Azeri reformers in many ways; both agencies aimed to end gender segregation, 
veiling, common illiteracy, and underage marriages. In the meantime, in the process of gender 
reformation, Soviet cultural and political leaders went far beyond pre-revolution reorganizers by 
pioneering equal rights for Muslim women in public life, work, payment, and land ownership. 
Moreover, they introduced courts and law enforcement executives who had to defend women’s 
personal and economic independence. To secure broad support for these reforms, Communist 
Party leaders and government officials appealed to the masses through the print media. In 
particular, the journal Sharg Gadini, Woman of the East, designed for Muslim women, sought to 
make the female population of Azerbaijan aware of their rights and to promote the Communist 
Party’s agenda to integrate Muslim women into the economic, political, and social life of the 
socialist state. 
 




This chapter focuses on the roles of Azeri literature and the journal Sharg Gadini, which 
juxtaposed images of the modern and backward Azeri woman, in an effort to convince Azeri 
society to embrace Soviet-style modernity. A close examination of the articles published in Sharg 
Gadini revealed that journal editors promoted the native’s government radical approach to 
emancipating Muslim women rather than the official Moscow program for gradual gender 
reformation. This chapter also demonstrates that the journal, advancing the idea of the modern 
Azeri woman, did not always fit into the internationalist modernism of Moscow official discourse. 
 
The Journal “Sharg Gadini”: The Conduit for Enlightening Values 
 
In the 1920s, Azerbaijani Soviet reforms for Muslim women’s emancipation represented 
two ideological frameworks, Communist and late-Imperial modernist. The Communist program 
specified the definitions of class, which does not know gender boundaries, and eternal class 
conflict to eradicate the remnants of patriarchal living. The late-Imperial modernist agenda aimed 
to convince society that proper female education contributes to society’s morality and progress. 
By juxtaposing images of modern and backward Azeri woman, Azeri Soviet writers and gender 
activists, like their late-Imperial predecessors, popularized these ideas in print media. The journal 
Sharg Gadini became the major print organ that aimed to influence female members of Azeri 
society to embrace Soviet-style modernity.  
The Azerbaijani Communist Party [AzCP(b)] and the Zhenotdel of Caucasus Bureau [CB] 




Sharg Gadini, designed specifically for Muslim women.2 The members of the Azeri Zhenotdel, as 
discussed elsewhere, were women of various nationalities, however, the editors of Sharg Gadini 
were always Azeri women. Ayna Sultanova led the journal between 1923 and 1931. Gulara 
Kadyrbekova was its chief editor from 1931 to 1937. The main contributors to the journal were 
also exclusively Azeri female activists for gender reformation, such as Ayna Sultanova, Gulara 
Kadyrbekova, Peri Alieva, Alivia Babaeva, Khalida Gasimova, Aziza Dzafarzade, and 
Khanumnaz Alibekova. The famous Azeri female writers and poets, Shafiga Efendiieva, Mirvarid 
Dilbazi, and Nigar Rafibeili, wrote for the journal by providing articles and poems where they 
criticized veiling, women’s seclusion, and illiteracy.  
 
 
Figure 27. The editorial staff of the journal Sharg Gadini. Sitting from left to right: (unidentified person), M. 
Mirzoeva, Sh. Efendiieva, A. Sultanova, Kh. Azizbekova, and K. Ishkova.  
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Sharg Gadini began its life in 1920 as a wall newspaper for women, circulated bi-weekly 
at the “Ali Bairamov” and other clubs by the Azerbaijani Zhenotdel functionaries. On July 2, 1923, 
the TsIK AzCP[b] issued a decree about the establishment of the journal for Muslim women. In 
November 1923, the local Zhenotdel distributed first forty-page issue of one thousand copies. 3 By 
giving the journal such a general name, Sharg Gadini, Woman of the East, Party officials stressed 
the enlightening goal of the journal, to liberate all Soviet Muslim women and girls from ignorance. 
The journal, in return, portrayed the Zhenotdel as a progressive agency that brought many positive 
changes to the ignorant society by eliminating veiling and female illiteracy at the women’s club. 
The journal also emphasized the role of the clubs in advancing Muslim women’s emancipation, 
and particularly the “Ali Bairamov” Club as a key player in the process of Muslim women’s 
liberation.4 
The journal’s cover page is a valuable document itself because it reflects the development 
of Soviet gender reform in Azerbaijan. Between 1923 and 1926, the cover page of the journal 
depicted a chained oriental woman in odalisque attire who dreamily looks at the rising sun under 
a big red star and a sickle, the Communist symbols. Beginning in 1926, the cover page of the 
journal had only a title and the issue number; this simplicity represented the official and 
monotonous language of the articles dedicated to Communist cultural ambitions. In 1928, when 
the government of the Azerbaijan Republic initiated a campaign of rapid universal unveiling, the 
cover page of every issue illustrated modern Azeri women who had thrown their veils off. From 
the end of 1929 and onward, the journal’s cover page demonstrated happy Azeri female shock 
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workers, pilots, engineers, athletes, and students, in this way emphasizing that the Communist 
Party fully liberated Muslim women, making them builders of the socialist state and absolutely 
equal to men.  
                                         
 
                                        
Figure 28. The cover pages of the journal Sharg Gadini, 1923, 1928, and 1929. Baku. Photo by author. 
 
The journal Sharg Gadini, as indicated in its name, promoted the Communist Party official 




partners in the Soviet Union on the road to internationalism. Sharg Gadini, being distributed 
among Soviet Turkic women,  had to appeal to all eastern women of the Soviet Union, promoting 
their equivalent status among all nationalities, even doing this exclusively in the Azeri language.5 
This standpoint was totally different from the approach of the other Muslim women’s journals, 
which manifested the creation of a modern, progressive nation. For example, the Uzbek language 
media created images of Uzbekistan for Uzbeks, and the women’s journal Yangi Yo’l, New Path, 
played an important role in defining Uzbek women and envisioning their relationship with the state 
of Uzbekistan.6 Such policy derived from the process of the definition of national borders all over 
the Soviet Union in 1922. In October 1924, Soviet government officials divided Turkestan into 
several republics. Soviet census officials regulated the presence of the major nationality groups in 
the territory of the former Russian Empire, in accordance with the lands they inhabited, and then 
established borders that would define new territorial entities, republics and autonomous regions. 
As Kamp demonstrates the women native to these entities, in particular “Uzbek women were no 
longer part of an undifferentiated mass of “eastern” women.”7 In Uzbekistan, the journal Yangi 
Yo’l was created to represent the interests of Uzbek women and girls. Kamp concludes that in the 
mid-1920s “Yangi Yo’l inscribed womanhood with nationality and nation-building with gender” 
when the republican leaders referred to Uzbekistan as a country.8  
In Azerbaijan, Party officials introduced the process of binding nation and gender 
significantly later. This process began in 1929 when Communist Party leaders presented a new 
paradigm of gender reform: as new citizens, women became as integral as men to the “ethnic 
 
5Nasirli, “Turkmen gadinlari,” Sharg Gadini, no. 5 (1924): 16–17;  Kasparova, “Shergda gadin khereketi,” Sharg 
Gadini, no. 1 (1924):  35–36; Nasirli, “Uzbek gadinlara yeni heiata dogru,” Sharg Gadini, no. 7 (1924): 21–22; 
Karpovsakia, “Turkestan gadinlari hayatinda,” Sharg Gadini, no. 11 (1924): 14–15. 
6 Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan, 97–99. 
7 Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan, 99. 




republic,” since the Soviet state and the Communist Party turned the titular nationalities across the 
Soviet Union into mobilized participants in building a socialist national entity.9  The new Soviet 
gender policy of 1929–1939 merged both gender and ethnicity in the creation of the nation state 
within the Azerbaijan Republic. Moscow-based and local government officials stopped 
distinguishing “culturally advanced” European women from “backward” Azeri Turkic or Muslim 
women. While promoting the image of Azerbaijani women, they ended describing the local female 
population as Muslim and Turkic. In this way, a new discourse emerged that emphasized that Azeri 
women ceased to be a part of the undistinguishable mass of oriental women. The culmination of 
these changes came in 1938 with the renaming of the journal Sharg Gadini into Azerbaijan Gadini, 
Woman of Azerbaijan, inscribing nation-building with womanhood in this way.  
As discussed elsewhere, in Azerbaijan, the gender reforms of the 1920s represented two 
ideological frameworks, Communist and late-Imperial modernist. The Communist discourse 
prioritized class and class conflict over the gender issues to transform the society from patriarchal 
into modern. However, Azeri gender activists preferred to discuss and work on the improvement 
of Muslim women’s societal status through gender, rather than class. This difference was 
profoundly evident in the pages of Sharg Gadini and Russian-language journal Kommunistka: the 
latter argued that feminism was a bourgeois program of pre-revolution elite women and thus, 
distracts the Soviet female population from the class struggle.10 While the all-Soviet journal 
promoted the interests of working class women, the Azeri journal started to debate class difference 
and class conflict among women significantly later, in 1929.  
 
9 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2001), 155, 357. 
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1923, 67–75;  Dvenadtsatyi S”ezd RKP(b). April 17–25, 1923. Stenograficheskii otchet. (Moscow, 1968), 724; 
Putilovskaia, “Rabota Kommunisticheskikh partii sredi zhenshchin narodov Vostoka,” Kommunistka 12–13, May–




Since the very first issue, Sharg Gadini’s editors stressed that the beneficiaries of Soviet-
style liberation from patriarchal practices were all Muslim women, regardless of their societal 
status.11 Azeri Zhenotdel leaders argued on the pages of Sharg Gadini that Azeri women 
collectively were more distinguished by cultural markers: literate versus illiterate, sedentary versus 
nomadic, urban versus rural, rather than by class. Contributors to Sharg Gadini were more devoted 
to the idea of the struggle of oppressed women against male enemies indoctrinated by Islamic 
covenants and patriarchal practices. Only at the end of the 1920s did the distinction between Party 
and non-Party Azeri women and between rich and poor women, and the wives of “alien elements” 
and those men devoted to the Soviet power, become the central characteristic in Sharg Gadini.12  
 Sharg Gadini also expressed a different position on the discussion on the role of religion 
in gender reforms from the Russian-language all-Union journal Kommunistka. In contrast to 
Kommunistka, the Azeri journal distinguished between superstition and religion, always 
emphasizing the purpose of female education for the good of motherhood, even doing this in the 
frame of the Soviet paradigm on a politically active female labor force.13 While Kommunistka was 
totally against any form of religious presence in the new socialist society, the Sharg Gadini journal 
editors did not produce strong antireligious proclamations but criticized only the radical clergy 
who interpreted Islamic covenants in a way that opposed women’s emancipation.14  
In 1926, the Azeri Soviet government unleashed a campaign that discredited the mullahs, 
and advocated the closing of all religious educational centres, along with the abolition of the Arabic 
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alphabet. Sharg Gadini and the republican central newspaper Kommunist were the first newsprints 
that changed their script from Arabic to Latin, beginning this process in 1926 and completely 
shifting to Latin in 1928. Azeri Communists considered the abolition of the archaic alphabet as an 
important part of the official state campaign against Islam, which aimed to put an end to the old 
way of thinking preserved by conservative clerics.15 It is important to admit that the Azerbaijani 
political elite, mostly consisting of late-Imperial and ADR politicians and intellectuals who strived 
for societal modernization and joined the Communist Party, gaining prominent leadership 
positions chose Latin script instead of Cyrillic for two important reasons. First, associating Cyrillic 
with the Tsarist past and linking themselves to the pro-Western late-Imperial enlighteners, the 
Azeri Communists aimed to continue those modernist ideas and to avoid the Russification 
promoted by the late tsarist regime.16 Second, the Azerbaijani gender reformers promoting 
Latinization, first in the women’s journal and then in other print media, stressed the leading role 
of Muslim women in societal modernization.17  
To spread the knowledge that the Communist regime was intolerant of patriarchal norms 
of living and stood at the guard of Muslim women, the journal had a specifically designed column 
called Noksanlara Atesh, Fire at the Misconducts. In that column, the editors and contributors 
reported about “crimes of daily life” — cases of forced marriage of minors and the sale of girls for 
qalim, bride money or valuable commodities paid by the bridegroom depending on his social 
status.18 The Azeri reporters brought to light cases concerning the men’s abusive behavior towards 
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women also warned about legal penalties for harassment of women.19 It is important to note that 
the Sharg Gadini contributors evaluated the cases of violence against Muslim women as violence 
against women and domestic violence stressing that abusers do not have ethnicity. Unlike local 
editors, the Moscow-based officials and journalists promoted a discourse in which Muslim women 
traditionally suffered from abusive men more than non-Muslim women. The latter ones built this 
discourse mostly using files that came from the records of Azeri Zhenotdel branches and were 
related only to Azeri women and silencing the facts of abuse of Armenian, Russian and other non-
Muslim women.20 
However, considering the publication of the Russian-language women’s periodicals 
Krest’ianka and Rabotnitsa, which also illustrated widespread interfamilial and political violence, 
it is clear that Russian women suffered as much as their Azeri female contemporaries from abusive 
patriarchy. These Russian women’s journals, unlike the official Party reports and the all-union 
journal Kommunistka, presented the cases of abuse towards Slavic women who opposed the male-
centric traditional society more accurately. Such Russian authors as P. Dorokhov, V. Gorshkov, 
G. Kuzmichev, N. Alekseeva, and others, illustrated the difficult life of the Russian peasant woman 
who suffered from a sadistic mother in-law, alcoholic husband, and oppressive customs. These 
editors and contributors to the journals for Russian women truly described all cases of atrocities 
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and harassment as the remnants of strong patriarchal traditions in Russian society, particularly in 
the rural areas of Soviet Russia.21 
As the history of humanity shows, every society that experienced the agricultural 
revolution and technological development, which led to surplus, societal hierarchy, and creation 
of state, encouraged the limitation of women’s rights and societal roles. According to Friedrich 
Engels, the advance of patriarchal relations began with the establishment of tradition that requires 
to pass property in the male line. Thus, to eliminate any concerns about fatherhood the patriarchy 
imposes strict control of women’s chastity to minimize their contact with men who are not related 
to family.22 It is also true that long before the establishment of Islam, many agriculturally and 
technologically developed Middle Eastern cultures of the pre-Muslim period and ancient European 
Greek and Roman civilizations established veiling and gender segregation to control women. In 
those class-structured societies, veiling and seclusion became one of the social markers for urban 
middle- and upper-class women, showing that they did not have to perform manual or sexual work 
like low-class women or female slaves.23 Thus, the arrangements between genders and social ranks 
produced different systems of male dominance, Islamic and non-Islamic patriarchy, that are 
equally responsible for gender inequality and women’s subordination.  
  The official Soviet discourse, which stated that Muslim women suffered more than 
European women, can also be explained by long-established public opinion which tended to 
present Muslim women as victims. As Nikki R. Keddie argues, this viewpoint came from the 
ideological differences and hostilities between Islamic and European cultures. Keddie stresses that 
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Western beliefs about the Islamic world exaggerate only negative traits, particularly of gendered 
relationships, such as women’s seclusion, veiling and polygyny, that presumably force women to 
“live without meaning or satisfaction.”24  
Along with this, Edward W. Said’s term Orientalism also defines cultural distinctions 
between the European and Islamic worlds. Orientalism became the starting point for Western 
civilization to introduce scientific theories, novels, social narratives, and political justifications 
concerning the Orient, its people, and customs. According to the theory of Orientalism, the Islamic 
world was extremely primitive, violent, despotic, irrational, inferior, and governed by lust. Thus, 
enlightened Europeans felt obliged to bring “progressive and contemporary Western 
enlightenment” to the reactionary Oriental world to civilize it.25 The Russian Communists, like 
their Imperial predecessors, believed in their enlightening mission to rescue Muslim people, and 
in particular Muslim women, from the oppressive Islamic laws and norms of living, emphasizing 
this mission in the Party protocols and women’s journals.  
In the 1920s, Azeri editors and journal contributors explained violence towards Muslim 
women as an attempt of the patriarchy to keep female family members in submission, opposing 
their desire to study or work outside home.26 Male family heads, regardless of social status, took 
advantage of norms of conduct in Islamic society, presuming that men could dictate women’s 
public role and dress. From 1929 on, Sharg Gadini transformed this image of an ordinary abusive 
man into a class enemy; this coincided with the period of collectivization, a consolidation of 
individual peasant landholdings and labor into collective farms, so called kolkhozes.  
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By introducing collectivization of the agrarian sector, the Stalinist government aimed to 
boost agricultural production and liberate poor peasants from economic servitude to the land 
owners, kulaks, in this way completing the class war and totally end patriarchal relationships in 
the rural world.27 While in the early and mid-1920s the journal’s articles claimed that only 
backward men oppressed women, in 1929, the journal editors introduced a new image of an 
oppressor – a man affiliated with clergy, wealth, and former nobility. Starting in 1929, Sharg 
Gadini articles systematically revealed that the local Zhenotdel’s reports linked male abusers with 
the “alien class” of the former nobility and the clergy. They presented those cases as a result of a 
female fight against enslavement imposed by wealthy men and clerics, along with a female desire 
to gain economic and social independence.28  
The journal also paid considerable attention to the question of an appropriate age of 
marriage for girls, with the mission to increase public awareness of the new laws since women’s 
societal status in Azerbaijan had significantly changed. In 1923, the Azerbaijani Civil Code on 
Family, Marriage, and Child Support declared that only those new marriages registered at civil 
offices, ZAGS, would be regarded as legitimate, although it did recognize all the religious 
marriages arranged before 1920.29 Divorce became possible on the demand of one of the spouses 
regardless of their gender and could be obtained through court procedure. The Soviet code also 
increased the minimum age for marriage from 13 to 16 for women and from 15 to 18 for men set 
 
27 Baberowski,  Vrag est’ vezde: Stalinism na Kavkaze, 617–618. 
28 Simurg, “Azadlig uchun jinaiet,” Sharg Gadini, no. 10–11 (1927): 68–71; “Turk gadinlara jolunu kesme,” Sharg 
Gadini, no. 8 (1929): 17; Safi, “Jenaiet gurbani,” Sharg Gadini, no. 2 (1929): 23–25. 
29  Istoria gosudarstva i prava v Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR (1920–1934) (Baku: AzGiz, 1973), 327–335; E. Zakhar’ian, 




previously by the Civil Code of the Russian Empire.30 This also was remarkably different from the 
Sharia norms allowing marriages among minors.31  
The Criminal Code of 1926 qualified polygyny, child marriage, bride-money, and marriage 
by coercion as criminal acts and introduced imprisonment from three to ten years for those who 
exercised old matrimonial traditions violating the Soviet regulations.32 Sharg Gadini highlighted 
the Zhenotdel’s activity as the main means by which the Party and state enforced the new 
legislative principles. The journal constantly stressed that the agency worked for Muslim women’s 
benefits. Sharg Gadini editors promoted the activity of legal instructors who explained the 
advantages of the new legislation and women’s rights in the family across the republic.  
It is important to admit that in discussing the appropriate age of marriage, the Azeri 
contributors to Sharg Gadini connected it to the stage of psychological maturity rather than to the 
age of physical development. This point of view was different from the standpoint of their 
counterparts in Soviet Uzbekistan who paid more attention to the physical development of young 
women. The doctors of Soviet Uzbekistan, such as Anel Asfendiarova and Izzedine Seifulmuluk, 
wrote plaintively against early marriage. They structured their arguments comparing the age of 
puberty of Uzbek girls and girls in the South Caucasus, not specifying the ethnic and religious 
backgrounds of the latter. The Central Asian doctors asserted that while girls in the South Caucasus 
entered the period of puberty by age 10, the records of doctors showed that Uzbek girls typically 
began to menstruate at age 15 or 16. Thus, they concluded that Uzbek girls should not be married 
until their bodies were fully developed to bear children without difficulties, which is possible for 
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young women only between the ages of 18 and 21. The doctors from Uzbekistan concluded that 
the marriage of prepubescent girls represented not only a native backwardness but also led to the 
“degeneration of nation” because the result of such unions would be defective children.33  
Azeri gender reformers and the Sharg Gadini editors, unlike their Uzbek colleagues, did 
not employ medicine in asserting the proper age for marriage. The Azeri journal contributors 
prioritized psychological development over bodily development for maternity benefits, which was 
a direct outcome of the pre-revolution discourse. They stressed that early marriage was the major 
obstacle to raising the educational level of every woman and her children and thus, a millat.34 In 
this way, the journal advocated the pre-revolution discourse presuming that eradicating illiteracy 
was essential for effective societal modernization. Nevertheless, the authors in Sharg Gadini 
employed ideas about medicine in denouncing another societal evil, namely the veil, as the 
fundamental issue and symbol of female isolation.  
As it was discussed elsewhere, veiling was culturally specific among certain groups of the 
Azeri Muslim population. Among Azeri women, those of the urban communities, Baku, Ganja, 
and Lenkoran, wore a face- and body-covering veil, chadra. To signal their presence in the street, 
Muslim women in chadras wore wooden clogs that produced noise and warned men to yield the 
sidewalk.35 In contrast, rural and nomadic women who worked in the fields and moved the herds 
from summer to winter pasturelands neither covered their faces nor wrapped their bodies. They 
wore the head scarf, kelagaia, and others forms of head scarves as sign of modesty.36 In 1928, 
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Azeri Communists and intellectual elites initiated a campaign for the rapid abolition of the chadra 
and reflected on their achievements and advancements in the socialist society on the pages of Sharg 
Gadini.37  
The editors of Sharg Gadini employed medical reasons, with support from Soviet doctors, 
claiming that veiling and a secluded lifestyle provoked various female ailments, from respiratory 
diseases to slowed fetal development during a pregnancy.38 Another argument was that veil-
wearing violated workplace safety rules, because it could cause injury and suffocation.39 In the 
meantime, journal contributors always stressed that unveiling did not lead to loss of morality 
among women, and tried to ease the societal tensions aroused, in particular among the urban 
community of Baku city. Thus, most of Sharg Gadini’s articles focused on new laws and the 
problems with their enforcement. The journal’s editorial column, Noksanlara Atesh, exposed those 
who harassed women and provided reports from courts that guarded female honor and rights.40 
This innovative tactic to protect and promote women’s rights in the print media and literature 
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The Image of Azeri Women in Azeri Soviet Literature 
 
Azeri Soviet gender reformers were deeply committed to Azerbaijan’s modernization, and 
encouraged the dismissal of the old lifestyle by glorifying the universal affordability of Soviet 
new-style education, which shaped a modern woman. The novels and plays produced during the 
1920s by Azeri writers, comparing the old life to the new life, education versus ignorance, agitated 
for the benefits of Soviet education to Muslim young women. This manifestation resonates with 
the pre-revolution discourse that opposed qaranliq, ignorance, against ishig, enlightenment. In 
Azerbaijani literature there are two outstanding plays that echo this pre-revolution Azeri discussion 
about the need for Muslim women’s education and empowerment.  
In 1928, the Azeri playwright Dzhafar Dzhabbarli (1899–1934) wrote two novels, entitled 
Almas and Sevil, that described the various tensions and cultural influences that shaped the life of 
the Soviet Azeri woman. These two works greatly contributed to the campaign for Muslim 
women’s enlightenment. The plays were a part of the school curriculum throughout the Soviet 
period, and still are in the school program in modern Azerbaijan. The plays take a strong anti-
clerical position that is more reflective of the secularist discourse of the late-imperial Azeri 
reformers for the benefit of enlightened women, mothers, and thus millat, rather than the atheism 
of the Soviet ideology. The plays illustrate the character development of two young women named 
Almas and Sevil during the late 1920s.  
Almas, the main character of the novel of the same name, is a young schoolteacher who 
returns from the city to her village to teach at a new school. She is sincerely devoted to the Soviet 




education, the change of women’s status, and redistribution of wealth.41 She struggles not only 
against the old customs, but also against the opportunism and abuses of those Soviet officials who 
came from the old wealthy families. She also fights the immoral Islamic priests who lure women 
at the mosques and she calls for the transformation of these spiritual centres into women’s clubs 
to end parochial male-dominated influence.42 The play, written in very plain language, aimed to 
inspire Azeri Muslim women in their empowerment. The official report that discussed the role of 
literature in shaping public disposition indicates that the Soviet authorities decided to propagandize 
this play all over the Soviet Union.43 To broaden its ideological appeal, Soviet officials produced 
a film based on this play in 1929 that was shown across the Soviet Union. The film was one of the 
first films produced at the Azerbaijan Film Studio, which was established in 1920 in Baku, and 
later named after D. Dzhabbarli.  
It is important to note that the play Almas does not debate the issue of veiling. This can be 
explained by the fact, discussed elsewhere, that rural Azeri women did not wear a veil. However, 
in another play entitled Sevil, the issue of veiling, along gender equality, is the central subject.44 
Because of its focus on the important issue of Muslim women’s empowerment, the play Sevil was 
and still is very popular in Azerbaijan.45 Unlike Almas, the play’s main character, Sevil, became a 
symbol of the modern Azeri woman: educated, skilled, career-minded, independent, and 
passionate about gender equality. The popularity of this character also can be explained by the fact 
that Sevil’s personal and societal achievements were a result of her hard work and dedication to 
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her goals. She had to overcome many hardships, such as poverty and a narrow-minded, abusive 
husband, to become successful.  
The play narrates the story of Sevil, a 19-year-old illiterate young mother. She is married 
at the age of 13 to a man named Balash, an employee at the Soviet state bank in Baku, and a former 
trader. Balash likes to spend his time at the casinos and bars. He has an affair with an Azeri woman 
named Edilia. Edilia came from a bourgeois family. She is fluent in Russian and French. Edilia 
received training as a beautician in Paris. She likes to spend time at the restaurants and dresses in 
a fashionable, Western style. Balash admires her and, spending more money on her than he can 
earn, needs to perform several fraudulent activities at his bank to have additional income. Unlike 
Edilia, Sevil is always at home caring for her little son and the house. She wears chadra in front 
of non-family male guests, does not go outside, and in accordance with Balash’s words, acts more 
like a servant to her husband rather than a friend of life, haiat joldashi.  
Balash is also unhappy with the behavior of his sister, Guliush. Guliush is a member of one 
of the Soviet women’s clubs and struggles to end Muslim women’s unprivileged societal position. 
She tries to improve Sevil’s life, and her marriage as a whole, by changing her sister’s-in-law 
attitude to female status in a family. However, Sevil argues that she must obey her husband because 
er, Allahin kolgesidir, a husband is a shadow of God. This response makes Guliush angry: she 
argues that if God exists, he will never put a Muslim woman, one of his children, in such an 
underprivileged position. She advises Sevil to stop wearing chadra and to go to school to become 
independent, to survive the upcoming era of cultural transformation, medeniat zelzelesi. Sevil soon 
realizes the truth of these words when her husband announces his intentions to divorce her and 
marry Edilia. Balash throws Sevil out of their house. Their son, in accordance with Islamic and 




alimony and deprived of seeing her son, she has to become a domestic servant at someone’s 
household to survive.  
Guliush, who works as a kindergarten teacher, is extremely disappointed with the 
carelessness of her new sister-in-law toward her nephew and takes care of him for several 
(unspecified) years. On his tenth birthday, she organizes a birthday party. Guliush bitterly notices 
that her brother’s new marriage is not happy as a result of Edilia’s frivolous behavior with other 
men and total neglect of her husband, stepson, and their home. Balash loses his job at the bank 
because of his fraudulent operations, which ruins his reputation. Later, during the party, Sevil 
arrives to see her son. She looks modern and behaves confidently. She explains these changes by 
saying that she went to work at a factory and began to study the literacy courses organized at the 
women’s club. For her achievements, the Party granted her a scholarship to study at the university 
in Moscow where she lives now. She came for her son’s birthday party to present him with her 
gift, a toy airplane. She proposes to her son that he act in his life like this airplane, to bravely 
overcome all earthly forces to achieve his dreams. Balash is amazed by the image of a modern 
woman and without any apology proposes that Sevil remarry him. Sevil categorically rejects him, 
denouncing his consumeristic attitude to women, and finishes her speech with the glorification of 
the Soviet achievements in women’s liberation, culture, and science.46  
For many Muslim women, who experienced humiliation from male family heads and lived 
as powerless creatures, the play Sevil became an inspiration in their struggle to end isolation, 
illiteracy, and veiling. As Ayna Sultanova recalled, after reading this play or watching the film, 
many Muslim women abandoned their chadras and went to study in schools and courses organized 
at the clubs to become educated and skilled individuals.47   
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Even though the plays Almas and Sevil manifest all the elements of socialist realist 
literature that glorifies technology, industry, and Soviet feminism, and critiques the old patriarchal 
way of living, they also resemble features of the pre-revolutionary understanding of the role of 
education for the woman’s and nation’s benefit. Sevil, in particular, reflects the Azeri modernists’ 
perception that a modern woman must be educated and publicly active, but she should not ignore 
the other moral demands of Azeri society. Dzhabbarli introduced the character of Edilia to criticize 
those women who understood the newly acquired liberties incorrectly. Instead of using their 
freedom to gain an education and new skills, these women preferred to mix freely with men, wear 
décolletage, sleeveless, and short dresses, cut their hair, begin smoking, and forget their wifely and 
motherly duties while living in mixed-gender society. The author presented them negatively, 
emphasizing that such outcomes came from a lack of proper education, and as a result, such 
morally disoriented women were always left without family, jobs, or societal respect. The plays 
Almas and Sevil mirrored the reformists’ discourse, which did not aim to challenge traditional 
gendered social norms around female chastity. It stated that Azeri women and girls still had to 
maintain their namus and not to bring any shame to their families by becoming morally corrupt 
while living in a mixed-gender environment. 
Other Azeri writers, namely Dzhalil Mamedkulizade, Mehdi Gusein, Abdulla Shaik, and 
Tagi Shahbazi Simurg, also wrote novels that compared backward and modern women, publishing 
some of them in the journal Sharg Gadini. The stories emphasized a Muslim young woman’s 
desire to study against the will of her retrograde parents, brothers, and husbands who advocated 
for traditional women’s roles.48 The moral of all stories published in the mid-1920s was that those 
young women who had opposed their backward relatives would become teachers, nurses, or 
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engineers, and could support themselves and even their old ailing parents later in life, while those 
who followed their parents’ advice to stay passively at home were left in miserable conditions 
when they lost their husbands due to illness or divorce.49  
The writers of two neighboring countries, Turkey and Iran, which also went through a 
period of societal transformation, also employed literature to promote the reforms of women’s 
status in Islamic societies. In Turkey, since the late-Ottoman period (1900–1918), the writers were 
divided into Islamist, Westernist, and Turkist positions. The first group opposed gender 
reformation while the latter two favored it.50 The pro-Western authors, Sinasi, Namik Kemal, 
Sabakhaddin Ali, and others, argued in their works that the introduction of equal rights and modern 
education for women and young girls would eliminate the oppressive aspects of traditional 
marriage and the family. Those men of letter also made Muslim women responsible for societal 
stagnation because of their idleness and ignorance.51 Unlike those writers, the female editors of 
the women’s journal Kadinlar Duniasy, Women’s World, (1913–1921) argued that men and 
patriarchy were responsible for women’s subordination. To change women’s societal status, the 
contributors proposed Western models of the gender reorganization: the introduction of women 
into the labor force, equal pay, voting rights, and equality in marriage and the family. 
In 1923, after the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey, the new discourse that favored pro-Turkist ideals around women’s role in society became 
dominant. Atatürk (1881–1938), one of the founders of the Republic of Turkey and its first 
President, abolished Islam as a state religion, introduced secular co-education, limited access to 
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the gender-inegalitarian Arabic and Ottoman texts and promoted Turkishness.52 One of the 
ideological fathers of Atatürk’s gender reforms, Ziya Gökalp, advocated “Turkish feminism.” He 
called for a return to pre-Islamic Turkic societal norms that encouraged women’s power, even in 
warfare. Like the old-Imperial Azeri intellectuals, M. F. Akhundov and A. Agayev, Gokalp 
claimed that Arabic and Islamic influence undermined Turkic women’s liberties. The Turkish 
writers of the 1920s followed Gokalp in this rhetoric, arguing that women’s education and equality 
were important assets to a new Turkey.53 
In Iran, starting in 1920, native writers also produced literary works that promoted an image 
of enlightened and publicly active women for the benefit of the whole nation. The Iranian writers 
Mohamed Ali Jamalsadeh, Iraj Mirza, and Sadeg Hedayat, like their Azeri counterparts, compared 
the traditional woman, degraded by early marriage and ignorance, with the modern, educated 
woman. The editors and contributors to the newspapers Shafag-i-Sorkh, Red Aurora, and Nahid, 
Venus, promoted the model of Western type modernity based on mixed-gender education and 
women’s rights in the workforce and family.54 The Iranian press of the 1920s discussed the harmful 
aspects of veiling and polygyny, promoting ideas about the reorganization of gender roles that 
were finally realized during the reformative period of Reza Shah Pahlavi, 1936–1941.55 Hence, in 
the 1920s, Soviet Azerbaijan was not unique in experiencing gender reformation as reflected in 
and endorsed by literary works.  
In conclusion, the Azeri writers and the contributors of the journal Sharg Gadini, like their 
late-Imperial predecessors, believed that the introduction of education to Muslim women would 
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be beneficial for both family and nation, millat. Sharg Gadini played an important role, covering 
the issues of illiteracy and backwardness. The editors, continuing the old-Imperial discourse 
against patriarchal traditions, connected the negative consequences of child-marriage with the 
problem of eliminating illiteracy. The journal editors argued that early marriage was the major 
obstacle in raising the educational level of every woman and her children. In this way, the journal 
blended late-Imperial rhetoric with the Communist Party politics that claimed that the eradication 
of illiteracy was essential for effective political communication and societal modernization. While 
ethnically diverse Zhenotdel leaders stood for the Party program for women’s empowerment 
through their involvement in the workforce, Sharg Gadini’s exclusively Azeri native editors 
continued to promote education as an only means of liberation. Sharg Gadini combined pre-
revolution and Soviet rhetoric: women were seen as “mothers of the nation, millat”, women 
suffered from the patriarchal oppression, and women empowered by the new rights to end the 
dictate of patriarchy. 
While the official discourse always stressed that a modern woman must be educated and 
publicly active, the native writers reminded that woman should not ignore the important moral 
demands of Azeri society. Azeri women and girls still had to preserve their namus and not 
jeopardize the reputation of their families and communities by becoming immoral while living in 
a mixed-gender environment. The journal also promoted the legal regulations to defend them by 
exposing incidents of atrocities against women and girls committed by abusive men. By criticizing 
the abusers and popularizing court cases, the journal made two fundamental shifts in the gendered 
power relations of traditional Islamic society: Muslim women obtained access to law and the courts 




marked the Soviet policy accomplishments by granting Muslim women equal opportunities to gain 








The Thorny Road to Liberation 
It was much easier to explain a veil than to 
answer questions about the wounds. 
                               Pawan Mishra1  
 
The late-Imperial discourse about the introduction of women’s rights and the abolition of 
the veil made a significant contribution to raising awareness about gender equality in Soviet 
Azerbaijan. Azeri feminists and male reformers welcomed the Soviet state program to accelerate 
societal transformation through granting women legal rights and severely punishing those men 
who went against the reforms. In 1928, Azeri government officials declared that modernity was 
incompatible with veiling and inequality. Unveiling became a topic of public argument and 
conflict in Azeri society. The proponents of immediate veil abolition, generally presented by early 
Azerbaijani Imperial reformers and female graduates of the Tagiev school, considered it a 
symbolic act of woman’s departure from the patriarchal past. Opponents to prompt chadra 
eradication, Moscow-appointed Communist officials, stood for the gradual abolition that would be 
an outcome of public education and women’s introduction to the socialist labor force.  
This episode in the history of the Soviet program to modernize Azeri society through rapid 
chadra abolition challenges two dominant historiographical accounts. First, the Soviet version, 
which credits the Communist Party’s program and Moscow-imposed officials for the liberation of 
backward Muslim women through unveiling. This discourse glorifies Soviet cultural policies that 
 




made Azeri women emancipated and excludes the Azeri agency from the process of gender 
reorganization.2 The second account, which became dominant from 1991 and the downfall of 
Communist rule in Azerbaijan and which advanced the people’s determination to assess their past 
and future, is maintained by Western and modern-day Azeri historians. This group of scholars 
argue that mass unveiling was an exclusively Moscow-initiated program that cruelly subjected a 
powerless Muslim populace to a totally alien and uninvited cultural transformation.3 These both 
of interpretations are united in one aspect: the reluctance to recognize Azeri male and female 
agencies in chadra abolition and the acquisition of equal rights. 
This chapter examines Azeri agency in unveiling and Azeri women’s empowerment. It also 
investigates the implementation of Soviet gender policies focusing on conflict among regional and 
central Communists, divided by ideology, religion, and ethnicity. It demonstrates the debates and 
confrontations between the Azerbaijani gender activists, whose worldview stemmed from the pre-
Soviet gender discourse, and the Moscow officials, in pursuit of legal equality and particularly 
unveiling. This chapter also examines the development of Soviet reorganization, particularly the 
agrarian reform that elevated Azeri women’s societal position in a village, and resistance to these 
reforms initiated by patriarchal societal and family leaders to preserve their power and social 
status. By analyzing the court documents of the late 1920s, this part of the study investigates the 
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causes of the murders of emancipated Azeri women, and the consequences of these murders on 
the Soviet gender campaign for Muslim women’s emancipation. 
 
Soviet Law on Guard for a New Azeri Woman  
  
Women’s status in the Azeri community changed gradually through a series of 
compromises between Sharia, secular regulations dating to the late Imperial and ADR periods, 
and new Soviet legal initiatives. Introducing legal equality in Azerbaijan, the Bolshevik 
government, considered it to be a leading force in societal transformation. Soviet civil law aimed 
to overthrow patriarchal traditions and customs and totally change Muslim women’s societal and 
family positions. Azeri female gender reformers initiated the legal changes that brought an end to 
the old family traditions. In 1921, at the First Congress of Eastern Women, held in Baku, they 
issued a resolution to end early and polygamous marriages. In 1922, the female delegates of the 
Congress of Transcaucasian Women, also organized in Baku and representing the work of 4,000 
Zhenotdel activists, passed several decrees that separated religious laws from marriage and 
divorce.4 In 1926, the Azerbaijani Civil Code on Family, Marriage and Child-Support increased 
the minimum age for marriage, set previously by the Civil Code of the Russian Empire, from 13 
to 16 for women and from 15 to 18 for men.5 This also was remarkably different from the Sharia 
norms allowing marriages of female minors aged 9 to 11.6  
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The new Civil Code also declared that only those marriages registered at civil offices, 
ZAGS,7 would be regarded as legitimate, although it did recognize all the religious marriages 
arranged before 1920.8 The Soviet Code demanded that marriage seekers provide two official notes 
at the ZAGS. The first official document was a doctor’s medical resolution that confirmed the 
appropriate ages of the marriage seekers. The second document was a legal document, signed by 
a lawyer, confirming that the marriage pursuers were not in any existing marriage. Aiming to end 
the Islamic practice of male-initiated marriage annulment, the new Civil Code allowed women to 
demand a divorce through a court proceeding.9 The new regulations also defended divorced, 
unemployed women, obliging the former male spouses to pay their wives alimony for three years 
and to support their children until the age of 18.10  
In 1926, to defend those rights, the Soviet government introduced a Criminal Code that 
qualified polygyny, child marriage, bride-money, and marriage by coercion as criminal acts. In 
December 1928, the Criminal Code introduced fines and imprisonment from three to ten years for 
those who exercised old matrimonial traditions that violated the Soviet regulations.11 Soviet law 
stressed that women and men were equal in all aspects of social and political lives, making, 
however, some exemptions for women, granting them  twenty-six months of maternity leave and 
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three to five working days of menstrual leave per month, and limiting female labor in heavy 
industry.12  
As the Party and the Soviet government considered the new laws to be an important tool 
for the upcoming cultural revolution, the state implemented aggressive measures to reinforce them 
in the Muslim patriarchal society. Zhenotdel became the main means by which the Party and state 
imposed the new legislative principles. In 1922 alone, the Azerbaijani Zhenotdel introduced 
twenty-three instructors who explained the advantages of the new legal and women’s rights in the 
family and work force. By 1924, their number grew to forty, and they ran nine legal aid bureaus 
that moved across the republic to educate people in the regions.13  
In 1923, the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan Republic [TsIK AzSSR] founded 
the Azerbaijani Committee for Improving Working Women’s Life, Azkomtruzhenits, and tasked it 
with the integration of “culturally backward women,” particularly in the urban areas.14 That 
agency, under the leadership of G. Kadyrbekova, had representatives from various Commissariats: 
Enlightenment, Health, Finance, and Justice. It supervised the implementation of the Party 
program on female emancipation through those bodies.15 Azkomtruzhenits monitored female 
unemployment, coordinated the work of the shelters for homeless women and prostitutes, provided 
work for those in need, and advocated for sending Muslim girls to public educational schools and 
using general health centers instead of attending religious schools and traditional healers.16 Three 
years later, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union [TsIK SSSR] established the 
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Committee for Improvement of Labor and Life of Women, KUTB.17 In Azerbaijan, both 
committees played an important role in women’s integration into modern society through the 
abolition of the patriarchal order.18  
KUTB and Azkomtruzhenits oversaw the implementation of the state and Party programs 
for the popularization of the new matrimonial law and punishment of those who violated it. The 
legitimacy of pre-Soviet marriages along with those registered at the Soviet civil offices produced 
confusion. Kadyrbekova revealed, providing the records of numerous cases, that Muslim men 
married second wives by civil registration while continuing to live with first wives from pre-Soviet 
religious marriages.19 The agencies also recorded the number of abandoned women and the 
difficulties they later faced in entering another marriage because they did not officially terminate 
their pre-Soviet religious marriage. Zhenotdel’s workers also voiced another problem facing 
Muslim women: the struggle to obtain Islamic alimony, mahr,20 from men who refused to pay it 
on the basis that mahr was no longer legal. Kadyrbekova and Ishkova presented evidence that 
many Muslim men also refused to pay the Soviet court-ordered alimony to a spouse – claiming 
that they did not recognize its authority either.21  
KUTB and Azkomtruzhenits also revealed that many male Party and state bureaucrats had 
abandoned their “unenlightened” Muslim wives: they had affairs with the so-called sovbaryshni, 
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female clerks of non-Muslim origin. The Zhenotdel officials complained that those men refusing 
to support their previous families, even by court order, set negative examples for rank-and-file 
Communists.22 Therefore, during the first years of the coexistence of Soviet and religious 
matrimonial principles, KUTB and Azkomtruzhenits primarily worked on solving the problems 
provoked by “unenlightened” men who abused both matrimonial norms for their benefit and put 
Muslim women and their children in a vulnerable position.23 The State Archive of the Azerbaijan 
Republic, ARDA, has several files, del, each of 500–700 pages-long, that contain recorded 
complaints from Azeri women seeking to defend their rights and the well-being of their children 
from abusive men. This documents demonstrate that women enthusiastically went to that agency 
to obtain justice and what is more important, they received the support in settling the interfamilial 
issues.24 
The Azeri gender reformers argued that these problems came from women’s limited 
understanding of their rights and their adherence to customs and religious norms, that in turn, were 
an outcome of the insufficient work among Muslim women. Thus, the Zhenotdel activists 
popularized new laws through individual and public meetings, through print media, and amid the 
introduction of mobile legal aid corners at clubs and community centers, and at cooperative craft 
stores and cooperative stores.25 To develop Muslim women’s economic independence, and to 
expand the boundaries of their everyday life, the Azerbaijani Zhenotdel also organized, under 
Moscow’s supervision, craftsmen’s cooperative workshops, artel’, and cooperative stores that sold 
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goods produced only by Azeri female artisans exclusively to women at prices lower than at the 
regular stores owned by male traders.  
In 1921, there were twenty-one women’s artel’s across the republic: eleven in Baku and 
ten in other regions where nearly four thousand Muslim women worked.26 By 1931, the number 
of artel’s decreased to thirteen because many Azeri women found employment at the gender-
mixed industrial or civil centers. The largest artel’ in the republic was Gadin Zakhmati, Women’s 
Labor, located in Baku city. This center had 960 Azeri female members. The other twelve artel’s 
provided employment for 836 Azeri women in the republican regions.27 This difference in the 
number of employees in those gender segregated artel’s can be explained by the long-established 
culture of veiling and gender segregation in Baku and its modest existence in the regions. 
Artel’s and the cooperative stores were women-only businesses and ideal spaces for 
propaganda purposes, not only for socialist ideology and women’s rights, but also for everyday 
issues: modern child-raising, health care, and education.28 Unlike clubs, which also maintained 
gender segregation, these stores and artel’s received indisputable approval and support from the 
centre. Artel’s, in accordance with Marxist theory, would provide the basis for complete gender 
equality as the path to women’s liberation through “employment outside the home and the 
conversion of private, unpaid work performed within the household to work performed in the 
socialized sector and paid by public funds”.29 Another important mission of the male-free clubs, 
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artel’s, and stores was to convey to women the message that under the new law, they became equal 
to men in every aspect of social life. This idea was the cornerstone of Soviet-style modernization, 
which required the abolition of patriarchal and religious customs and had to ensure the freedom to 
participate in economic life.30  
Artel’s also became a legitimate means of survival for Azeri women from former 
aristocratic and rich families. Working at artel’ gave them an opportunity to support their families 
while their male relatives, considered “alien elements,” were not allowed to work at any Soviet 
office or industry or to serve in the military. The official propaganda emphasized that Soviet power 
culturally improved those old-regime Azeri women through the jobs provided at artel’s. Zhenotdel 
functionaries believed that while those women worked at artel’ they would end their unproductive 
existence and acknowledge Communist values.31 One example was the carpet weaving artel’ 
called Gadin Zakhmati, Woman’s Labor. The artel’s records indicate that the majority of its 
members were women of formerly high social status and were skilled in carpet weaving, sewing, 
and embroidery, proficiencies obtained at the old Imperial traditional and public educational 
centers. These skills helped them to find a job and support their families during the time of 
turbulent societal transformation that left many well-off families and individuals outside Soviet 
life. 
In the early 1920s, to popularize Soviet laws, All-Russian Communist Party officials 
introduced the institution of an elected female representative, delegatka. This female deputy from 
a work place, neighborhood, or village was required to attend a conference for women at the 
Zhenotdel or Communist Party meetings, and in return, had to explain Communist values in her 
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community.32 In Azerbaijan the delegatka program became known as the vakila program and was 
one of the Party’s effective strategies for bringing Azeri women into public life.33 This program 
allowed selected Muslim women from small towns and remote villages to gain knowledge about 
Soviet female rights by being fully financially sponsored during their stay at a larger centre for 
several weeks. Usually, vakila was a woman who had societal recognition in her community and 
very rarely a Communist Party member. The number of Azeri native representatives, vakila, was 
2,356 out of 6,070 among all female representatives in Azerbaijan.34 Vakila became vital to the 
regime to promote Soviet gender values for the benefit of women, families, and society. 
Kadyrbekova stated that the institution of vakila significantly helped Soviet leaders to promote 
laws that defended the new women’s rights and to attract the Muslim population, who feared 
forcible indoctrination.35 
The process of introducing Soviet legal norms in the Azeri community aroused many 
problems that hindered that process. Ismailova, the head of the Zhenotdel regional branch, claimed 
that the centre did not understand local realities as the result of the irregular work of the centre 
functionaries in remote regions and a lack of communication between peripheral branches and the 
headquarters.36 Another Zhenotdel worker, Rasul-zade, claimed that unfamiliarity with Islamic 
 
32 R. Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860–1930. 336 - 
350. Stites claims that the system of “delegate meetings” established by Zhenotdel in Russia was designed as an 
institution for women’s liberation and political indoctrination. Delegatka was a worker woman assigned to the 
Zhenotdel for a period of three to six months. After her apprenticeship delegatka would be appointed as an observer 
at a factory, school, hospital, village soviet, and trade union to report to Zhenotdel about the positive and negative 
aspects of the implementation of Soviet laws.  Stites argues that delegatka was a threat to male bureaucrats, drunkards, 
and camouflaged rich merchants, large landlords, and other “alien elements.”  
33 “Telegrammy TsK AKPb uiezdnym komitetam partii o komandirovanii zhenshchin-azerbaidzhanok na 
instruktorskiie kursy Zhenotdela. Ob orhanizatsii i provedenii “Nedeli Truzhenitsy” i drugoe,” (June 23, 1921–August 
22, 1921) ARDA f. 411, o. 1, d. 44, l. 19. 
34 “Statisticheskie svedeniia o sniavshikh chadru, o bytovykh prestupleniiakh, o vovlechenii zhenshchin v uchebu i 
rabotu,” (September 27, 1928–September 19, 1929) ARDA f. 379, o. 6, d. 74, l. 35. 
35 “Ustavy AzTSIK o deiatel’nosti delegatok,” (February 17, 1925–September 5, 1928) ARDA f. 379, o. 6, d. 5, ll. 5–
13. 
36 Izmailova, “Stenographicheskii otchet II vsesoiuznogo soveshchaniia rabotnikov zhenklubov, ugolkov i krasnykh 




norms among the central agents produced confusion: the centre often obliged men and non-Muslim 
female workers to work among secluded Muslim women, thus feeding speculation that the 
Zhenotdel was not a place for decent Muslim women.37 In March 1923, in the rural Kazakh region, 
these speculations surged when Zhenotdel activist Vetrova, a Russian-born woman, organized an 
anti-prostitution campaign attracting to the club local courtesans of non-Muslim background in the 
regional Zhenotdel. That event prevented many Azeri Muslims from joining the Zhenotdel 
women’s club. Along with this, Rasul-zade reported that some of the Zhenotdel regional female 
activists had the reputation of being immoral within their home societies, and that locals wanting 
to keep them far from their communities sent them to the centre as vakila.38  
In addition, some local female Zhenotdel functionaries behaved in a despotic manner, 
ruining the reputation of the agency. One of them, in the Lenkoran region, physically abused her 
female subordinates and bribed them into silence with extra food rations.39 The Zhenotdel activists 
acknowledged that such abusive and poorly educated employees undermined gender reforms for 
Muslim women’s empowerment. Baberowski claims that all these problems in Zhenotdel’s 
performance came from fact that Azeri native female gender reformers were absolutely illiterate 
women. He states that among Azeri Zhenotdel members, only A. Sultanova and N. Efendiieva 
were literate individuals who could understand and convey the message of Communist gender 
discourse to the broad masses and that this factor impacted the course of the reforms.40  
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Azeri gender reformers, like their central Moscow-based Zhenotdel colleagues, blamed 
patriarchal traditions but not ideological and administrative mistakes for the interruption of 
reforms. In 1928 they declared that veiling and seclusion were the main obstacles on the road to 
the emancipation of Muslim women. One of the main barriers to women’s emancipation, in the 
understanding of both the local and central Zhenotdel, was the veil as a fundamental issue and 
symbol of female societal isolation. In Azerbaijan, veiling was culturally specific among urban 
communities, especially Baku and Lenkoran, the longstanding Shia spiritual centers. Urban Azeri 
Muslim women, unlike those in village arears, wore a face and body-covering veil, chadra.41 As 
discussed elsewhere, long before the Soviet unveiling campaign, the issue of face-covering was a 
focus of public debates in Azerbaijan. This subject had its advocates, who argued against religious 
fanaticism and for the end of veiling and women’s segregation. Until 1928, the process of unveiling 
in Azerbaijan was voluntary and not regulated by the state. Those women who were unveiled 
before the Party call of 1928 were members of progressive families, graduates of the public 
schools, or spouses and sisters of leading Communists.  
From the first years of Bolshevik rule, Moscow-based government officials called for the 
gradual removal of veiling and the end of women’s isolation all over the Soviet Union, assigning 
this task to the Zhenotdel exclusively. The central resolutions for unveiling demanded graduality 
and carefulness not to deter Muslims from Soviet power. However, high-ranked Azerbaijani 
Communists and the editors of the journal Sharg Gadini were in opposition to this tactic and 
initiated the campaign that went ahead of the Moscow directives arguing for the introduction of 
certain laws and deadlines to abolish veiling and criticizing those who considered this task to be 
 
41 Azerbaycan Etnoqrafiyası. 3 vols. (ŞƏRQ-QƏRB: Baku, 2007), on different headcover styles, 2:130. On chadra, 




only the work of the Zhenotdel.42 Pre-revolution intellectuals and politicians who welcomed 
Communist  power argued that women’s liberation could not be achieved if the veil remained in 
society. M. Guliyev, A. Sultanova, G. Kadyrbekova, A. Karaev, D. Bairamova, Kh. Shabanova-
Karaeva, G. Musabekov, N. Narimanov, Agamali-ogli, and other high-ranked Azeri politicians 
stated that veiling was the major symbolic antithesis to modernity. Thus, they demanded that 
Moscow introduce government measures for immediate chadra abolition as part of the Party’s 
strategy for drawing women into the public sphere.  
                     
Figure 29. Azeri women in chadra, Baku. AAKFD photo. 
 
In Azerbaijan, the very first official resolution that claimed to end veiling as a top state 
priority came to life on February 8, 1921. In that resolution, the members of the First Congress of 
Azerbaijani Women decided to begin the campaign against veiling on International Women’s Day, 
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March 8, 1921.43 This resolution paved the way for state-regulated mass unveiling in Azerbaijan. 
On March 8, 1921, Azeri Communist Party leaders and Zhenotdel activists organized processions 
in Baku to march from various quarters of the old city, Ichari Shekher, Inner City, and industrial 
settlement Gara Shekher, Black City, to unite at Lenin Square. During this public demonstration, 
they gave speeches that promoted equal rights and unveiling as signs of women’s devotion to 
Soviet-style modernity.  
In 1921 and after, Zhenotdel officials also held public unveiling ceremonies in several 
factory shops in Baku industrial quarters and officially praised the newly unveiled women.44 In 
1928, Azerbaijani Party leaders and functionaries from the Commissariats of Justice and 
Enlightenment, and those close to the Zhenotdel agency and its journal Sharg Gadini, observing 
the slowness of the process of chadra removal, argued that this lethargy was an outcome of the 
absence of an indisputable state edict to ban veiling. They claimed that the lack of a government 
ruling also allowed proponents of patriarchal practices to argue that the state itself did not oppose 
veiling. Hence, to immediately end veiling and seclusion, the Azeri reformers for Muslim women’s 
liberation demanded that Moscow release an official decree to strengthen and accelerate gender 
reforms. The debate also intensified in 1928, after Azeri reformers compared the pace of chadra 
elimination reforms in Azerbaijan to the state-promoted unveiling campaign in Turkey. Ishkova, 
the leader of Azerbaijani Zhenotdel, noted that “The government-sponsored movement in Turkey 
to ban fez, yashmak, and to liquidate harems heavily influenced the native Party members and now, 
they demand a decree on chadra elimination.”45 
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The Azeri reformers also insisted on rapid societal modernization through unveiling 
because they considered Azerbaijan to be the role model state for the entire Muslim world. They 
referred to King Amanullah of Afghanistan who, in his mission to modernize a tribal society, 
looked for various models of modernization by travelling to Europe, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, 
particularly Azerbaijan. In 1928, highly ranked Azeri Communists, such as A. Karaev, G. 
Musabekov, Agamali-ogli, and A. Sultanova, supervised the king during his tour across the 
republic to demonstrate those cultural triumphs realized under socialism. In particular, they 
glorified the achievements of the establishment of modern public education, Muslim women’s 
liberation, and the abolition of religious norms and traditional customs.46 
In 1928, motivated by the perceived leading position among the Muslim nations, the 
leaders of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan abandoned its gradualism in Muslim women’s 
emancipation drive and adopted a new socio-political program that attacked the old ways of living. 
This cultural revolution aimed to emancipate Muslim women rapidly. Throughout 1928 and 1929, 
the Azerbaijani Communist Party and Zhenotdel activists dedicated many meetings at the 
Zhenotdel offices, at the Muslim Women’s Clubs, and at the general meetings at industrial shops 
to discussing the need for a legal act against chadra. Azeri Communists, such as Agamali-ogli, 
Kh. Shabanova-Karaeva, M. Guliyev, A. Karaev, G. Musabekov, A. Sultanova, and G. 
Kadyrbekova, and intellectuals, such as Sh. Efendiieva and Dzh. Mamedkulizade, organized 
Komissiia po Sniatiiu Chadri, The Committee for Chadra Abolition. The members of that 
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Committee called in unison for an attack on the old traditions and their supporters.47 When those 
officials gave speeches in Russian, they used the term Nastuplenie, Attack, echoing their Russian 
colleagues who presented themselves as soldiers on the social and political battlefield to fight 
remnants of the old regime. When they promoted the new program in Azeri language, they used 
hujum, which is translated as an attack. Both terms fitted ideally within the Party’s militarized 
vocabulary to combat patriarchal practices.48  
However, in Azerbaijan, unlike in Uzbekistan, the term hujum did not become a slogan to 
describe the campaign for cultural transformation of the late 1920s to liquidate the visual symbols 
of cultural backwardness. Azeri Soviet reformers, aiming to attack remnants of the old life, did not 
use Attack or Hujum to express the Communist Party’s drive to transform Muslim society. To 
define Azeri Party-led reform for prompt chadra abolition, Committee members employed a 
relatively non-aggressive slogan — Redd Olsun Chadra, Chadra Go Away. From 1928, the Redd 
Olsun Chadra campaign became the dominant symbol of Soviet modernization for cultural 
transformation in Azerbaijan and an important part of the state-building process. 
Starting in 1928, Azeri proponents of the state decree to ban chadra organized the 
campaign and supported their arguments against veiling in the journal Sharg Gadini, providing 
information about women who abandoned the veil and advanced in socialist society.49 The 
government also employed Azeri writers and poets to proclaim the urgent need to remove chadra 
from society, issuing a great number of books and pamphlets titled, like the movement itself, Redd 
Olsun Chadra. In plain language, the Azeri authors N. Rafibeili, A. Dzhavad, H. Sanili, Dzh. 
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Dzhabbarli, and others, emphasized the role of unveiling in building a modern and egalitarian 
society in their poems, plays, and novels.50 
 Women activists across republic organized mass unveiling meetings, gave speeches 
demanding a government ruling to outlaw veiling, and gathered signatures on petitions for a 
decree. According to Party records, between January and April of 1929, the Zhenotdel held thirty-
four meetings in Baku alone, where 2113 women unveiled. During the same period, there were 
148 meetings in the regions that organized the unveiling of 1104 Azeri women. The records also 
state that all women who participated in those meetings demanded an official decree on chadra 
abolition to protect them from public harassment and from those male family members who 
opposed unveiling of their wives and daughters.51  
In addition, praising the imposition of fines on Shia religious rituals, which by 1928 
brought an end to their practice, Azeri officials from the Commissariats of Justice and 
Enlightenment began to demand the imposition 300 rubles fine for appearing in public places in 
chadra, and their total confiscation.52 To promote chadra abolition the Azeri government 
introduced a policy to reimburse a confiscated veil with a gift of fabric enough to make a dress or 
coat. The reasons behind this policy were the widespread complaints from many impoverished 
Muslim women who stated that they would eagerly unveil, but that being deprived of a decent 
dress or coat, they needed chadra to cover their exposed bodies under their poor clothes. To 
support this policy, Moscow sent two train compartments of European-style coats to reimburse 
women for the rejecting to wear their chadras. Also, Azeri Zhenotdel officials allocated 5,000 
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rubles to repay the cost of chadra instead of a piece of fabric for all recently unveiled women in 
need.53 Overall, between March and July 1929, the Azerbaijani Committee for Chadra Abolition 
received from Moscow and the Azeri Party administration 2241,425 meters of fabric, which cost 
11450,556 rubles, to compensate for the value of confiscated chadra for unveiled Muslim 
women.54  
Along with this, to inspire an interest in Azeri women to remove chadra, Azeri officials 
issued a directive demanding that civil and industrial managers provide jobs for recently unveiled 
women.55 For example, in Baku alone, the artel’ Sanaii Shirketi, Manufacturing Company, 
provided jobs for 102 Azeri women on the condition of removing their chadra. Gadin Zakhmati 
provided employment for twelve recently unveiled women. The official records state that between 
March and October of 1929, the number of newly unveiled and employed women in Baku alone 
was 2,003.56 
The Azeri advocates for the decree, such as Kadyrbekova, Bairamova, and Sultanova, also 
employed medical knowledge to claim that chadra and seclusion were responsible for various 
female ailments, from respiratory diseases to slowed fetal development during pregnancy.57 They 
also argued that veil-wearing violated workplace safety rules because it could cause injury and 
suffocation.58 Portraying chadra as a black piece of fabric, which deprived women of sunlight and 
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fresh air and thus made their bones weak and their skin unhealthy, the reformers stressed the ugly 
image of Azeri women wearing chadra: a black, shapeless sack. To boost the crusade against 
veiling, the reformers employed Azeri fashion designers who introduced new types of head-
coverings: hats, berets, and modern head scarves. Promoting the new style head-coverings in Sharg 
Gadini, they stressed that chadra was backward, unfashionable, and unsuitable for a modern 
woman.59 
In contrast, opponents of the decree, represented mostly by the non-Muslim Zhenotdel and 
Party functionaries, K. Ishkova, V. Tseitlin, F. Shlemova, and others, found strong support from 
Moscow to defend their arguments. They argued that veiling would fall by itself after women had 
attended educational centers and enrolled in the workforce. Moreover, they stressed the increase 
in the divorce rate among the Muslim population, because many men divorced unveiled women 
and the latter were left without financial or social support. They insisted that education and job 
opportunities had to be the primary means of unveiling.60 The Moscow Party’s directives, sent to 
the local Party and Zhenotdel agencies, stated that issuing the decree on the abolition of face 
coverings would be premature and untimely. Furthermore, it would provoke resistance to Soviet 
reforms, referring to the cases of verbal and physical harassment of unveiled women in Baku.61   
The central Moscow-based Zhenotdel officials argued that a decree would force Muslim 
women to stay home, rather than to come out into public life. Nadezhda Krupskaia, Lenin’s widow 
and one of the leaders in Soviet gender reforms and female public education, also had a negative 
opinion about a potential unveiling decree. In December 1928, at the All-Union Congress of the 
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Toiling Women of the East, she criticized even discussion of the decree, declaring that the oriental 
masses were not prepared for radical veil eradication yet.62 However, the Azeri reformers 
understood it not as a rejection of the introduction of the decree, but as its postponement, needed 
to increase propaganda work among Azeri Muslims.  
The Azeri government and Party executives intensified their campaign to end the 
patriarchal traditions by claiming that madrasahs and mosques became the major rivals for Soviet 
gender reforms in the republic. After the Bolsheviks’ empowerment in Azerbaijan, the priesthood 
was in open opposition to the new regime. Mullahs, in their struggle to preserve religious norms 
of living, turned their attention to Muslim women, calling them the only societal group that would 
be able to retain traditions and religion.63 To attain support, many clerics proclaimed that the Koran 
did not require veiling and seclusion. Moreover, moderate reformists clerics challenged the 
canonical interpretation of mosques as male-dominated places by allowing women to pray there 
and even become ministers.64 The Soviet authorities declared that these reformist mullahs launched 
the reformation of women’s positions in Islam as a counterweight to Soviet gender policy in order 
to retain control over the commoners and even the Communists.65  
It was true that even some Azerbaijani gender reformers continued to debate veiling and 
women’s seclusion in the framework of pre-revolution criticism against the abuses of Islamic 
covenants by the conservative mullahs, rather than against religion as a whole.  From the first years 
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of Bolshevik power in Azerbaijan, Ishkova, a leader of the Azerbaijani Zhenotdel, complained that 
many female activists in the department remained devoted Muslims. She referred to the case of 
Zhenotdel’s executive officer from the Sal’iany region, who argued that religion could not be 
eliminated from women’s everyday lives and continued to practice religious rituals at her branch, 
in this way making the club popular among local people.66 The central Zhenotdel also criticized 
the regional director of the Zhenotdel branch in Shamkir, Gadzhieva, who claimed that Islam 
means Communism and that the Koran should be studied in a new way, free from the influence of 
the corrupt clergy.67 Despite this official disapproval of Gadzhieva’s methods of promoting Soviet-
style gender reforms, the archival documents demonstrate that she was able to improve women’s 
position in one patriarchal community.  
  Gadzhieva collaborated with the Islamic priests and was able to convince them to perform 
weddings for those who also desired to have a religious ceremony but only after civil registration 
at ZAGS and only after Zhenotdel approval. Also, Gadzhieva insisted that a man who wanted to 
take a second wife must support his claim with medical records of his first wife’s chronic illness, 
and only after this he would be allowed to enter into a polygamist marital union. Along with this, 
she issued the directive that decreased the makhr price from 30.000 rubles to 5.000, in this way 
allowing young men who were not rich to marry young women, and mullahs agreed with this as 
well. Baberowski, citing the same archival document in order to stress his main argument about 
the alien and repressive character of the Zhenotdel-promoted gender reforms, manipulated this 
record, omitting the requirement for the medical report, the existence of the makhr – 30.000 rubles, 
and the simultaneity of religious and civil marriages. He states that Gadzhieva asked a mullah who 
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wanted to take the second wife to pay 5.000 rubles to the Zhenotdel cashbox for self-serving 
purposes. The mullah refused, saying that it was awfully expensive.68 However, this document 
shows that Gadzhieva understanding that the religious practices and customs still were upheld by 
the many Azeris tried to control the process and helped those women and men who could not 
afford the expensive mahr.  
The Kommunist newspaper records demonstrate that between 1926 and 1928, many Azeri 
women continued to perform religious ceremonies despite the state-run campaign against Shia 
practices. The newspaper editors provided records of the Allakhsizlig, Godless, society’s meetings 
which criticized those women who followed the mullahs and participated at the Ashura 
ceremonies.69 To estrange women and men from those Islamic practices, the authors appealed to 
women as a caregiver of their sons and husbands who had to explain their men the lack of hygiene 
norms during the self-whipping process along with the harmful consequences of religious fasting 
for women’s bodies.70 The periodicals of that period also illustrate that the reformist Muslim clergy 
became influential competitors to the Soviet reformers by abandoning their disputes about the 
righteousness of the Shia and Sunni denominations of Islam to unite in their struggle against the 
Soviet rule.71 Along with this, the editors of the Kommunist newspaper stated that to preserve their 
influence and to be strong competitors in ideological discussions, the mullahs had begun to study 
not only science and Western philosophy, but also Marxism.72  
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Remarkably, the rhetoric about the modernization of Islamic practices and the role of 
religion in the life of the Azeri community was not limited only to discussion within the paradigm 
of gender reformation. Nariman Narimanov, high-ranked Communist leader, writer, and former 
doctor at the Tagiev School, argued that religion played an important role in the life of the whole 
Azeri community. To introduce the advantages of Bolshevik rule in Azerbaijan, Narimanov 
compared Communist ideals with Islamic doctrines. In his writing and speeches, which he often 
performed at mosques across the republic, he declared that Karl Marx acted like the Prophet 
Mohammed in banning the worship to idols and gold. To liberate Muslims, he argued, there was 
a strong need to teach them to work in industry, to raise a proletariat, and to ostracize merchants 
and rich people who spoiled commoners by imposing the wrong moral values and adoring 
money.73  
Narimanov also claimed that Islam did not oppose education, but that the corrupt clergy, 
who aimed to control society, argued against public enlightenment. By eliminating those degraded 
priests, the Bolsheviks opened the doors to the true understanding of Islam: “Communism gave 
our priests the right to practice the religion in accordance with its genuine character.” He concluded 
that modernist mullahs should not be afraid of the Soviet power that defended freedom of spiritual 
expression.74 To support his proclamations, Narimanov went against the Moscow-sent directives 
which commanded the end of religious practices and rituals. Between 1920 and 1923, despite the 
Moscow-issued ban on publicly practicing acts of self-flagellation during the month of Ashura, he 
allowed street processions and the performance of that ritual.75  
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Called the “Lenin of the East,” Narimanov had great authority, which helped him to 
maintain a balance between the Bolsheviks and the broad Azeri community during the first years 
of societal transformation in the Azerbaijan republic. However, this dialog with Islamic spiritual 
leaders ceased to exist after Narimanov’s death in 1925. The Azeri Communist regime escalated 
the campaign against religious centres, which further led to a complete closure of Islamic spiritual 
places: mosques and Shia holy shrines.76 Furthermore, the Azeri government and Party authorities 
severely undermined the position of those clerics who were involved in women’s emancipation 
within Islamic reformation and finally banned their activities.77 Azeri politicians, who devoted 
their Communist careers to Soviet-style cultural transformation, made a connection between the 
ineffective process of women’s liberation and the influence of the Islamic clergy.78  
The Azeri gender reform activists, N. Tagieva and G. Mir-Kadyrova, declared that one of 
the main issues on the road to veil abolition and female empowerment was that even some male 
Communists were not truly devoted to female emancipation, and adhered to religious dogmas on 
gender relationships. They pointed to the fact that those Communists, while forcing other women 
to remove their veils, demanded that the women in their own households wear chadra and keep 
the secluded life-style.79 G. Huseynov and Farig, leading Azeri politicians and journalists writing 
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in Sharg Gadini, denounced that many Azeri women, with permission from their male relatives to 
attend the clubs, continued to wear chadras even at the Zhenotdel’s meetings in Baku.80  
Therefore, Party and Zhenotdel officials proposed to first remove veil from the wives of 
Party and government functionaries and then from other women.81 Along with this, observing 
some resistance to the plea to remove the veil, they also called for a decree to protect unveiled and 
politically active women from violent attacks. They argued that the existence of the official ruling 
would make unveiling a universal rather than an individual act.82As a result, even though a decree 
banning chadra had not yet been issued by the Moscow central authorities, the Redd Olsun Chadra 
campaign culminated in October 1928 when the Azerbaijani Commissariat of Enlightenment 
banned face coverings at all educational and government centres.83 The Progress Records of the 
Azkomtruzhenits demonstrate that by February of 1929, just after five months after the issue of this 
decree, the number of unveiled women across the republic was 26,987. The document stresses that 
12,305 among those unveiled were women from Baku and its surroundings.84  
Azeri Communist reformers also severely criticized Azeri male attire, especially the 
traditional hat: papaq, a high sheep fur hat worn by Muslim and Christian men throughout the 
North and South Caucasus.  In Azerbaijan, papaq wearers were traditionally peasants and nomadic 
men. In October 1928, the discussion of papaq took a central place in Azeri reformers’ discourse 
on abandoning the remnants of the old life in the countryside. To justify the reformation, Azeri 
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Communists employed old and modern historical facts. During one of the Party’s meetings, 
Teimur Guseinov referred to the reforms of the Russian tsar Peter the Great (1672–1725), who 
modernized Russian society by forcefully introducing Western culture. Guseinov, in particular, 
stressed that the dress reform aimed to “civilize” Russians by removing traditional clothes first 
from the nobility and merchants and then from commoners. To encourage people to look like 
Europeans but not like Asians, the Russian tsar also imposed a tax on beards forcing Russian men 
to shave. In cases of misbehavior, he personally cut their beards with an axe.85 The latter fact was 
especially attractive to Azeri Communists, who insisted on punitive methods to impose the new 
dress standards.  
Another political leader, Guliyev, appealed to the success of the Turkish leader, Atatürk, 
who totally eliminated all Ottoman-era headdresses, also by punishing opposition to this reform. 
Agamali-ogli connected papaq to Islam. According to him, a proper Muslim man could not pray 
and appear in public without the headcover. Thus, if Soviet officials eliminated papaq they would 
simultaneously destroy the power of religion in Azeri society.86 In November 1928, the Azeri 
Communists issued an official decree that banned village men from appearing at educational and 
civil centers in papaq. They also assigned a date, January 25 of 1929, by which male peasants had 
to stop wear papaq, exchanging it for the European-style cap or beret.87  
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Figure 30. Azeri peasants. Two standing men are in papakh. Baku, 1929. AAKFD photo.  
 
It is difficult to estimate how effective the ban on papaq was in reality because, unlike 
reports about chadra removal, Azeri Soviet officials did not keep any record about the number of 
male peasants who stopped wearing papaq. What is known from the official records is that the 
brief reform produced a significant level of opposition. The Muslim village men violently opposed 
stopping to wear papaq, considering it an act of disgrace. Many men refused to leave home to go 
to work at the farms or the village soviets, pointing to alleged sickness.88 Some defended their 
rights with weapons. As a result, in March 1929, five months after the beginning of the anti-papaq 
campaign, the Azeri Communist authority issued a new decree that allowed male villagers to wear 
papaq in public places, recognizing it as traditional male headwear.89  
In June 1929, after a prolonged silence, the Azerbaijani Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, AzTsik, finally voiced an official position in response to the demands for a 
decree for forced chadra elimination. Party executives did not annul the decree from the 
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Commissariat of Enlightenment of 1928 banning women’s appearance in chadra at educational 
and civil institutions. However, in an official statement, they endorsed the Moscow officials’ anti-
decree consideration, accusing the Azeri decree proponents of ignorance of class consciousness 
and betraying Communist ideas on women’s liberation. They blamed decree advocates for 
propagandizing women’s liberation only through mass unveiling, linking them to the old-Imperial 
reformers, and ignoring the most important aspects of the Soviet gender program to liberate 
Muslim women by attracting to industry.90 
It is important to admit that the practice of wearing papaq in villages gradually ceased by 
itself after the Second World War when many village men, returning from the European fronts, 
moved to the cities for jobs at industrial centers and, trying the fruits of urban culture, began to 
consider papaq old-fashioned. Nowadays, papaq as an old symbol of Azeri masculinity can be 
seen at souvenir shops in tourist districts or on male artists who perform national dances. Chadra, 
unlike papaq, totally disappeared from Azeri society, and its traces are impossible to find, at both 
the souvenir shops and even at museums.  
Along with the campaign against chadra and papaq, there was also a brief state initiative 
that aimed to eliminate other symbols of Azeri society, namely musical instruments. In 1928, A. 
Karaev, R. Akhundov, and M. Guliyev announced that Azerbaijani music, performed on tar, saz, 
and kamancha (string musical instruments); balaban and zurna (wind instruments); and nagara 
and daf (drums), were primitive and old fashioned. They proclaimed that Azeri music possessed 
depressing characteristics of deficiency imposed by unenlightened Islamic culture. Thus, there was 
no place for old Azeri music in the process of building a modern and radiant society. These 
politicians stated in unison that Azeri society would become modern if it abandoned the national 
 




instruments and started to use exclusively European musical devices. Along with this, they insisted 
on the creation of Western-style opera and ballet theaters.91 The results of this Soviet campaign 
were twofold for the evolution of modern Azeri music. The negative aspect was that Soviet Azeri 
musicians and composers, such as Uzeiir Gadzhibekov, Fikrat Amirov, Kara Karaev, and others, 
answered the government call to modernize Azeri music and limited the role of these long-
established musical instruments in Soviet Azeri culture. However, the positive aspect of the 
reformation was that they developed distinguished modern Azeri music by incorporating those 
national instruments into symphonic orchestras and the jazz bands.92  
 
Empowering the Village Women 
 
The cultural revolution initiated by the radical Azerbaijani political elite to abolish the 
visual symbols of the patriarchal past proceeded along with the grandiose societal transformation 
all over the Soviet Union. In 1928, the Stalinist government initiated agrarian reforms. The 
reorganization of the rural world aimed to establish total state control over the countryside, to 
complete class warfare in the countryside, and to terminate patriarchal relationships.93 The Great 
Turn, in Stalin’s words, also aimed to erase all traces of capitalism, which had entered under the 
New Economic Policy, 1924–1928, and to transform the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, 
without regard to cost, into an industrialized socialist state. 
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Communists believed that collectivization of the countryside through cooperative labor, 
shared land, and state control would provide more food for the growing city proletariat and more 
resources for industry. Through collectivization, Communist leaders intended to free many 
peasants for industrial work in the cities and to enable them to extend their political authority over 
the remaining peasantry, ending old traditions and customs. The decision to collectivize the 
agrarian sector rapidly and forcefully was linked to the Communist agenda and Stalin’s personal 
agenda of speedy industrialization. The First Five-Year Plan, 1928–1932 called for rapid 
industrialization of the economy, with an emphasis on heavy industry. The masterminds of the 
First Five-Year Plan, planned to transform Soviet agriculture from predominantly individual farms 
into a system of large state collective farms, focused particular hostility on the wealthier peasants, 
kulaks. Elimination of the well-off kulak households, forced collectivization of the remaining 
peasants, and the abrupt end of traditional culture in the rural world initiated a disastrous disruption 
of agricultural productivity and societal resistance all over the Soviet Union.94  
In Azerbaijan, the first Soviet land reform came to life in 1924. Land reform had two aims: 
taking land from the large landowners and granting land to the poor stratum of rural society to gain 
support for the Soviet regime. Most importantly, it aimed to break village patriarchal relationships 
based on the dependency of the poor on the wealthy, and to initiate class warfare in the 
countryside.95 The Azerbaijani government stressed the gender egalitarian character of land 
reform. The new law on land ownership declared that men and women were equal in their rights 
to own land. However, Soviet law policed that only household heads, traditionally the male 
leaders, would become landowners. Muslim women could obtain an individual plot only after a 
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divorce or the death of their husbands.96 This regulation was similar to that which Soviet authorities 
introduced in Uzbekistan and different from that in Russia, where the Russian peasant husbands 
and wives were equal owners of land.97 It is important to note that these principles on land 
ownership in Azerbaijan did not violate the traditional Sharia norms, which stated that female 
property had to be monitored by a male relative.  
The Soviet government followed their tsarist predecessors in agrarian reformation: in 1870, 
the old-Imperial authorities did not disturb these gender peculiarities of property law either. The 
Agrarian Reform Act of 1870 considered the allocation of a land plot, 5 desiatins, only for an adult 
male peasant, and recognized a man as the household leader. This tsarist reform also aimed to 
create village communities similar to Russian ones where the peasants held their land plots in 
communal ownership.98 However, this reorganization was not successful and did not change the 
traditional forms of peasantry in Azerbaijan: the majority of male farmers, 70%, continued to 
possess their individual plots and did not build communal communities. Azeri Muslim farmers 
could rent some plots from large landowners and repay their debts with the agricultural products. 
The amount of the reimbursement was individually discussed between a rentier and a peasant, 
always men. That relationship was part of the traditional form of clan system where the large 
landlords, bek and mullah, regulated the life of the village communities.99  
In the mid-1920s, to propagandize Soviet land reform, government officials stressed that 
the Azerbaijani Communist Party made women independent and equal in land possession. 
Zhenotdel functionaries supported this claim, pointing to the government program that helped 
 
96 “Polozhenie o trudovom dome dlia odinokikh zhenshchin. Protokoly soveshchianii pri Narkomzdrave ob itogakh 
raboty po organizatsii detiaslei v uezdakh i bor’be s prostitutsiei v respublike,” (October 17, 1928–December 16, 
1928) ARDA f. 379, o. 6, d. 50, l. 5. 
97 Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan, 112–113.  
98 Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 19.  




single Muslim women to obtain some knowledge and skills to work with a plough, cultivate grains 
and cotton, and raise silkworms. To help women to become successful in farming the government 
also tried to unite Muslim female farmers in agricultural cooperatives, giving them free seeds and 
tools, and organizing kindergartens for their young children.100 However, in December 1928, Azeri 
Zhenotdel officials complained that after the land redistribution, the number of Azeri women who 
worked independently on their land plots was very small and their cooperative farms were not 
profitable. Female farmers still preferred to rely on male relatives and refused to send their young 
children to the village kindergartens.101  
Along with this, Zhenotdel officials stressed that a widowed landowner became an 
extremely attractive candidate for a new marriage. After entering the new marriage, a female 
smallholder passed management of her farm to her new husband and left agricultural society to 
focus on her family. Zhenotdel workers called that process “a returning to an unproductive 
existence.”102 As a result, land redistribution reform did not make Muslim women fully equal in 
the patriarchal village, though it brought some support to the Soviet regime from poor farmers who 
obtained land plots expropriated from rich landowners. However, the end of individual 
landownership came in 1929, the year of mass collectivization and societal transformation. 
The collectivization of 1929 brought dramatic changes to rural Azeri society by eliminating 
the traditional leaders and imposing new ones in the countryside. Soviet regulations allowed 
former large landowners to stay in villages or provinces if they had willingly given their property. 
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Many were pressed to resettle and leave the provinces or were arrested. The Leader of the 
Communist Party in Azerbaijan, A. Karaev, stated that some landlords however, retained some 
land plots and even become members of the local village councils and proposed to denounce them 
as class enemies.103 Soviet state officials encouraged village women to participate in 
dekulakization campaigns, dispossessing wealthy men and denunciating traditional leaders as the 
class dushmani, class foes.104  
The Azeri Zhenotdel and Party officials used direct and abusive verbal attacks on the 
former nobility and wealthy people as the perceived enemies of Soviet initiatives, and particularly 
unveiling. Furthermore, in 1928, the Azeri Communist leaders declared that opposition to Muslim 
women’s liberation and other Soviet reforms had strong support from the influential religious 
authorities that was deeply rooted in the rural world. Azeri Soviet political leaders proclaimed that 
the priests, in particular, influenced former large landlords to launch the counterattack to Soviet 
gender policy in villages.105  
To promote state policy against Islamic spiritual leaders, Azeri government officials 
announced many facts that illustrated the negative role of religion in traditional society. For 
instance, they claimed that in 1926, in Shamkhor region alone, almost all teachers were former 
mullahs. In 1928, in Geokchai region, nine out of ten teachers belonged to the priesthood, 
continuing to regulate the life of their community. Considering these and other facts, high-ranked 
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Azeri Party leaders, such as A. Karaev, G. Musabekov, and G. Guliyev, unleashed the anti-
religious campaign that led to the closing of the spiritual centers.  
The closure and confiscation of the mosques was so widespread and aggressively 
performed that it received criticism from Moscow officials and some Azeri Communists. Thus, S. 
Efendiev, the chairman of the AzTsik, disapproved of that process, calling it the “socialist 
competition on the cultural front.”106 Kommunist newspaper records between 1928 and 1929 
demonstrate the number of closed and expropriated religious centres in several regions. In 
Shamakhi, the regional authorities demolished 13 out of 18 mosques and used the building 
materials for the construction of a theatre.107 In Geokchai, local officials converted thirty-six 
mosques into entertainment centres and warehouses.108 M. Guliyev, the Commissar of 
Enlightenment, in his article Firka va Din, Party and Religion, stated that religious leaders, settled 
in 969 Shia and 400 Sunni mosques across the republic, were a potential threat to Soviet reforms 
on modernization and demanded their total annihilation.109  
In June 1928, Kommunist published an official resolution that declared the incompatibility 
of religion with modernity. M. Guliyev, the mastermind of the resolution Medeniiat Inglabi va 
Din, Cultural Revolution and Religion, condemned Islam and the ways its norms harmed societal 
development in six chapters. In chapter five, he stressed the negative role of Islam on women’s 
societal position. He pointed to the religious norms that kept Muslim women secluded, veiled, and 
deprived of basic rights. Guliyev criticized mullahs for their century-long support of Muslim man’s 
superiority over woman, making her an object for sale and thus encouraging polygyny and bride-
money. In his words, it was Soviet power that brought true liberation to Azeri women and any 
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pause or weakness in the reform process could invalidate the achievements in gender 
reorganization, bringing back Islamic parochial practices.110 In accordance with this official 
declaration, Azeri Communists considered any cooperation with reformed clerics on methods of 
women’s emancipation as dangerous and insisted on a total abolition of religion in gender 
relationship.111  
The radical Azeri anti-religious campaign went against Soviet policy on relaxation of the 
treatment of Islam and its priesthood. The Moscow directives of 1928–1930 dictated Azeri 
officials not to violate the authority of Muslim clergy, stressing that the religious question was part 
of the whole Soviet oriental politics and required the extremely delicate reformation like the 
problem of nationalities. The All-Soviet Communist government was alarmed by the scale of 
resistance to Soviet religious reform, particularly in Uzbekistan, where Islamic priests were 
persecuted, and spiritual centres were confiscated. In June 1929, the Presidium of the Communist 
Party of Azerbaijan [AzTsK KPb] received a firm order from Moscow to return all Islamic 
religious centres, which had been confiscated and converted into secular premises, to the local 
communities.112 Azeri officials had obeyed that order, however, they modified it to fit their agenda. 
They continued to threaten Islamic clerics, labelling them and former rural nobility as the major 
dangerous influences on the female and rural masses in general.113  
In 1929, in his report entitled Bakinskii Proletariat and Azerbaidzhanskaia Derevnia, Baku 
Proletariat and Azerbaijani Village, presented at the XVIII All Party Meeting, A. Karaev stressed 
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many obstacles raised by class enemies to hinder the process of Soviet reforms. He emphasized 
their strong position in villages, in particular, and insisted on total war to destroy them.114 Karaev 
argued that peasant women would be the most powerful societal segment to destroy opposition to 
Soviet power in village. He stressed that Muslim village women were more active than urban 
women. Agamali-ogli echoed this statement, saying that women were more honestly devoted to 
the ideas of Communism and in particular to land redistribution than men.115 A. Karaev believed 
that this was because the rural women were traditionally independent, never veiled, and secluded. 
Along with this, he credited the Soviet policy that granted women land and involved them in the 
village soviets to decide the community problems equally with men.116  
Baberowski argues that the Soviet regime forcefully demanded that Azeri women 
participate in the village soviets, threatening to apply restrictive measures to those families that 
refused to send their female members to vote or to become members in those village organizations. 
Along with this, Baberowski undermined the results of Azeri women’s activity in the village 
soviets, stating that Azeri women never contributed because after the end of the election campaign 
they stayed at home being terrorized by their husbands, who promised to kill them for any political 
activity.117 
However, Party records and statistics demonstrate that native Party leaders, clearly 
understanding the peculiarities of gender norms in some Azeri communities, organized gender-
separated voting stations during elections.118 By implementing this tactic, they attracted many 
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Muslim women and did not deter conservative men from Soviet village elections. The Party 
records of the early 1930s also indicate that by establishing a culture of social and political activism 
among Muslim women in a village, Soviet authorities helped women to voice their concerns about 
their own empowerment in Azeri society. Azeri official records also revealed that for the majority 
of Azeri village women, gender issues were more important rather than the class conflict promoted 
by government leaders. As the Progress Records of the Communist Party Activity in a Village 
indicate, Azeri village women mostly denounced those men who kept them secluded and were 
abusive and backward individuals. Very few records illustrate Azeri women’s struggle against 
former wealthy and noble village men while participating in village social and political life.119 
Azeri women of the Agdash region complained that the male village executives did not 
distribute voting cards to them. Thus, they demanded postponement of balloting until women 
received the ballots. Defending their right to vote, they were able to change the course of the 
elections in their community. In Khanabad village, forty-six local men voted for Yusuf Vali as a 
leader of the village council. However, fifty-seven women opposed his election and ostracized him 
for improper behavior towards women. In Kasile village, women outvoted the candidate pointing 
out that he kept his wife secluded. Overall, in Agdash region, there were 5,002 Azeri women who 
participated in elections to the local village soviets along with 10,443 Azeri male voters.120 In 
Gyandzhe region, particularly in Akhmedli village, women demanded the opening of a new school 
with female teachers because they did not trust male instructors who came from the city or had an 
education gained at madrasah. In Amirvar village women opposed the election of a man who was 
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the son of the former large landowner. Women stated that the candidate’s father aggressively 
threatened the kolkhoz members, saying he would take back all his land plots which had been 
allotted to poor farmers by the Soviet power.121 
 
 
Figure 31. Azeri rural women discussing village matters, Karabakh, 1933. AAKFD photo. 
 
Party functionaries acknowledged that nomadic women had much more authority in their 
communities than sedentary women. In Dzhebrail region, inhabited mostly by the nomadic Azeri 
Turkic tribes and semi-nomadic Kurds, women were powerfully active in defending their rights. 
Those women, mostly widows, even argued with Party emissaries to return of polygyny. They 
argued that Muslim men preferred to marry the girls who had never been wed, and thus, widows 
with children lost the chance to enter another marriage. Local women also criticized those men 
who opposed their empowerment. Women from Dilagarda Village complained that they had to sit 
on the steps of the building because the male village leaders did not allow them to be present at 
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the discussion of the local budget. In Shukurbekli village, the male Party official refused to listen 
to women’s petition that presented several cases of domestic violence. The report also indicates 
that in several villages, Kurd-Makhmudlu, Khalafa, Ishiglu, Shakhsavan, and Zilanlu, a fight 
occurred between women and men over the creditability of their candidates.122  
In Kazakh region, in Tatly village, women disapproved of several male candidates, 
denouncing them as bandits. In Kushchi village, women did not allow the election of a man, 
arguing that he was polygamous and treated one of his wives very badly. In Dondar-Kushchi, 
village women ostracized four candidates because they kept their wives secluded. Overall, the 
report demonstrates that in 1925 there were 190 Azeri female members of the village soviets in 
the Dzhebrail region alone.123 The Party report also indicates that Nakhichevan region, a province 
in Western Azerbaijan that has a border with Turkey, was a citadel of opposition to the Soviet 
regime, and local men violently opposed all Soviet initiatives. Moreover, the leader of the regional 
Communist Party branch in Nakhichevan argued that women could wear chadra because there 
was not any official regulation to remove it.124 Party and Zhenotdel officials declared that 
Nakhichevan region had the lowest number of women in the village soviets.125 They explained this 
fact through the domination of the strong clan system, the long-established power of the religious 
and traditional customs, and the region’s long distance from Baku and the central Communist 
government.126 
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Violence as the Response to Societal Reforms in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1928–1930 
 
The Redd Olsun Chadra campaign and the introduction of female executives in village 
soviets became an important part of a clash of political forces, as the dispossessed and 
disempowered former male authorities tried to resist the Soviet program. Soviet policies for 
women’s empowerment also aggravated household and societal conflicts, provoking violence 
against Muslim women. On October 1, 1929, the all-Union Communist Party leaders and 
government officials proposed to interpret the murders of emancipated women by their husbands 
and the murders of female activists by old authorities as equally political crimes, bonding 
murderous husbands and “alien classes” together. The Soviet state began to consider crimes 
against women as the most important political question to be discussed. Moscow officials issued 
a resolution that assigned forty-five days for the whole investigation process of crimes committed 
against emancipated Muslim women all over the Soviet Union. The court procedure to issue the 
final verdict should take no longer than ten days.127 They had to introduce these measures after the 
large-scale of violence against unveiled and politically active women in Central Asia, in particular 
in Uzbekistan.  
In 1926, in Uzbekistan, the Communist Party’s Central Asia Bureau officials initiated 
cultural revolution, a campaign known as the Hujum, attack. In the period between 1927 and 1929, 
the state started a crusade against veiling, along with the closure of mosques, the arrest of Islamic 
priests, the dispossession of land from large landowners, challenging the traditional structures of 
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authority in family and society. As Kamp states, many men became responsible for the murder of 
hundreds of women in Uzbekistan.128 Douglas Northrop insists there were thousands of victims.129 
That level of violence was incomparable with the level of hostility in Azerbaijan, where the number 
of female victims, in accordance with the official record of the Persecutor’s Office of Azerbaijan 
Republic, was eleven.130   
In modern historiography, extraordinarily little has been written about the accounts and 
causes of violence toward emancipated and politically active Azeri women. Existing studies are 
limited to the works of J. Baberowski, F. Hayat, A. Muradova, and G. Ibragimova. Baberowski 
explains the low number of female victims in Azerbaijan as cases unreported by Azeri government 
officials who did not want to spoil the record of the reform’s process.131 Anthropologist F. Hayat 
briefly introduces several facts about the harassment of unveiled women in Baku alone, connecting 
them with ethnic tensions between Azeri Muslims and Communist authorities of Armenian 
heritage.132 Muradova considers the state-run reform campaign for unveiling as “a direct violation 
of human rights” that caused several crimes.133 Ibragimova claims that the state initiated rapid 
chadra abolition to force women into industry and that sparked the violent opposition and killing 
of several Azeri women in Baku.134 Despite the various opinions on the reasons behind the murder 
of the Azeri women, all historians point out that very few women lost their lives during the 
campaign for their liberation and empowerment in 1920s. 
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To explain violence against women, I define men as one of the crucial social actors that 
forced women to stay in a subordinate position within patriarchal society. By 1930, Azeri society 
was a male-dominated society that had non-symmetrical gender relations where men played 
intense public roles. Azeri husbands contributed less labor than wives to running the household 
but took much from the women’s unpaid labor. In such social and family organization, coercive 
control was a crucial part of maintaining male domination within the domestic sphere. E. Stark 
argues that “beating, imposing strict dress codes, isolating women are the means of the coercive 
control.”135 As it was discussed elsewhere, many Azeri men employed all of those means to control 
their female family members. From 1928, some Azeri men tried to strengthen that control as an 
answer to the Soviet cultural reforms that disrupted traditional Muslim community and family 
structures. Soviet reforms removed the traditional societal and family leaders from their positions. 
Many men responded violently to that societal transformation, directing their anger toward the 
traditionally submissive members of their community, women.  
On the scale of atrocities, crime against women in Azerbaijan was different from the 
violence in Uzbekistan, because the Soviet program for mass unveiling destabilized the traditional 
structure of Uzbek society, shaped in the Imperial period, more than in Azerbaijan. Russian 
colonialists in Uzbekistan did not cooperate with local nobilities and did not integrate the 
conquered population into the Russian social-cultural system. Such politics established the 
boundaries between colonizers and colonized that limited interactions between Russian settlers 
and the local population. As a result, local people aiming to preserve the traditional societal order 
imposed boundaries to keep separate from alien culture. From 1925, the Soviet officials 
 







introducing radical religious, agrarian, and educational reforms severely undermined those 
boundaries. Thus, those who opposed the Soviet reforms joined Basmachi, emigrated, or attacked 
their supporters, at levels unknown in Azerbaijan, whose population, particularly in Baku, was 
well-integrated into the Russian cultural milieu.136  
Crime against women in Azerbaijan was also different from violence in Uzbekistan in its 
presentation. In Azerbaijan, as the records demonstrate, the majority of crimes against women 
were spontaneous. They were results of the disagreements with female family members and never 
planned by a group of people. Azeri men did not terrorize other women by killing their own wives 
or daughters. Not a single female person in Azerbaijan, unlike in Uzbekistan, was killed for alleged 
misbehavior in a symbolic act of gang rape, left as a dismembered female corpse with a cutthroat 
or purposefully ruined face to terrorize other women. However, by killing women, the male 
murderers, equally in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, clearly manifested that the community and 
family held an authority over women. In both republics, regardless of the degree of violence, 
Muslim men tried to reinforce the gender hierarchy by considering unveiled and publicly active 
women as a threat to the traditional family order. Thus, I place men, but not the state or colonial 
authority, as the responsible power behind those deadly acts. 
Scholars such as Baberowski, Muradova, and Ibragimova have another opinion on the 
reasons for these atrocities. They state that the Soviet campaign for women’s empowerment in 
villages and mass unveiling were colonial projects and produced the anticolonial resistance. 
However, they ignore the Azeri Communists’ genuine pursuit to modernize Muslim society, 
developed from the concepts of late-Imperial enlightenment and supported by the Soviet state. 
They also neglect the primary sources: the Zhenotdel files, the journal Sharg Gadini. Most 
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importantly, they ignore the voices of many ordinary Azeri women who answered the call to 
liberate themselves. None of the historians ever studied the court documents, or, especially 
important, the personal files of the victims and those women who survived in their struggle for 
equality. The Azerbaijani State Archive possesses the documents that reflect women’s struggle to 
acquire power and equality in the new society. These archival records, united under one title, 
Prestupleniia na Pochve Rarskreposhcheniia, The Crimes against Emancipation, demonstrate that 
many Azeri men were not ready to accept those changes and thus killed the modern-thinking Azeri 
women.  
In Azerbaijan, victims of attack became martyrs whose images the Zhenotdel and 
government officials used to propagandize the Soviet struggle with the old traditions and their 
defenders. The murder of Saria Khalilova, which was carried out by her father with support from 
her former husband and younger brother, received considerable attention in the press and was 
commemorated in the state-organized mass funeral procession, and with a monument and 
numerous writings.137 Saria Khalilova’s personal story mirrors not only gender roles in patriarchal 
society but also the broader societal conflict between qaranliq, ignorance, and ishig, 
enlightenment, that the Azeri cultural reformers had tried to resolve since the end of the nineteenth 
century.  
Saria Khalilova (1893–1930) was born in Baku to the family of a small merchant, alverchi. 
She received traditional education at home. At age 15 her father married her to her cousin who 
was ten years older than her, Movsum Khalilov, from Shamakhi city. Khalilov was a merchant, 
alverchi, running two shops in Shamakhi and Kiurdamir. This business required much traveling 
and Saria was often left alone with their four children. Several years later she returned to Baku to 
 




live with her parents. In 1927, Saria initiated a divorce from her husband, citing his frequent 
absence from the family and neglect of her and their children. By 1927, her elder son had become 
a student at the Military School and the other children, including the teenaged girls, planned to go 
to college. Khalilov had different views about the girls’ upbringing and was particularly against 
his wife’s schooling and social activism.138  
In the mid-1920s, Saria went to The Ali Bairamov Club to study. Her exercise books 
illustrate that at the club she learned how to write using Latin script and learned the Russian 
language. She also learned basic arithmetic and science. Along with this, she obtained knowledge 
of the Soviet Civil Code on Marriage and Family, which equipped her well to work as an instructor 
at the same club in 1929. In December 1929, she received a promotion to become one of the leaders 
at the regional club for Muslim women.139 In one of her letters to her husband, Movsum Khalilov, 
she explained that as a good student, after the training at the club, she would go to work in 
[unspecified] region to emancipate other Muslim women. She assured him that she would take 
their children with her and provide them with good care. She also complained about his bad 
treatment of her as an individual during their married life. She criticized him for imposing many 
restrictions that deprived her of “light” [enlightenment] that she finally found at The Ali Bairamov 
Club. Khalilova also assured him that she left him not to get a new husband but to pursue her desire 
to become an educated person and to have an interesting life.140 Remarkably, the veil was never 
an issue in the discussion of her emancipation. However, this explanation did not help Khalilov to 
appreciate his wife’s desire for independence. Khalilov appealed to her father and other relatives 
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to find a measure to stop his wife from leading such life. He stressed the traditional moral norms, 
saying that if a man cannot stop a woman, he is not a proper man. He blamed her father and brother 
for being weak to allow such a disgrace in their household.  
On January 29, 1930, after many demands to return her to her husband, Saria’s father seized 
the moment when the children were at school and Saria was at home, and in the presence of her 
brother, former husband, and mother, stabbed her with a butcher knife. The forensic examination 
revealed that Saria had received thirty-seven stab wounds: one was in the thigh, nine in the chest, 
eleven in the face and neck, and sixteen in the arms and palms. The large number of wounds in the 
palms and hands indicated that the Saria tried to resist and protect herself.141 In a very short time, 
between January 29 and March 30, 1930, the Prosecution authorities sentenced her father, Haji Ali 
Kasimov, 62 years old, to capital punishment, and her former husband, Movsum Khalilov, 47 years 
old, and her younger brother, Alekbar Mekhtiev, 20 years old, to 10 years of imprisonment each 
without parole. Her mother, who witnessed the murder and asked the neighbors for help, was found 
not guilty, and was obliged to be a guardian for Saria’s children. 
The murder of Saria Khalilova made her a martyr, whose image the Zhenotdel and 
government officials used to propagandize the Soviet program against old traditions and their 
defenders.142 The government initiated a show trial to raise public awareness that the Soviet state 
would severely punish those who opposed Muslim women’s liberation. Zhenotdel officers, with 
support from the Communist Party, converted the private funeral ceremony into a mass 
demonstration. Saria’s body, dressed in European clothing and placed in a European-style coffin 
decorated with flowers, was accompanied by hundreds of women.143 The funeral procession 
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symbolized the break with old patriarchal practices and was in total opposition to the traditional 
Islamic norms of burial, which required the human body, regardless of gender, to be wrapped in 
savan, an unbleached piece of white shroud, put on palanquin, and carried exclusively by men to 
the cemetery.  
The local Communist officials organized the mass procession of women, who carried 
banners that with the slogans to end of seclusion and veiling. Many threw their chadras off and 
treaded on them. The Communist leaders gave speeches promising to atone for Saria’s blood by 
punishing all of her enemies along with the enemies of all Muslim women. By organizing such a 
public funeral procession, the state also promoted the new position of women in all aspects of 
Soviet life.144 In 1930, state authorities installed a bust of Saria Khalilova to commemorate her as 
a martyr. Until the end of Communist leadership in the republic, the day of Saria’s death, January 
29, became a day of official ceremony, when the leaders of the Youth League of the Young 
Communists, Pioneers, accepted new members into their organization.145 
Saria Khalilova’s murder was not an only incident in which Muslim men opposed women’s 
emancipation. There are several other documents, united in one file under the title The Crimes 
against Emancipation, that represent several instances of women’s murder by their husbands. One 
of those documents, entitled The Jealousy-Related Murder Cases, contains the criminal dossiers 
of Kasumov M., Khalilov K., Babaev B., Babaev S., Babaev E., and Gasanov I., who stabbed their 
wives to death.146 In 228 pages, the inspectors of the Republic Prosecutor’s Office proved that 
these men killed their wives for their allegedly disgraceful behavior while studying at the [gender-
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segregated] clubs in Baku or its surroundings. Officials presented the facts that these convicted 
men had opposed their wives’ work outside the home and had discouraged them from studying 
further at the colleges, arguing that women used those places to interact freely with male strangers. 
The Soviet authority connected these murderous acts with class consciousness. The official 
resolution stated that these men came from old, rich, and noble families, that they did not welcome 
Soviet power, and thus, that they raised many obstacles to the Communist-style initiative to 
emancipate Muslim women. They all were sentenced to capital punishment for their crimes.147 
Another case, entitled The Criminal Case of Meshadi Askerov who Murdered his Wife for 
her Activism and Work at Kolkhoz, clearly demonstrates the official discourse that linked anti-
feminist hostility with class conflict. In Gyandzhe region, Askerov Meshadi killed his wife Afshan, 
who was 22 years old and seven months pregnant, by beating her to death. The documents state 
that he committed this crime because of his strong disapproval of her work at the kolkhoz and for 
her activity at the village soviet and Muslim Women’s Club. Askerov also threatened to kill his 
mother-in-law, also a village activist, for her harmful influence on his wife. The documents also 
indicate that Askerov already had a criminal record for killing a young boy, a Pioneer, who 
testified against Askerov at the court. In his testimony, the eleven-year-old Pioneer stated that 
Askerov, a former large landowner, constantly terrorized his father, promising to take back the 
land plot allotted to his family by Soviet powers. For this murder, Askerov received eight years of 
imprisonment but served only three of them for unidentified reasons. However, the Soviet 
government took the case of killing a Muslim female activist more seriously, organizing a show 
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trial and making it public.  In July 1931, the members of the Public Prosecutor’s Office issued a 
death sentence to Askerov.148   
Another case, entitled The Criminal Case of Nasir Assad ogli for Murdering his Wife 
during the Process of Emancipation, shows that even medani, an enlightened man, could kill his 
wife. Nasir Assad ogli was a public school teacher and instructor at the Likbez. He was very well 
known for his social activism to end illiteracy among people of Gyandzhe region. However, on 
June 18, 1932, he killed his wife, Fatma Eldis qizi, by stabbing her to death. The government 
authority organized a show trial and attracting mass media to cover the process. As a result, on 
June 27, 1932, just nine days after the murder, the Prosecutor’s officer assigned a death sentence 
for the crime. However, advocates could prove that Nasir Assad ogli was a kind person in byt, 
everyday life, and an ardent supporter of the Communist power. Nasir Assad ogli also 
acknowledged his guilt, referring to his jealous character. Thus, on July 11, 1932, taking into 
consideration his personal record and his repentance, the authorities changed the term of 
punishment from the death sentence to ten years of imprisonment.149 
The criminal case against Abbas Alia Assad ogli investigated the murder of a young female 
teacher, Aian Sultanova, on January 12, 1926, in Shamkhor region. The peculiarity of this case is 
that the murderer, Abbas Alia Assad ogli, twenty-five years old, received a death sentence when 
the state did not equate everyday crimes to crimes against Soviet power yet. The authority issued 
a death penalty for his crime, connecting it to the old practice of bride kidnapping that Soviet 
power made illegal. During the trial, Abbas Alia acknowledged that he wanted to marry Aian 
Sultanova, a schoolteacher, who opposed this union because of his lack of education and 
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unattractiveness. Thus, Abbas, with group of his friends, organized her abduction on her way home 
from the school. Aian resisted and promised to denounce him. As witnesses stated during the trial, 
Abbas panicked when she produced so much noise and was genuinely reluctant to marry him, so 
he shot her in the head.  In May 1926, he was executed. It should be noted that there is no 
information about the punishment for those men who helped Abbas to kidnap Aian Sultanova.150 
In June 1932, in Baku, Agaverdiev Abdulla Aga ogli killed his wife, Babaeva Umai, by 
inflicting fifty-seven stab wounds. Like some other killers, Agaverdiev explained his crime by 
citing his wife’s alleged infidelity.151 The file contains several letters that Babaeva wrote in the 
spring of 1932 to the local police department, asking to protect her from the husband who regularly 
threatened to kill her. In one of the letters, she stated that Agaverdiev was a backward person who 
had come from Iran for a better work opportunity. She stressed that he did not respect the Soviet 
reforms that made man and woman equal and opposed her studying and working. Umai also 
emphasized that she was a Communist, who studied at the Polytechnic College to become an 
engineer and worked at the chemical plant. Along with this, during the summertime, Umai went 
to kolkhoz to teach village Muslim women at the rural Likbez. However, her husband did not 
support these activities, citing traditional gender norms. He stated that she was involved in 
frivolous behavior with other men while she was outside the home. The documents also revealed 
that Agaverdiev spent considerable time trying to collect information to prove her allegedly 
disgraceful behavior.152 
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 In another letter, Umai revealed that along with a group of men of Iranian heritage, her 
husband was engaged in stealing potash from the plant and selling it on the black market. 
Witnessing how they divided the money at her home, she promised them she would denounce their 
deeds to the police. As a result, Agaverdiev swore to kill her if she did not give him some time to 
escape to Iran. He also offered her the chance to go with him. Umai rejected this, and in a panic 
that he could forcefully take her with him or to kill her if she refused, she asked the police to defend 
her, stressing that she was a Soviet citizen and enjoyed the Soviet achievements that made women 
equal. Being terrorized by her husband, Umai stopped coming home, spending nights at the plant’s 
shop or the plant’s canteen. Agaverdiev demanded that she return, threatening to spoil her 
reputation, which would lead to her exclusion from the Communist Party and from the College. 
Umai refused to return, and on June 28, 1932, Agaverdiev waited for Umai on the way to her place 
of work, and then killed her by stabbing her fifty-seven times.    
In their report, inspectors from the Prosecutor’s Office connected the murder of Umai to 
the murder of Saria Khalilova, and presented this case as a crime against Muslim women’s 
liberation performed by a man who came from a patriarchal country that lacked Soviet-style gender 
equality.153 However, Agaverdiev refused to accept the allegations regarding the Soviet gender 
program, insisting that he killed her exclusively for her infidelity. Agaverdiev’s statement went 
against the witnesses’ testimonies, which maintained that Agaverdiev did not allow Umai to study 
and to work. The witnesses insisted that he was particularly against her trips to a village to teach 
rural Muslim women.154 In accordance with Article 70 UK AzSSR, the Prosecutor’s officers 
sentenced Agaverdiev to death. However, being a non-Soviet citizen, Agaverdiev appealed to the 
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Supreme Court, and his term of punishment was changed to ten years of imprisonment and 
confiscation of his estate.155  
Hence, the eleven criminal cases represented in the Persecutor’s Office protocols 
demonstrate that the majority of women who lost their lives for being active in Soviet political and 
social spheres were wives, daughters, and sisters of men who opposed emancipation, their desire 
to study in the city, or to enter the professions outside the family. Only a few accounts concerned 
the murders of women activists, leading figures in village soviets or clubs for Muslim women’s 
emancipation. It should be noted that before the 1928, Party officials acknowledged that the 
violence against women in Azeri society constituted occasional acts and characterized it as the 
domestic violence of oppressive men over their wives, daughters, and sisters. From 1928 on, with 
the introduction of the Redd Olsun Chadra campaign and the Party-led program to use peasant 
women in class conflict, Party officials declared that those Azeri women who did not unveil and 
did not become politically active did not do it because they were not allowed to by ignorant male 
family members under influence of mullahs, large landowners, and rich merchants. Such discourse 
prompted the centre to increase pressure against patriarchal traditions, claiming that they were 
extremely strong in Muslim societies, and to enforce stricter measures to eliminate them along 
with their advocates.156 In this discourse, resistance to unveiling and political activism was located 
in men who opposed the Soviet meaning of emancipation. Having “Soviet” as the core of the 
accusation automatically placed those men in among the class enemies. The women’s journal 
Sharg Gadini portrayed the cases of violence against Muslim women as a female fight against 
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enslavement imposed by the wealthy and the clergy, along with a female desire to gain economic 
and social independence.157  
As a result, in 1928, attacks on unveiled and politically active women became legally 
defined as counter-revolutionary acts: to undermine the Soviet state’s program for women’s 
liberation, and to deter Muslim women from allying themselves with the government. In the 
summer of 1929, the Azerbaijani government announced that the murder of an unveiled and 
political female activist would be considered an act of terrorism against the Soviet power in 
accordance with Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the AzSSR, which deserved a death 
sentence.158 Party and state officials declared that they would provide financial support for victims’ 
families and hold public trials for those found guilty of counter-revolutionary activity. State 
officials, aiming to put an end to these crimes and to address women’s fear of facing the accused 
in the courts, announced that the new law would consider even anonymous claims to protect 
women from violence and harassment. The need to protect women even at the Soviet court came 
from the problem that Kadyrbekova began to voice since 1929. She expressed concerns about an 
increased level of opposition to gender reforms encountered not only from so-called class enemies 
but also from male Communists at the local and republican centres on whom the Party and 
Zhenotdel had to rely.159 This opposition was a direct outcome of the official state program of the 
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The Aftermath of the Soviet Gender Reforms, 1930 - 1939 
 
In Azerbaijan, Party membership increased rapidly in 1924, after Lenin’s Call, Leninskii 
prizyv, and new members obtained extraordinarily little training.  Lenin’s Call aimed to bring to 
the Communist Party new members from non-Slavic populations as part of the korenizatsiia 
[indigenization] policy that elevated the social status of the titular ethnic groups and created ethnic 
a political elite.160 In June of 1923, there were 6,857 Communists, mostly of Slavic, Armenian, 
and Jewish origin, in the republic. In 1924, central Moscow officials introduced the official quota 
of a thirty-five percent increase in members of Muslim Azeri origin in Baku alone. As a result, in 
November 1924, there were 2,337 new members of Azeri ethnicity; forty percent of them were 
illiterate. The so-called vydvizhentsi, young specialists, nurtured within the Soviet system, replaced 
the members of the old intelligentsia and politicians.161 
In 1927, only thirty-seven people with a university education and 267 with secondary 
education degrees gained before the Revolution remained among 27,058 Party members and 
candidates as compared with 1,000 in 1921.162 This was a direct outcome of the Communist Party 
policy. In 1921, the Party organized forty courses in Azerbaijan alone that aimed to prepare 237 
future executive officers, including fifteen women.163 By 1924, the number of the new political 
elite of Azeri origin had increased from 16.8% to 60% among all state bureaucrats.164 In March 
1926, TsIK AzCPb passed a special directive that required annual reporting on native 
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vydvizhentsi’s promotions, emphasizing this as a state priority.165 By, 1930, the political activists 
who emerged in the early years of Bolshevik rule, and particularly those whose worldview was 
formed by the old-Imperial gender discourse, had been gradually replaced by the new generation 
of Azeri Communists.  
Vydvizhentsi often were men who joined the Party for very trivial reasons, had a limited 
understanding of Communist ideology, were illiterate, and were not enthusiastic enough to cut all 
ties with local customs. While only the Party functionaries of the old cohort were zealous 
Communists and sincerely supported the gender reforms, the new recruits often undermined 
emancipation by opposing women’s work in village soviets, and strove to stop gender reforms and 
women’s participation in land redistribution.166 These vydvizhentsi from the “Lenin’s Call” 
generation used different methods to divert native women from Soviet reforms. One of these 
methods was to spread rumors that the Zhenotdel pressed Muslim women to engage in sexual 
relations. In fact, many of these male officials were themselves responsible for such deeds.  
Tseitlin, the Azerbaijani Zhenotdel’s executive worker, complained about male 
Communists who aimed to engage their female co-workers in sexual relationships. Zhenotdel 
officials stressed that such “comrades” damaged all achievements and the entire idea of female 
emancipation.167 They argued that local Muslim men must not work among women due to their 
inclination to see in every working woman an object of sexual desire. The Sharg Gadini column 
Noksanlara Atesh, Fire at the Misconducts, warned about legal penalties for harassment of women 
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in the workplace. The journal exposed those who harassed women and stressed that the Soviet 
courts stood at the guard of the female honor and rights.168  
However, while Zhenotdel and Sharg Gadini officials made it clear that all abusers would 
be denounced publicly and punished by Soviet law and courts, the Soviet government stopped 
supporting the Zhenotdel. In 1930, the Soviet authority closed the All-Union Zhenotdel stating that 
the women’s agency had become separate from the proletariat.169 In 1930, Soviet leaders also 
closed the republican branches in Azerbaijan because, allegedly, they had fulfilled their mission 
of integrating Muslim women into socialism. Welfare work and job and educational training 
among women became the task of the various government departments.170 Azeri Zhenotdel female 
activists lost their government positions, being accused of “deviation from the Party line” and 
nationalism.  
New political leaders emerged in the mid-1920s, accused Kh. Shabanova-Karaeva, Kh. 
Azizbekova, A. Sultanova, G. Kadyrbekova, and other activists from the native Zhenotdel of 
money laundering, sheltering of class enemies, ties to the Musavat, and corrupting the idea of 
Muslim women’s emancipation.171 As discussed elsewhere, there is no information about the 
government and Prosecutor Office bureaucrats’ arguments or the implemented procedures for 
convicting Azeri female Communists as “enemies of the people.” The State Archive for the 
Political Documents of the President’s Office of Azerbaijan Republic [Azerbaijan Respublikasi 
Prezidentin Ishler Idaresinin Siyasi Senedler Arkhivi] that possesses all documentation regarding 
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Azerbaijani Communists who perished during the time of the Stalinist repressions, considering 
them “Top Secret,” denies access to researchers and the general public. However, while working 
at the State Archive of the Russian Federation, GARF, in Moscow, I found one document that 
illustrates the character of this state-run campaign against Azeri female Communists.  
 
 
Figure 33. Khavar Shabanova-Karaeva, Baku, 1925. AAKFD photo. 
 
The anonymous collective letter from a group of Azeri-native proletarian students from 
several Moscow universities to the Chair of TsIK Emel’ian Yaroslavsky denounced the harmful 
role of Khavar Shabanova-Karaeva in the process of building socialism in Azerbaijan. The authors 
of this anonymous letter called Shabanova-Karaeva, a key figure in the Azeri Zhenotdel and the 
leader of The Ali Bairamov Club from its very first day, “a masked enemy” who sheltered class 
enemies because of her bourgeois origin. They stated that her close ties with people from her years 
at the Tagiev school and connection with the old-Imperial intellectuals and Musavatists heavily 
affected the worldview of the leading Communist Ali Gaydar Karaev and were responsible for his 
deviation from the Party line. They also accused Shabanova-Karaeva of frivolous behavior with 




young male favorites. They blamed her for converting the Baku Medical School, where she held a 
teaching position, into a personal brothel. Furthermore, they condemned her for petitioning and 
bribing Azeri officers from the republican Prosecutor’s office to save her Musavatist friends from 
Soviet justice.172 This anonymous letter shows that the new builders of socialist Azerbaijan 
employed both political and anti-feminine discourse for intimidation that led to the arrest and death 
of the majority of Azeri female Communists like Karaeva-Shabanova and her husband Ali Gaydar 
Karaev.  
Khavar Shabanova-Karaeva (1901–1959) was a graduate of the Tagiev school and the 
Medical Academy in Moscow. She became a member of the Communist Party in 1919. To escape 
arrest and execution by the Musavatists, she emigrated to Bolshevik Russia Astrakhan’, along with 
Ayna Sultanova and others, and returned only after the Sovietization of Azerbaijan in 1920. She 
held several positions at the Azeri Zhenotdel and the journal Sharg Gadini. Being a doctor, a 
gynecologist, she was also a chief of the Communist Party branch for Medical Specialists. From 
1929, Karaeva was under investigation for her alleged connections to Musavatists. From her final 
arrest in 1937 until 1954, she was a detainee at the Moscow Butirka prison and at several GULAG 
camps in Siberia and Kazakhstan. Her husband, Ali Gaydar Karaev (1896–1938), did not escape 
the fate of all old Bolsheviks. Karaev was born in Shamakhi city to the family of a well-off 
merchant. He received a degree in engineering from the Russian Polytechnic Universities in 
Kharkov and Novorossiysk. Beginning in 1913, he published articles in the journal Molla 
Nasreddin, where he argued for societal transformation through the elimination of common 
illiteracy and by granting women liberties. Between 1916–1919, he was a member of the Social-
Democratic Party, Menshevik. In 1919, he joined the Communist Party, and became an active 
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politician and a government leader. Between 1920 and 1929, he held many high-ranked positions 
such as Commissar of Justice, Commissar of Labor, and Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. 
From 1920–1924, he was chief editor of the newspaper Kommunist. In the 1930s, he was a Second 
Secretary of the Transcaucasia Committee. Karaev was executed in April 1938, as an “enemy of 
the people” who plotted against the Soviet power.173 
  Debates on methods of Muslim women’s emancipation performed by Azeri female 
Communists and other gender reformers of the old cohort became cornerstone arguments to accuse 
them in bourgeoise elitism that never separated religion from society and, thus, did not result in 
the total abolition of gender segregation and veiling.174 The central officials also blamed 
Azerbaijani gender reformers for losing their perspective on women’s liberation and distracting 
attention from more important matters, like the enrolment of women into the workforce and 
promoting class identity. As a result, the central state officials declared they would close all clubs 
for Muslim women’s emancipation. By 1936, the number of clubs for Muslim women had declined 
from  forty-two to twenty-eight across the republic, becoming community centres for women of 
all nationalities.175 In 1938, the government closed all female clubs, converting them into 
recreational centres open to people of both genders regardless of nationality. The Ali Bairamov 
Club became the civil registry office, ZAGS, under the name Saadat Saraii, The Palace of 
Happiness.  
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In 1935, the Soviet government introduced the new Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan 
Republic, significantly lowering the terms of prosecution for those who committed crimes against 
women in the process of emancipation. Article 119 prescribed a maximum of five years for 
practicing polygyny. Article 120 imposed three years for marriage on minors. Article 121 set five 
years as the punishment for physical abuse of women who wished to work or study. Article 173 
ordered a maximum of ten years of imprisonment for the murder of political and social women. 
Article 189 prescribed a maximum of three years for those who forced women into marriage. 
Article 190 set two years as the punishment for those who paid and received bride-money, kalym. 
The new Criminal Code eliminated capital punishment as a measure against crimes towards 
Muslim women on the road to emancipation. However, the Soviet Criminal Code still continued 
to practice the death sentence to those individuals who committed crimes against the socialist state. 
Thus, the government stopped considering the murder of unveiled and political female activists as 
acts of terrorism against Soviet power, judging them as “crimes of everyday life.”  
As a result, the number of abuse cases toward Azeri women and girls significantly 
increased. In 1936, in Baku alone, there were 178 acts of female self-immolation (the facts never 
known before), 391 acts of rape, 190 cases of paying kalym, 190 abductions of women, 188 
marriages by coercion, 201 instances of refusal to pay alimony, and 119 examples of polygyny.176 
Reports from the regions revealed cases of legal injustice, along with incidents of underage 
marriages and polygyny. In Lenkoran region, a teacher raped his 15-year-old female student and, 
bribing the local prosecutors, escaped a sentence. This fact kept many families from sending their 
daughters to school.177 In Barda region alone, seven men married young girls aged from ten to 
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fifteen and were sentenced to four years, in accordance with Articles 193 and 195 of the Criminal 
Code of AzSSR for marriage to minors, although they did not serve their terms fully.178 In Kuba 
region, the report indicates that thirteen underaged girls, from ten to fourteen years of age, were 
married. The document also reveals that fourteen men had more than three or four wives.179 
  The official report, which summarized the work of the Republican Prosecutor’s Office, 
also stated that those men who harassed Muslim women in their pursuit of liberation or violated 
the Soviet Code on Marriage and Family could now pay fines or be sentenced to conditional terms 
without imprisonment. The data shows that in Baku alone, fifty men who were married to 
underaged girls and were in polygynous unions paid fines, from one hundred to three hundred 
rubles; thirteen men received conditional sentences; and twenty-four men were exonerated, all of 
whom continued to live in those unions. The protocol emphasized that such minor terms of 
punishment were the direct result of the corruption of legal organs that were closely tied to the 
new cohort of Azeri Communists, so-called vydvizhentsi. The authors of this protocol stressed the 
need to investigate their true devotion to Communism.180  
The new political cohort used the official positions at their service, continuing patriarchal 
practices such as kalym, polygyny, and marriages to minors, which the first generation of Azeri 
reformers struggled to eliminate. The Record of the Prosecutor’s Office for the period of August 
1935–May 1936 revealed such examples: regional Communist Gamid Samadov was going to 
marry to eight-year-old Mesme Ismail qizi from Kazakh region, paying her parents five hundred 
rubles, three sheep, fifteen kilograms of rice, ten kilograms of sugar, and five dresses. In 
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Nakhichevan region, a highly ranked official named K. Abdulla bribed a school vice-principal 
with sixty rubles, thirty-two kilograms of grapes and forty-eight kilograms of cheese to declare 
that his nine-year-old daughter was deaf, and thus unable to study at school. In reality, he married 
her to Churli Aliyev, a local politician. In Massali region, an unnamed local Party executive of 
thirty-five married an eight-year-old orphan girl. Overall, this official record indicated that 
between August 1935 and May 1936, there were sixty reported cases of violations of the Civil 
Code on Marriage and Family exclusively by the regional Party and government functionaries.181 
The new Party discourse that positioned class interests over gender interests by closing the 
Zhenotdel, the agency that controlled the implementation of reforms in Muslim women’s 
liberation, led to a situation where women did not have any female representatives at the various 
Party and government levels to defend their rights.182  
Also, in 1936, the government changed the rhetoric defining crimes against Muslim 
women’s emancipation. The official report from the Presidium AzTsik stated that cases of murder 
of emancipated women could be committed by unenlightened male individuals of all nationalities 
and towards women of any ethnic background. For this first time, this official report placed rapists 
and murderers of Russian, Jewish, Ukrainian, Armenian, and Azeri origin on one line, in this way 
illustrating that criminality and backwardness were no longer ascribed only to male Muslim 
Azeris.183 This new official discourse was an important part of the Party’s new program on gender 
reform. Party officials stopped distinguishing “culturally advanced” European women from 
“backward” Azeri Muslim women. Government officials began to promote the image of 
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Azerbaijani women and stopped describing the local female population as Muslim and Azeri 
Turkic. In this way, they emphasized that Azeri women were no longer part of the general group 
of oriental women.184 The culmination of these changes came in 1938 with the official designation 
of Azeris as Azerbaijanis, Azeri Muslim women as Azerbaijani women, and the renaming of the 
journal Sharg Gadini to Azerbaijan Gadini, inscribing in this way that womanhood became 
integrated into the process of nation-building. The leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union declared that they achieved their agenda to emancipate Muslim women. Thus, as new 
citizens, women became as integral as men to the “ethnic republics,” since the Soviet state and the 
Communist Party turned the titular nationalities across the Soviet Union into the active actors in 
building a socialist national entity.185 The new Soviet gender policy of 1930–39 merged gender 
and ethnicity in the creation of a nation state within Republic of Azerbaijan. 
In conclusion, in the mid-1920s, Azeri leftists welcomed Soviet legal regulations as an 
important tool to overthrow patriarchal traditions and customs, a program that they failed to 
achieve during the periods of Imperial and Musavatist rule. This political strategy allowed them to 
focus on societal modernization by participating in the new regime. While some had been 
Communists since the early 1910s, many other Azeri intellectuals and politicians transformed 
themselves into Communists in order to have the right to speak in the name of their Muslim 
community. By installing themselves as the new political and cultural elite, in opposition to the 
old cultural community leaders and Russian colonial authority, they were united in one mission: 
to modernize society. Even though native Communists propagandized the official doctrine 
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defending working class interests, they also revived the old-Imperial discourse to benefit the whole 
Azeri community, millat, through mass education and women’s emancipation.  
Modern Western and Azeri historians debate the devotion of Azeri leftists to the Soviet 
regime, neglecting the fact that attractive Bolshevik revolutionary rhetoric put an end to religious 
radicalism and Russian Imperial colonial policies. These intellectuals, such as Dzh. 
Mamedkulizade, the Bairamalibekovs, Y. Vezirov, Sh. Efendiieva, and others, welcomed 
Bolshevik power, believing they would achieve their idea of modernization under the new power. 
They were also attracted to the new state programs because Azeri Communists including A. 
Sultanova, G. Musabekov, A. Karaev, G. Kadyrbekova, G. Guliyev, M. Efendiev, and many others 
(although not the Russian outsiders), were the leading executives of Bolshevik programs in the 
new republic.  
In the 1920s, the central role in political and particularly cultural life belonged to the Azeri 
Communists and early sovietized Azerbaijani Imperial reformers. They aimed to make their millat 
modern and secular, with them as a new elite. The Azeri reformers compared themselves to fellow 
modernists in Republican Turkey, prompting new laws to modernize Azeri society rapidly. 
Declaring the incompatibility of patriarchal practices and religion with modernity they, like their 
Turkish counterparts, pronounced veiling and seclusion as the main obstacles on the road to the 
emancipation of Muslim women. To justify their campaign for rapid chadra abolition, Azeri native 
politicians demanded that Moscow introduce an official decree for unveiling as a measure to 
proceed with a reform to support and defend those Muslim women who welcomed the political 
and cultural reformation. This Azeri-initiated crusade against veiling became the subject of conflict 




The pace of the anti-religious campaign was another subject of hot debate among the Azeri 
and central government and Party officials. In their eagerness to end the power of ulama and 
Sharia, the Azeri government and Party executives confiscated spiritual centres and arrested 
Islamic priests in such an aggressive manner that the Moscow authorities, already terrified by the 
scale of resistance to Soviet reform in Uzbekistan, disapproved of the Azeri-style anti-religious 
crusade. Moscow-based officials instructed local Communists to decelerate the pace of cultural 
and religious reforms, arguing that the issues of religion and veiling were one part of the whole 
Soviet politics in the Muslim East and required an extremely delicate approach. As a result, the 
Azeri model of modernity was short-lived, and did not fit into the Stalinist political and economic 
model of societal transformation initiated in 1929. 
Starting in 1929, the Stalinist strategy of industrialization ascribed Soviet women, 
regardless of their cultural background, to new economic and social roles. The massive 
introduction of a female workforce into industry required new ideology and new government 
institutions to control Soviet women. The new patterns of the Stalinist government authority and 
the introduction of the rapid industrialization of the Soviet state accompanied by the 
collectivization of agriculture transformed Muslim women’s roles as part of these broader political 
and economic changes. Later, the dissolution of the Zhenotdel, the abolition of the clubs and 
mobile courts, and the eradication of strong regulations to punish abusers left Muslim women 
without any female representatives at the various Party and government levels to defend their 
rights and societal achievements. 
Subsequently, the degree of hostility against Azeri women soared as a direct outcome of 
the Communist Party program that prioritized state interests over gender interests. Stalinist Party 




Communists, with new political and economic priorities exercised by a new generation of Party 
recruits, vydvizhentsi. The vast expansion of the Party membership in the mid-1920s altered the 
composition of the Communist Party and the government. The new recruits were from various 
social origins and had quite different political ambitions. Vydvizhentsi brought more traditional 
patterns of behavior and viewpoints on women’s societal roles. As a result, the old Bolshevik 
concept of the liberating fundamentals of female emancipation receded, giving way to economic 






     The Sky is Not a Limit  
 
       We are born to realize a dream into reality, 
To overcome long distances and space. 
Our mind gave us steel wings as hands. 
Our heart is a flaming engine. 
Always higher, higher, and higher! 
March of the Soviet Aviators.1 
 
 
 In the 1920s, the Soviet government and Communist Party leaders initiated reforms to 
modernize traditional Muslim society in Azerbaijan. In the early 1920s, the Azeri Soviet reformers 
aimed to change women’s public position, one that had been shaped by Islamic law and the long-
established practices that tolerated marriages on minors, polygyny, bride price, and veiling. In the 
late 1920s, the Soviet regime introduced the new paradigm of women’s equality with men, 
emphasizing the new roles of Muslim women as builders and defenders of the socialist motherland.  
In the period between two world wars, the Soviet modernization project was similar to the 
programs that several other states launched to transform their societies. As Stephen Kotkin states: 
“each major country – since none relinquished its great power ambitions – became involved in a 
competition for articulating a mass-based version of modernity, which gave a new impetus and 
form to its geopolitical rivalries.”2 
The governments of countries neighboring Soviet Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran, also 
undertook reforms to change Muslim women’s societal roles as an integral part of their cultural 
modernization. Like in the Soviet Muslim East, political leaders native to both countries claimed 
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that female illiteracy and patriarchal traditions were the main markers of their communities’ 
backwardness. To achieve cultural, economic, and political prestige in a competitive world, the 
states proposed to establish modern cultural settings built by all citizens regardless of gender. In 
this way, by declaring the campaign to defeat backward traditions, those governments changed 
women’s roles for the benefit of a new society.  
In this chapter, I argue that in the interwar period it was a state, rather than the enlightened 
middle class that defined the course of gender reformation. This chapter asserts that the position 
of women in Muslim societies in the 1930s should be studied as political projects of contemporary 
states and of their historical evolutions. This part of the study provides a comparative analysis of 
governments’ reforms and their influence on women’s lives in Soviet Azerbaijan, Turkey, and 
Iran. I demonstrate that Soviet policies on changing Muslim women’s status during the interwar 
years were not unique.  
This chapter examines programs created by the governments of Iran and Turkey to destroy 
traditional patriarchal institutions and the legal authority of Islam in their pursuit of modernity. I 
also argue that in these three culturally, ethnically, and linguistically linked countries, regardless 
of their political regimes, the project to advance Muslim women to aviation making them the 
combat pilots, emerged as the highest point of Muslim women’s emancipation. Thus, this chapter 
investigates the state-run campaigns for Muslim women’s introduction into industry and military 








 Making the Modern Woman in Republican Turkey 
 
 In the 1920s, two Middle Eastern states, Turkey and Iran, initiated movements toward 
modernity. Turkish and Iranian political leaders choose the Western style of modernity, which was 
different from the transformative programs of other nation states in Africa and Asia that had a 
record of European colonialism in their territories. As Partha Chatterjee points out, post-colonial 
states tried to be different from that which was traditional as well as unique from that which was 
Western. In post-colonial countries, reformers aimed to transform old culture into something 
modern but not Western, linking the latter to colonial power.3 Since both Turkey and Iran escaped 
the experience of being colonial subjects, native reformers welcomed Western culture, associating 
it with progress and modernity.  
In 1793, Ottoman sultans and a group of high-ranked bureaucrats initiated the cultural 
reforms of Westernization, aiming to modernize their society. From the mid-1860s, in the Ottoman 
empire, the state which preceded republican Turkey, the important part of societal modernization 
were women’s reforms, based on the twin pillars of education and law. The first steps towards 
women’s education began in 1858 with the establishment of several primary schools for girls in 
Istanbul. In 1863, Imperial officials founded a college for the training of women’s teachers in the 
same city. During the period of constitutional monarchy, 1908–1922, male intellectuals and 
politicians voiced their thoughts about the need to improve the level of women’s education and 
public activity.4 In 1911, the Ottoman government established the first public institution to train 
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female civil servants. In 1914, the Istanbul University and the Advanced School for Commerce 
opened their doors to women.5 
The events of First World War and the influx of Muslim refugees from the former Ottoman 
territories to the Balkans significantly changed Turkish women’s societal roles. Turkish women 
found new roles in their communities: elite women established several philanthropic associations 
to relieve war hardships for those in need, while women from the lower class found employment 
in food and ammunition industries. Along with this, Turkish women began to work in hospitals, 
banks, and municipal administrations. The downfall of the Ottoman empire in 1919, the occupation 
of Istanbul by British troops, and the raids by Greek soldiers in the Mediterranean provinces, 
stimulated the rise of Turkish women’s political activity.6 Features of this process of advancement 
of Muslim women in politics resemble women’s political activism in Azerbaijan.  
In Azerbaijan, as discussed elsewhere, Azeri women protested against the British and 
Bolshevik occupations and Armenian aggression of 1918–1920. They also became broadly 
involved in war relief programs, the press, and municipal or central administrations to support their 
reformist governments.7 In both countries, the well-known female writers and educators of that 
period, Shafiga Efendiieva, Sara Talishinskaia, Ayna Sultanova, and Dzheiran Bairamova from 
Azerbaijan, and Turkish female intellectuals such as Halide Edib, Nezihe Muhiddin, and Nakiye 
Elgun, became the leaders in Muslim women’s struggle for legal and societal equalities. 
In 1917, Young Turk officials introducing the first Family Law Code nevertheless 
approved the old Sharia regulations that allowed marriage at age nine for girls and age ten for boys 
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and maintained polygyny. With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the first 
President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923–1938), and his supporters totally eliminated all religious 
and traditional cultural institutions and practices.8 Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), the founder of the 
official ideology, Avropalilik va Modernlik, proclaimed European-style Modernism that combined 
the egalitarian principles of European democracy with ancient Turkic nomadic culture.9 He was 
“an architect” of Turkish nationalism and instrumental in establishing the Kemalist nationalist 
discourse to sever Turkish people from their Ottoman past and create bonds with a pre-Islamic, 
Central Asian Turkish history. Gökalp argued that ancient Turks were both democratic and 
feminist. The power of khagan, king, and khatun, queen, were equal. Turkic women were warriors, 
governors, and ambassadors. Turks had no veil, polygyny, or gender segregation.10 This discourse 
allowed the republican government to claim that emancipating Muslim women through the 
introduction of Western cultural values would be a return to genuine Turkic traditions.  
In 1925, to modernize society, Atatürk’s government launched campaigns to eliminate 
traditional dress, promoting European-style garb for both men and women. The first law, issued in 
the same year, banned the fez and male religious wear, such as the turban and robe, outside of 
mosques. This first regulation regarding state control over male bodies preceded government 
authority over women’s bodies. Despite the promotion of the image of the modern republican 
woman as unveiled and in European attire, the first official degree that outlawed veiling and so-
called Islamic dress, a long and loose dress that covered neck and head, came to life only in 1935.11 
During the reformative years of the 1920s and 1930s, Atatürk and his supporters promoted 
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unveiling less radically than the Azeri reformers by propagandizing it only with personal 
examples. They presented their unveiled female family members to the general public and 
demanded removal of face covering only from female students and government employees. Halide 
Edib Adivar, Nezihe Muhiddin, and Atatürk’s adopted daughters were the emissaries of the new 
cultural norms. This reformation of dress as the visual symbol of societal backwardness was 
remarkably different from that promoted in Azerbaijan. In the Soviet republic, reorganizers began 
the reformation of dress first with women, and only later proceeded to men’s attire. 
In Azerbaijan, chadra became a symbol of women’s submissiveness and ignorance from 
the first days of Bolshevik progress. The Party and Zhenotdel leaders organized mass 
demonstrations and meetings to appeal to the masses for veil removal. Government officials kept 
a record of unveiled women and punished those who opposed unveiling. It is important to admit 
that Soviet Azeri reformers referred to Atatürk’s reform to legitimize rapid chadra and papakh 
abolition, in opposition to the directives sent from Moscow that demanded graduality. This 
reference shows the existence of a mutual interest among the intellectual and political elite of both 
Turkey and Soviet Azerbaijan. Soviet Moscow-based officials also paid attention to Atatürk’s 
gender reforms. In particular, the leaders of the central Zhenotdel compared Soviet achievements 
with Turkish ones stressing the positive role of gender segregated clubs, artel’s, and mobile courts 
in the success of Soviet Muslim women’s liberation from the patriarchy.12 In 1923, the Turkish 
political leader, Atatürk, interested in the Soviet model of societal modernization, sent his 
emissaries to the Soviet Union. In one of the Soviet resolutions, Commissar of Foreign Affairs 
Chicherin advised the Commissar of Enlightenment Lunacharskii to provide maximum assistance 
to the Turkish delegates. The Soviet executive stressed the need to explain to Atatürk’s emissaries 
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that the Soviet program for gender transformation relied on the legal equality of Soviet men and 
women, the citizens of the modern and secular state.13  
In March 1924, to transform Turkish women from passive subjects into active citizens of 
the modern state, republican leaders initiated the reformation of education. The Turkish republican 
government issued two new laws. The first legal act abolished the Ottoman Caliphate, an 
administrative-spiritual institute under the leadership of the Islamic spiritual leader over the whole 
Sunni community. The second law required the closure of all religious educational institutions. 
This new law also announced the establishment of coeducational system.14 However, this reform 
advocating free and compulsory public schooling did not bring universal female literacy. 
According to Nermin Abadan-Unat, this government project neglected rural women and girls and 
was responsible for producing long-term consequences: the low literacy rate among the female 
population. By 1984,  the literacy rate for women was 62.5 percent and 86.5 percent for men.15 
While in Azerbaijan, because of Soviet educational reforms which targeted rural and nomadic 
women in particular, by 1980 the literacy rate for women was 99.8 percent and 99.9 percent for 
men.16 Abadan-Unat explains the limited nature of educational  reform in Turkey as a direct result 
of an economic system that failed to remove “the clear discrepancies between town and village, 
class and region.”17 These differences were also responsible for the limited number of Turkish 
women who gained high education. Abadan-Unat points out that in 1928 alone, the total number 
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of female students at the universities was 441, compared to 3,477 male students.18 In Azerbaijan, 
in 1928, among 7,120 female students, 2,009 young women were of Azeri origin.19 
To meet the demands of the modern civilization, in February 1926, the founding fathers of 
the Turkish republic adopted the slightly modified Swiss Civil Code that established state control 
over families. The new Civil Code determined the lowest age to enter a marital union to be 
seventeen for women and eighteen for men. It granted women equal rights in divorce and child 
custody. The Civil Code outlawed polygyny. However, reflecting traditional values, the Code 
affirmed the husband as the head of the family, as the main judge in choosing where to live, and  
as the authority in approving women’s ambitions to study or work outside home.20 Unlike Turkish 
women, from the early 1920s, Soviet Azeri women received legal status as equal in the family and 
society, except in performing heavy labor and in the right to have a menstrual and maternity leave. 
In Turkey, the Civil Code’s regulations, which imposed man as the family leader, were revoked 
only in 1990 after a long struggle by Turkish feminists and feminist-socialists. According to 
Binnaz Toprak, Kemalist gender reforms emancipated but did not liberate Turkish women, 
because while gaining some civil and political rights, Turkish women nevertheless remained 
confined by communal norms and traditional customs that the state failed to eradicate 
completely.21  
Several factors contributed to the limited success of gender reforms in republican Turkey. 
One of them was the sharp societal and economic division of Turkish society, especially in the 
rural areas of the Eastern provinces populated by Kurds, Shia Turks – Alevi, and Arabs. These 
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military-agrarian peasant societies had relatively little integration with the economy, 
administration, and culture of the Ottoman empire and Kemalist republic.22 As Abadan-Unat 
states, only in the Western regions and urban centres were the reforms greeted positively by the 
local population.23 The second factor was the absence of thorough and far-reaching government 
control over the reforms’ development. In Azerbaijan, unlike in Turkey, the government and 
Communist Party strictly controlled the progress of Muslim women’s societal transformation, 
making every man responsible for the success of Muslim women’s emancipation. In particular, 
male members of the Communist Party and government officials had to set an example in 
advocating for the gender reforms and in treating Muslim women as equal, otherwise they would 
face strong criticism and punishment. In Turkey, only urban men close to the republican 
government encouraged their female family members to enter public life and abandon veil and 
traditional Islamic dress. Soviet government authorities, unlike Turkish officials, also went directly 
to villages to mobilize women, introducing gender-segregated literacy centres, clubs for Muslim 
women, and mobile courts to defend women.  
In particular, agrarian reform and collectivization, which destroyed social boundaries 
emphasizing class belonging over gender, allowed the Soviet state and Communist Party to 
establish powerful control over the progress of gender reforms in patriarchal village communities. 
The omnipresence of the Soviet state in Azeri Muslim society can be seen in the methodically kept 
statistics that recorded the numbers of Muslim women involved in literacy clubs and political 
organizations. By making public the criminal cases for crimes committed against Muslim women 
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in family and society, the Soviet government stressed the seriousness of its intentions. According 
to Kamp, the Soviet tactic to record and penalize all violations towards Muslim women 
demonstrates the socialist state’s authority and commitment to gender reforms.24  
In Azerbaijan, Soviet officials kept track of the statistic that revealed the number of those 
who resisted unveiling and continued to practice Islamic marriages on minors and bigamous unions 
approved by the Muslim clergy. In Turkey, statistical evidence about the number of cases of 
polygyny, underage marriages, forced veiling, and violations of women’s rights in property 
inheritance is absent.25 One strong indication that republican officials did not monitor the process 
of family reformation is their reaction to cases with recognition of so-called illegitimate children. 
As discussed, the Civil Code abolishing all Sharia guidelines on the family made legitimate only 
those marriages registered at civil government offices. However, the citizens of the republic 
continued to practice religious marriages. Consequently, by 1950, the state had to produce a series 
of amnesty laws to grant citizenship to the 7,724,419 children born in outlawed Islamic 
marriages.26  
The third factor responsible for the slow pace of gender reforms in Turkey was the 
republican government’s refusal to give Turkish women the right to mobilize independently. In 
1923, the first year of the republic, Atatürk disapproved of Nezihe Muhiddin and other women’s 
agenda to establish a Women’s People’s Party, stating that its feminist program would compete 
with the Republican People’s Party. Instead, the government advised women to form a Turkish 
Women’s Union, controlled by the republican authority. In 1924, the Union’s female leaders 
founded a journal, Turk Kadın Yolu, The Path of the Turkish Woman. In its eighteen issues, the 
 
24 Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan, 72–73. 
25 Abadan-Unat, “The Impact of Legal and Education Reforms on Turkish Women,” 188. 




journal’s editors demanded the introduction of women’s political rights.27 The official Republican 
People’s Party ignored their demands. Instead, between 1924 and 1934, the government 
coordinating the Union’s female leaders advised raising Turkish womanhood to the modern and 
experienced level of Western countries. Finally, in 1930, Turkish women received the right to vote 
in municipal elections. Starting in 1934, they could elect and be elected to the republican 
parliament, the Grand National Assembly.28 Unlike Turkish women, Azeri women received the 
right to vote in 1917, when the Provisional Government, established in the aftermath of the 
February Revolution, granted all women of the Russian empire suffrage. The government of the 
ADR, 1918–1920, and the Bolshevik authorities, 1920–1991, upheld this right, and as previously 
discussed, Azeri women fully exercised it.  
Along with this, many Azeri women, unlike their Turkish counterparts, enthusiastically 
cooperated with the ruling power, joining the Zhenotdel, the Women’s Division of the Communist 
Party, 1920–1930. Zhenotdel became a women’s agency that popularized, advocated for, and 
defended Muslim women’s rights in social and political spheres within the framework of the 
Communist ideology. Azeri Zhenotdel’s main agenda was to make Muslim women politically 
active by bringing them into Communist Party organizations. Nevertheless, close cooperation with 
the Communist women’s department did not preserve Azeri feminist independence. In the early 
1930s, Turkey and the Soviet Union, both one-party system states, stood in a similar position with 
regards to women’s roles in modern society. Perceiving that Zhenotdel and the Women’s Union 
had too much independence in the public realm, the governments of both countries closed the two 
agencies in 1930 and 1934, respectively. Thus, the discourse on women’s new roles in republican 
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Turkey and Soviet Azerbaijan, earlier or later, became subordinated to the state agenda rather than 
women’s interests.  
 
 
Making the Modern Woman in Royalist Iran 
 
Iran’s model of modernization, introduced by Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925, aimed to create 
a centralized nation-state with an emphasis on modern education and Persian nationalist principles. 
This official ideology was responsible for the fact that successive Iranian governments of the 
twentieth century have avoided publishing demographic statistics on ethnic groups. The official 
discourse deflated the number of Turks in order to protect a clear Persian majority to claim cultural 
and linguistic dominance.29 As Keddie points out, the “official figures greatly underestimate the 
size particularly of the largest groups, the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds.”30  In the pre-Pahlavi period, 
official Iranian sources from the 1850s reported that Turkic ethnic groups whose primary language 
was Azeri comprised one-third of Iran’s population.31 Thus, despite the differences in state 
political organizations (monarchist Iran with strong anti-Communist politics and the Azerbaijani 
socialist republic under the Communist rulership), which were  responsible for the limited 
interaction between the two countries, the fact that one-third of the Iranian population were Azeri 
Turks allows a comparative analysis of gender reforms in Iran and Soviet Azerbaijan.   
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, Iran underwent many political changes. In 1905, 
revolutionary activity against the absolute monarchy and demand for the introduction of a 
parliament and a constitution spread throughout Iran. In 1906, Nasreddin Shah Qajar granted the 
Constitution and the establishment of the parliament. In 1907 his son Mohamad Ali Mirza, a new 
Shah, abrogated it, and with the help of the British and Russian armies dissolved the parliament. 
The governments of the British and Russian empires preferred to control the marionette state. To 
have better control over Iran, the two empires divided the country into two zones: the Russians 
took control over the north, and the British zone was in the south of Iran. This division, and the 
Shah’s betrayal of national interests, sparked a civil war in 1908. In 1909, the Shah abdicated. 
Between 1909 and 1911, there was a period of parliamentary rule. However, in 1911, Britain 
regained control again and installed a new Shah, Ahmad Shah Qajar. In the meantime, Russian 
military forces occupied the Iranian Azerbaijani province with its capital, Tabriz. This intervention 
into domestic affairs provoked Iranian nationalism fueled by strong anti-British and anti-Russian 
sentiments. Moreover, many Iranians welcomed Bolshevik ideology because of its promises of 
national self-determination and the end of imperialist colonialism.32 
In 1919, the Shah’s ministers signed an unpopular Anglo-Iranian Treaty which would make 
Iran a protectorate. This gave rise to political opposition from Iranian nationalists and Communist 
leftists. In 1920, the Iranian Bolsheviks, represented mostly by Iranian-born Azeri Communists 
and those Iranians who became indoctrinated in Communism while working in Baku’s oil fields, 
established a short-lived Bolshevik state in Gilan province. One year later, in 1921, with support 
from the British military and political elite, who preferred a unified government to disorder and 
Communist control, Colonel Reza Khan usurped power through a military coup. In 1925, the 
 




Iranian assembly deposed the last Shah from the Qajar dynasty. The same year, Reza Khan 
crowned himself Shah of the new dynasty, Pahlavi.33    
Reza Shah’s first steps as a state leader were to centralize the country rather than to 
modernize it. Building a strong conscript army, he was able to put an end to tribal autonomy and 
separatist movements. He settled the nomadic tribes, imposed full control over the Parliament, and 
encouraged industrialization and construction of a united network of roads. By introducing a 
system of modern public schools and a secular system of social welfare, Reza Shah limited the 
power of religious leaders, ulama, who had traditionally controlled it. However, his break with 
religion was less radical than those initiated in republican Turkey and in Soviet Azerbaijan. In 
Iran, the Shia clerics, along with former tribal kings, strongly opposed modernization and 
centralization and still retained much authority over the Iranian population. However, various 
nationalist and feminist groups supported Reza Shah’s revolutionizing projects.34 
In Iran, the history of the women’s reformation began later than in the Ottoman empire and 
Russian Azerbaijan. In 1907, the Qajar government established the first public school for girls in 
Tehran, while in Istanbul, such a school had operated since 1858, and in Baku, since 1901. 
Ottoman authorities opened a Teaching Training College for women in 1870; in Baku it had 
functioned since 1913, while in Tehran it had only existed since 1918. Ottoman and Azeri women 
gained access to higher education in 1911. In Iran, women received this right only in 1936. 
Nevertheless, Iranian and Azeri women both established feminist periodicals in 1911, significantly 
later than their Ottoman counterparts, who had voiced their opinions in media since 1869. In 
Russian Azerbaijan, it was mostly tsarist authorities who opposed the establishment of independent 
public educational centres for Muslim girls and young women. In Iran, it was predominantly 
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religious authorities, rather than the government, who resisted modern female education and 
women’s mobilization.35 The majority of those male political and intellectual leaders who 
supported women’s right to modern schooling were members of the Communist and Socialist 
Parties of Iran. In particular, in 1920, the political leaders of the short-lived Gilan Communist 
Republic promised political and social equality for women.36   
In 1911, Iran’s women established women’s newspapers, Danesh, Knowledge, and 
Shokufeh, Blossom, that advocated for modern education. In 1913, native women under the 
leadership of Maryam Amid Mozayen al-Saltaneh founded the Iranian Women’s Society. In 1921, 
in Mashhad, female journalist Fakhr Afag Parsa issued a journal entitled Jahan i-Zanan, Women’s 
World. The journal promoted the need for women’s education and legal and societal equality with 
men. These demands provoked the burning of her house and abuse of her and her family by 
religious fanatics. Consequently, Fakhr Afag, like her female counterparts in Azerbaijan, Sh. 
Efendiieva, S. Akhundova, and others, had to flee to the capital to save her life. In 1923, after 
severe criticism from Islamic clerics and numerous threats to her life, Fakhr Afag closed the 
journal. Between 1922 and 1933, Qajar princess Mohtaram Eskandari, along with Fakhr Afag 
Parsa, Noor Hoda Manganeh, and Mastoreh Afshar, established the Jamiiat e-Nisvan e-Vatan, 
Society of Patriotic Women, which strove to increase women’s roles in society. Its members, like 
their female associates in Turkey and Azerbaijan, provided care for orphan girls and food and 
clothing for women left without a spouse, and established schools for female commoners. Society 
members popularized their activity in the women’s journal Nisvan Vatan, Patriotic Woman.37 Reza 
Shah approved of this women’s activity, stressing its positive influence on societal development. 
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The official rhetoric declared that for the building of a modern and united Iran, women’s roles as 
educated mothers and teachers of the nation were essential. From 1931, the state began to control 
women’s autonomous activities.  
In 1931, Reza Shah declared the Socialist, Communist, and Revival Parties illegal, the only 
parties that promised Iranian women legal, economic, and political equality with men.38 Reza 
Shah’s official anti-socialist and anti-Communist politics explains the absence of any links 
between the Pahlavi government and the Communist-ruled Soviet Union regarding gender and 
modernist reforms. However, Nazi Germany and Kemalist Turkey were sources of inspiration for 
Reza Shah in his politics to reform women. In 1934, he visited Turkey and was impressed with 
Atatürk’s model of societal modernization. In particular, he credited the promotion of reforms to 
end patriarchal practices and their visual symbols, the veil and Islamic dress, with increasing 
women’s public activity. In 1935, Reza Shah put an end to women’s autonomy in political and 
social mobilization by subordinating all organizations to state control. He founded the Women’s 
Centre under the leadership of his daughter, Shams Pahlavi, to prepare society for gender 
reorganization. He named this initiative to make Muslim women modern as Women’s 
Awakening.39  
Shah defined the main aspects of Iranian women’s transformation as the abolition of veiling 
and the introduction of women to modern education, industry, and civic services. In 1935, the state 
allowed women to gain higher education and introduced a midwifery school. From 1936, Iran’s 
young female population received access to compulsory elementary and secondary education. In 
1937, the government introduced a minimum age for marriage: fifteen for women and eighteen for 
men. The new Civil Code recognized only those marriages and divorces registered by the state. 
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However, Reza Shah proposed no new laws that would make women equal with men. 
Nevertheless, Iranian feminists welcomed this limited government program, believing that they 
could gradually attain long-awaited rights under strong state guardianship. 
 In January 1936, Reza Shah issued a decree that commanded the immediate unveiling of 
all women.40 The state applied violence to enforce this law. In many urban centres, local policemen 
pulled the veil off women. These radical measures introduced by the Shah and performed by his 
zealous supporters provoked strong resistance from Shia religious leaders. The ulama-led 
opposition became responsible for a series of riots across the country. Many Iranian women 
considered unveiling a brutal imposition rather than a liberation and opposed it severely. The 
reforms were short-lived and came to an end in 1941 after the Shah’s abdication. His admiration 
of Nazi ideology, his obsession to find the common “Aryan” roots between Iranians and Germans, 
and his strong support of Nazi Germany as an ally in the Middle East, provoked geopolitical crisis. 
In 1941, the British and Soviet governments, the most influential great powers in the region,  
aiming to destroy the German influence in Iran, forced Reza Shah to step down from the throne in 
favor of his son, Mohamed Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979).41 Starting in 1941, many political parties, 
ranging from the pro-Communist Tudeh to liberal and conservative organizations, became active 
again, promising to improve women’s societal roles. Nevertheless, the most active political force 
became the Islamic Shia groups that demanded the termination of all previous gender reforms, and 
particularly insisted on the return of veiling. In 1979, they realized their goal with establishment 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
The limited success of gender reforms in Iran during the interwar years can be explained 
by one factor: the deep class and cultural divisions of Iranian society that Reza Shah, unlike the 
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Soviet Azeri leaders, had no intention of eradicating. Only some urban middle and upper class 
Iranians welcomed the Shah’s edicts to abandon traditional clothing, particularly the veil, to end 
patriarchal gender norms, and to accept the European way of living. Unlike Azeri social-political 
reforms, the Shah’s government reforms did not reach the greater tribal, rural, and township people 
whose female populace remained completely untouched by state gender reorganization. The 
nomadic and rural women gained extraordinarily little from the reforms. Very few women entered 
schools, the nascent industry, or civil institutions.42  
Keddie states that Iran’s model of modernization divided society by establishing “two 
cultures”:  the thin stratum of those who followed Westernization, and the broad stratum of rural 
and tribal commoners, who remained confined to the traditional ways of living regulated by the 
powerful Shia ulama.43 Hence, the Iranian Shah regime, similar to that of the Turkey’s republican 
government, initiated cultural transformation to modernize and strengthen its nation-state. The 
women of Iran and Turkey, with different degrees of involvement and government support, 
participated in nationalist movements to unify and modernize their independent states. In the 
meantime, in Soviet Azerbaijan, Azeri women remained confined to the all-Soviet program, 
participating in the creation of a multinational political entity that, since the late-1920s, tolerated 
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Stalinist Gender Discourse in Action 
 
With the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928, the Stalinist government aimed 
to transform the Soviet Union as quickly as possible into an industrialized and completely socialist 
state. The First Five-Year Plan, 1928–1932, emphasized the need to expand heavy industry and 
also called for the transformation of Soviet agriculture from predominantly individual farms into 
a system of large state collective farms. Soviet government officials believed that collectivization 
would increase agricultural productivity, providing much needed crops to feed the growing urban 
labor force. Along with this, collectivization was expected to free many peasants for industrial 
work in the cities, and to enable the Communist Party to expand its political authority over the 
remaining peasantry. 
To expand Soviet industrial production, the authors of the Five-Year Plan recommended 
the intensification of women’s participation in industrial areas. In 1928, the all-union government 
introduced quotas for women’s employment in various industries in the South Caucasus. 
According to the plan, by 1932, at the end of the first Five-Year Plan, the number of women in 
light industry should have increased from 404,200 to 1,720,700. In the food industry, the quota 
required an increase of employed women from 26,900 to 148,500. The state demanded to raise the 
number of female workers in the chemical industry from 17,300 to 90,600.44 In Azerbaijan, 
women’s involvement in the various industrial fields was quite low, and the centre criticized the 
work of the local government for the slowness of the introduction of female labor into the socialist 
industrial sector.  
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According to the Report on the State Planned Economy of AzSSR, in 1928 alone, 41,260 
women of unspecified ethnic background were employees of various industries. In particular, 
18,965 women worked in the heavy, light, and oil industries, 2,475 served in trade, and 16,904 
were employees of the educational, medical, and service spheres. The Moscow-based authors of 
the planned economy instructed the republican government to increase the number of women 
employed in the socialist industrial sector by 1932.45 Along with this, the officials demanded that 
Azeri women be educated for occupations required in modern industry, particularly in engineering. 
As a result, in 1930 alone, two hundred forty three Azeri women became chemical engineers, forty 
graduated as civil engineers, and twenty-three worked as mechanical engineers.46  
Moscow officials also instructed the Azeri government to allocate 12 billion rubles from 
the local budget to industrial development.47 While the Azeri government had to invest vast 
financial recourses into heavy industry, Azeri women had to learn to survive in a time total deficit 
of goods and food, a result of the rapid construction of socialism. This period of product shortage 
is reflected in the journal Sharg Gadini. In the 1930s, the editors of Sharg  Gadini gave advice on 
how to make new dresses from old men’s and women’s clothing for women and their families.48 
They taught female readers how to make substitutes for ink, toothpaste, laundry detergent, and  
soap from plants, charcoal ash, and potash. The editors also posted numerous recipes for dishes 
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with potato, cabbage, and carrot, and suggested reducing meat and dairy consumption as it is 
harmful to human health.49  
In the 1930s, the Stalinist government introduced a new gender discourse that 
propagandized the importance of family as a central element of increased population growth, that 
was required for the industrial, agricultural, and military efforts to build and defend the socialist 
motherland. In June 1936, the government introduced a new legal act, the Anti-Abortion and 
Protection of Maternity Law, that established a new vision for the roles of Soviet women. The law 
contradicted the old Bolshevik policies about women’s equality, arguing that women’s 
psychological predisposition and civic duty was to raising children, combined with career 
aspiration.50 To justify this new gender policy, Soviet officials stated that since the socialist state 
under Stalin’s rule had achieved economic prosperity and political stability, there was no need for 
abortions that deprived women of joyful motherhood. The authors of the new law explained that 
by introducing the Abortion Law in 1920, Bolsheviks aimed to reduce women’s suffering from 
the outcomes of the First World War, capitalist exploitation, and the Civil War that brought famine, 
starvation, and diseases.51  
The Stalinist government introduced strict measures to punish those who violated the new 
regulation. According to the new rule, medical professionals who performed abortions without 
legal permission, those who performed it outside of medical facilities, and those who performed it 
without a medical degree would be sentenced to five years. The anti-abortion law denied all women 
who were expecting their first child the right to have this medical procedure under any 
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circumstances. However, women who had at least five children, had medical conditions, whose 
spouse was disabled, or whose pregnancy was a result of rape could have access to this medical 
operation. In the meantime, women who had three abortions would be sentenced to six months of 
jail time.52 To preserve marriages and to decrease the number of divorces, the law required the 
installation of a high payment for a marriage annulment procedure, to be paid by its initiator. The 
law also increased the amount of alimony paid by the male divorcee. No marriages were allowed 
for those who annulled a marital union three times. The marital status of each Soviet citizen had 
to be indicated in the passport. Along with this, the state imposed a tax on childless marriages.53  
It is important to admit that in Turkey and Iran, which also underwent a societal 
transformation during the interwar period, the question of women’ reproductive rights were not 
discussed because of strong patriarchal traditions and the power of religion over society. In Turkey, 
women were granted the right to abortion only in 1983, after a long struggle initiated by local 
feminists and socialists.54 In Iran, women’s right to control their body and family planning had 
never been more than a topic for a discussion among some feminist. To illustrate that women’s 
reproductive rights gained considerable attention and served to broaden state agendas not only in 
the Soviet Union but also in other countries, I will compare the Soviet program with the German 
and Italian agendas.  
Unlike the Soviet Union, a non-nationalist, multinational union of twelve ethnically, 
religiously, and culturally diverse republics, Germany and Italy were nationalist states that initiated 
programs to establish cultural and ethnic homogeneity. In both German and Italian societies, the 
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population’s “purity” and growth became a focus of state attention. Therefore, government 
authorities began to consider women as biological reproducers of the nation and carriers of unique 
culture. To ensure the “good health” of the nation, states’ authorities began to regulate family size 
and a woman’s rights to control her body and social status.  
 In 1889, in spite of strong opposition from the Catholic Church, the Italian government 
introduced the Zanardelli Code, which decriminalized abortion, while prescribing strict sentences 
for abortions done late in pregnancy.55 However, in 1923, with the establishment of the Fascist 
government under the leadership of Benito Mussolini, came an end to this liberty. Mussolini 
argued that an ideal Italian women must have twelve children, as this was the only way Italy could 
provide the soldiers required for future wars. In 1927, Mussolini introduced a plan to increase the 
Italian population to sixty million from forty million within twenty-five years. Starting in 1931, 
the Italian government introduced  the laws that deprived their people in accessing to 
contraceptives and information about birth control planning.56 The Fascist regime imposed a tax 
on childless couples and prescribed penalties: imprisonment from two to five years for anyone 
obtaining or assisting with abortion, and one to four years for a woman who performed an abortion 
herself. Moreover, to control population growth, doctors had to register and report all 
pregnancies.57 
In Germany, with the establishment of the Weimar Republic in 1918, the new constitution 
granted women and men equality in political and civil rights. The new Weimar Constitution made 
women eligible to vote, hold public office, and pursue careers. In the Weimar Republic, due to the 
sex ratio imbalance caused by the First World War, there were over one million more female voters 
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than male voters. So, women were politically active, particularly the members of the Social 
Democratic Party and the Communist Party, advocating for so-called “voluntary motherhood.” As 
a result, in 1926, the government decriminalized abortion. One year later, in 1927, the German 
Supreme Court legalized abortion for medical reasons and established abortion clinics throughout 
Germany. Along with this, the state established birth control clinics to provide cheap 
contraceptives to the working class.58 All these innovations were the result of the German system 
of nationalized welfare, similar to Soviet universal health care. 
In 1933, with the foundation of Nazi rule in Germany, the situation regarding women’s 
reproductive freedoms changed. National socialism advocated motherhood as the highest point of 
female life. Like the Stalinist government, Nazi authorities introduced several social programs, 
including marriage loans and better chances of promotion for couples with several children. The 
government considered abortion as a crime against the Aryan race and introduced a sentence for 
fifteen years during the 1930s and the death penalty during the years of the Second World War for 
those who performed the abortions. The Nazi government established and maintained a new 
“racial” order based on ideology about the hierarchies of human inferiority.59 The state began to 
boost the birth rates of “desirables” and to diminish birth rates among “undesirables,” in particular 
for Germans with hereditary diseases and for Jews, Roma, and Sinti. As a result, the government 
applied forced sterilizations and abortions to “undesirable” groups and from 1941, introduced the 
program of their total annihilation.60  
Even though the German Nazi and Italian Fascist regimes promoted compulsory 
motherhood only for “racially valuable” German and Italian women, the similarity with the Soviet 
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reproductive program was in their common agenda to convert women into birth vessels to produce 
more soldiers and industrial workers required for strong militarized and industrialized states. 
However, the Soviet tactic to introduce an anti-abortion law was different from those implemented 
in Germany and Italy. Unlike in Western European political regimes, the Stalinist government 
“allowed” its citizens to discuss the need for this new regulation, organizing public discussions 
across the Soviet Union in May 1936.  
In Azerbaijan, in May 1936, 10,239 women out of 25,555 participants took part in the 
discussion of the Anti-Abortion and Maternity Protection Law. In Baku alone, by June 14, 1936, 
there had been 248 meetings organized by Party officials to debate the law that criminalized 
abortion.61 Moreover, to propagandize the official discourse about the harmful character of 
abortion and to praise the benefits of motherhood for the female body and psyche, Azeri 
government officials employed medical workers. The government also glorified those women who 
had several children and supported this law. In one of these public discussions, Sureia Badzhi, a 
collective farmer from Kuba district and a mother of four sons and three daughters, praised the 
anti-abortion law because she wanted other women to experience the joy of motherhood. Zuleikha 
Abbasova, a mother of eight children from Khachmas district, expressed her thoughts: that 
women’s true duty was in childbearing.62 In particular,  Azeri women praised the all-Union 
government’s initiative in discussing it before its introduction: this was considered an obvious sign 
of true democracy, absent in the capitalist world. Along with this, female delegates stressed that 
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raising children in a socialist society was not a burden because of the government system of free 
kindergartens, free education, and healthcare.63  
It is true that to support women and families, the Anti-Abortion Law and Maternity 
Protection Law regulated the building of more kindergartens, and kitchens with free food for 
newborn children.64 However, in Azerbaijan, because of the strong traditional culture and close 
family ties, Azeri women preferred  to take care of their children in the family environment rather 
than to trust state institutions. The statistical data indicates that only 8.3 percent of urban women 
and 0.5 percent of rural women, mostly of European background, sent their children to the 
kindergartens.65 Azeri women preferred to enroll their children into state-run nurseries only if they 
were at the clubs for Muslim women, while they were studying or working there.  
The new cohort of Azeri political leaders, under the leadership of Stalin’s protégé Mir 
Dzhafar Bagirov, head of AzSSR between 1932–1953, in their zealousness to serve the Stalinist 
regime, promoted the new women’s role as a destiny for mothers, often in absurd ways. They 
organized public meetings of childless couples with those who had children. During these 
meetings, the couples with children had to elevate the feeling of the happiness of being a parent 
and to glorify their offspring’s achievements which could only be realized in a socialist country.66 
Some statements were absolutely ridiculous in their character. In Sheki district, a collective farm 
member named Mariam Shabalut, mother of seven children, initiated a socialist competition 
among the female community members to have more children. In Kirovabad district, local women 
promised to “increase their fertility” to produce more socialist citizens. Similar campaigns that 
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urged Azeri women to produce more children happened across all republic.67 Remarkably, no one 
questioned the legitimacy of the state, which claimed to be an international leader in women’s 
emancipation, during these public meetings to eliminate a woman’s right to control her body. Party 
protocols and letters sent to the Sharg Gadini editors by Azeri women expressed support for the 
introduction of the law, considering it to represent the state’s sincere attention for its female 
subjects.68 
Such zeal for the new gender program, and many other government initiatives, was a direct 
result of the Stalinist political terror that liquidated the old Azeri Bolsheviks and frightened the 
new ones. As Baberowski states, Stalin’s mass terror began first in Azerbaijan, in 1929. The 
historian explains his argument by analyzing Stalin’s revolutionary activity in the Caucasus, 
particularly in proletariat-rich Baku, where he made political enemies among the local members 
of the Musavat, Hummet, and even Bolshevik parties. In the Caucasus, Stalin also learned the 
archaic norms of honor, vengeance, and violence towards political opponents, skills he fully 
exercised becoming the all-Soviet leader. The historian argues that Stalin tested totalitarianism as 
a form of government first in Azerbaijan in 1929, and then all over the Soviet Union in the 1930s.69 
Thus, the liquidation of Azeri liberal old Bolsheviks and other political opponents who questioned 
Stalin’s personal authority and Moscow-sent directives, and the atmosphere of terror created by 
Stalin’s henchmen since 1929, were the main factors that Azeri government officials and 
commoners accepted all new laws without questioning. As a result, government and periodical 
documents of the 1930s illustrate the glorification of all Stalin’s reforms. As Stephen Kotkin notes, 
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Soviet citizens learned to “speak Bolshevik,” to express an indisputable recognition of Stalinist 
politics in the years of the Great Terror, as the only tactic to survive and gain some rewards.70 
Soviet Azeri writers and contributors to Sharg Gadini promoted this new Soviet discourse 
that both motherhood and achievements outside home contributed to woman’s true happiness.71 
Official reports stated that in admiration for Russian shock workers, Azeri women of all ages 
became inspired to set new records to become exemplary Soviet women. The Soviet media 
specified that in the 1930s, thousands of Azeri women such as Almas Alieva, Mania Kerimova, 
Taira Tairova, Mariam Kadyrli, Gulzar Abdullayeva, Nazli Abdullayeva, Zubeida Babaeva, 
Banush Abbasova, and many others, received orders and medals for their success in the national 
economy, mostly cotton production. Dozens received the highest Soviet award, the Hero of 
Socialist Labor; several women even received it twice, such as Basti Bagirova and Shamama 
Gasanova. Official reports and the press popularized Azeri women’s achievements to illustrate 
Stalinist-style Muslim women’s emancipation.72 As Ali Igmen states, the proclamation of Soviet 
heroines became a primary agenda of Stalinist cultural policies that had to promote the new 
concept of Soviet womanhood.73 
In Azerbaijan, this program had to influence Azeri women’s self-image in the socialist 
society. Sharg Gadini provided numerous picture galleries of the best female cotton producers, 
industrial workers, and machine gunners and snipers dressed in military uniforms.74 The journal 
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editors published the pictures of the young Azeri female students receiving instructions from male 
mentors to master military knowledge. The journal’s editors also featured Azeri women who won 
first prizes at local, regional, and all-republican shooting competitions.75 These images reflected 
the state policy to introduce women to military training as a crucial part of the new model of gender 
equality.  
The socialist government, initiating the mass entry of Soviet women into industry, 
promised to liberate women from male submissiveness, making them financially independent. This 
new gender discourse was different from the original Bolshevik feminist promises about equality 
in labor, education, and politics. Providing educational and working opportunities to Soviet 
women, the Communist government trained its female populace to defend their motherland at the 
workstation in case of imminent war with capitalists.76 So, political and military needs changed 
not only the Soviet economy but also women’s societal roles. The new gender program demanded 
that women fulfill economic plans, have more children, and be ready to defend their socialist 
motherhood, and this became the new norm of women’s liberation.  
 
Always higher, higher, and higher 
 
Starting in 1922, Soviet leaders believed in the “inevitable war” launched by world 
capitalists against the young socialist state. In the 1930s, the Stalinist government defined Nazi 
Germany and imperialist Japan as major enemies. The Stalinist theory of the “enemy at the gate” 
aided the government in mobilizing the population and industrialize the Soviet state in an 
unprecedented way. According to Stalin, in 1931, the Soviet Union was fifty or even one hundred 
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years behind the developed world, so to survive among aggressive capitalists, the young socialist 
state had to modernize itself in ten years.77 The Stalinist vision of the future war also established 
the young generation of the Soviet state as fighters ready to defend their socialist motherland. 
Preparations for the imminent war included the introduction of military training for young Soviet 
citizens, both men and women. To prepare its civilians, the government began with the reformation 
of the educational system and the establishment of paramilitary clubs.  
The new coeducational system aimed to create new gendered relationships free from 
patriarchal male and female identities.78 Both boys and girls had to be equally knowledgeable in 
math, science, art, and newly introduced military disciplines, such as shooting, using a gas mask, 
and air and chemical defense, along with training in physical culture.79 Within the secondary and 
higher education system, the main liaison between the government and Soviet youth became the 
All-Union Young Communist League, Komsomol, which indoctrinated the young generation with 
Communist ideals. Since 1927, the Komsomol’s close partner was another mass organization – 
the Society for the Promotion of Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Development, OSOAVIAKHIM. 
This public paramilitary association was instrumental in raising patriotism in a society living under 
the constant fear of war. OSOAVIAKHIM became an important tool in mobilizing the population 
not only for the noble mission of defending the socialist motherland but also in promoting Soviet-
type gender equality. The organization trained young women and men equally to be sharpshooters, 
parachutists, and pilots. 
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By 1931, the Society had eleven million members who received training in shooting, 
flying, and parachute-jumping. In 1935, the OSOAVIAKHIM had 122 Flying Clubs and more than 
one thousand parachute stands across the Soviet Union. In Azerbaijan, there were thirteen clubs 
and six parachute stands, situated mostly in Baku and its surroundings: Amiradzhani, Zabrat, 
Mardakian, Balakhany, and Baladzhary. In 1935 alone, the all-Union Komsomol and the 
OSOAVIAKHIM together reported that 800,000 people jumped off parachute stands, and 3,500 
people graduated from flying clubs and became certified pilots. In the first half of 1936, 10,500 
people jumped out of planes.80 To prepare Soviet youth for war, in 1934, The Komsomol Central 
Committee introduced an exam in military training. The exam’s requirements were to pass rifle 
shooting, grenade throwing, and jumping with a parachute, demonstrate the ability to perform first 
aid, and have basic knowledge in topographical maps and mechanics.81 
Throughout the 1930s, OSOAVIAKHIM organized various sky-diving and flight campaigns 
to popularize aviation among young Soviet women and men. Including women in civilian military 
training, the Stalinist government considered the use of female military force in the future war. 
According to the Soviet doctrine on defense mobilization, skydiving and piloting would be the 
most important factors for victory in future war. In the early 1930s, many Soviet women were 
promoted to newly available jobs such as parachuting and flying instructors. This change in gender 
roles was part of a state-sponsored program that encouraged women to enter into traditionally non-
female occupations. 
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 OSOAVIAKHIM leaders introduced a system to recruit female parachutists and pilots 
based on quotas that required and regulated women’s participation in the organization. This policy 
also aimed to retain a certain number of women graduates who would become future pilots and 
instructors.82 In Azerbaijan, local officials responded to this call with all seriousness. Azeri 
political leaders, such as M. Guliyev, the Minister of Public Education, initiated a campaign to 
elevate Soviet achievements in Muslim women’s emancipation to a new level, setting new 
standards in maintaining the status of role model for all of the Muslim East.83 The important part 
of that program became the cultivation of female military aviators — the only Muslim Turkic 




Figure 33. From left to right, Leila Mamedbekova, Sona Nurieva, and Zuleikha Seiidmamedova, Baku, 1936.  
ARDA photo.  
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In the 1930s, the Azeri OSOAVIAKHIM nurtured three Azeri female pilots, who were also 
flight and parachuting instructors. One of them, Mamedbekova Leila Alaskar qizi (1909–1989), 
was born in Baku to the family of Bolshevik revolutionary Alaskar Zeynalov, who was also a close 
friend to Nariman Narimanov. In her autobiography, Mamedbekova recalled that her father, an 
ardent Communist intending to advance Bolshevik power in Azerbaijan, sent her to distribute 
Bolshevik leaflets among Baku city dwellers several times.84 Like many Muslim girls of that 
period, Mamedbekova got married at a young age, thirteen. Her husband, Bakhram Mamedbekov, 
was a Communist and a government employee. In 1926, Mamedbekov insisted on removing his 
wife’s chadra and enrolling Leila into the Ibrahim Abilov Club to prepare for university. 
Mamedbekova, like many other Azeri women, officially unveiled in 1928, at a community meeting 
at the Club for Print Workers named after Comrade Stalin, Klub Pechatnikov Imeni tov. Stalina. 
Together with her husband, they had five children.  
Mamedbekova always stressed that her husband’s support helped her to graduate from the 
college in 1930 and to become a pilot. Between 1930–1931, she was a member of OSOAVIAKHIM, 
and the Baku School of Aviation. For two years, between 1931–1933, Mamedbekova was a student 
at the Moscow School of Aviation, studying to become a flight instructor. In March 1933, she 
made a parachute jump, becoming the 84th jumper among all Soviet paratroopers. After her return 
to Azerbaijan, she worked as head of the OSOAVIAKHIM Pilot Club in Baku. During the war 
years and after, 1941–1947, she headed the parachute-gliding club.  
 
 




                                         
 
Figure 33. Figure 33. Leila Mamedbekova in chadra. ARDA photo. 
Figure 34. Leila Mamedbekova with her son Rustam at the airport in Zabrat, 1940. ARDA photo. 
 
 
In her autobiographical record, Mamedbekova bitterly noted that the Azeri government 
denied her request to serve at the front because she was a mother of five children. However, 
trusting her professionalism, it assigned her to train paratroopers. Mamedbekova personally trained 
four thousand male paratroopers, two of whom, Adil Guliyev and Nikolai Sheverdiaev, became 
Heroes of the Soviet Union, the highest sign of the Soviet distinction awarded for exceptional 
service to the state and society. She also trained her son, Rustam Mamedbekov, to become a 
combat pilot during the Second World War, and to work as a civil pilot after the war. After the 
Second World War, and until her retirement in 1964, Mamedbekova worked as head of the pilot 
club and supervised a unit of paratroopers.85  
 
 





Figure 35. Zuleikha Seiidmamedova. Baku, 1934. ARDA photo. 
 
Another Azeri-born female pilot, Seiidmamedova Zuleikha Gabib qizi (1919–1999), was 
a combat fighter during the Second World War. Zuleikha was born in Baku to a well-educated 
family: her father was a financier, and her mother was a graduate of one of the Tagiev schools.86 
Between 1934–1938, Seiidmamedova studied at the Azerbaijan Industrial University, in the 
department of oil engineering. In 1934, her first year as a student, she joined the OSOAVIAKHIM 
club. In 1935, being promoted by native government officials, this young Azeri woman took part 
in the all-Union rally of parachutists at the Moscow Tushino airbase, to make a group jump. This 
group jump symbolized the friendship of all Soviet people that does not know gender or ethnic 
boundaries. Seiidmamedova represented the Azeri republic, its people, and emancipated Muslim 
women.87 In 1938, she entered the Moscow Air Military Academy, named after Zhukovskii, to 
study military navigation. In May 1941, she graduated the academy as a military aircraft navigator. 
In December 1941, she became a member of Aviation Group 122, which consisted only of female 
pilots, such as the famous Russian Soviet female fighters Marina Raskova, Lidia Litvak, Ekaterina 
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Budanova, and others. Seiidmamedova participated in five hundred flights as a navigator of fighter 
pilots at the most dangerous fronts: the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Warsaw, and Vienna. 
After demobilization from military service in 1952, Seiidmamedova became a Minister of Social 
Security of the Republic of Azerbaijan.88 
 
 
Figure 36. Sona Nurieva. Baku, 1934. ARDA photo.  
 
Nurieva Sona Piri qizi (1915–1986) was an Azeri female aviator who performed top secret 
missions before and during the Second World War. Nurieva’s father, Piri Nuriev, was an oil 
engineer. Prior to the revolution, he studied in England and worked for Nobile’s Brothers’ and 
Tagiev’s oil enterprises. After the sovietization of Azerbaijan, he worked at the oil refinery plant 
 




and became head of the shock workers’ brigade. Sona Nurieva stated with respect that her father’s 
oil team finished the Five-Year Plan for oil production in two and half years. Piri Nuriev had been 
given many government awards for his service and was among the first in Azerbaijan to receive 
the Order of Lenin.89 Sona Nurieva graduated from school in 1930. In 1932, she finished the 
OSOAVIAKHIM pilot school in Moscow. Between 1932–1934, she was a flight instructor at the 
Baku-based OSOAVIAKHIM club.  
Starting in 1936, Nurieva worked as pilot for Soviet airlines. She came to prominence 
during the Second World War as a pilot who performed state secret missions.90 She flew to Iran to 
deliver instructions to Iranian Communists to establish the Communist regime, to overthrow Reza 
Shah, and to prepare for the Tehran Conference. In November–December 1943, Nurieva was one 
of the pilots who transported Soviet political leaders, including Stalin, to Iran for the meeting with 
world leaders F. D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill at the Tehran Conference.91  After the war, Nurieva 
worked as a civil pilot for the international airlines until her retirement in 1968.92  
In Iran and Turkey, both governments also introduced feminist projects, promising to give 
Muslim women new opportunities in professions outside the home. The reforms aimed to 
transform Muslim women from secluded and illiterate into educated and skilled, even in 
traditionally male professions. In Iran, between 1936–1941, Reza Shah’s radical transformation of 
womanhood, called the Women’s Awakening, became a major watershed in making Iran modern. 
Women’s journals like Alem-e Nisvan, Women’s World, and Iran-e Bastan, Ancient Iran, 
promoted the state program to familiarize Iran’s women with industry and public education.  
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The journals introduced an image of a “professional woman” to the general public. In 
particularly, the journal Iran-e Bastan demonstrated to Iranian readers the significance of modern 
women for the progress of the society. It is important to admit that the journal’s chief editor was 
Sayf Azad, a Nazi sympathizer who supported Reza Shah in his pursuit to justify the common 
Aryan heritage of Iranians and Germans. As a result, the journal chose a pro-German type of 
modernity to propagandize among Iran’s population. The journal publicized the image of German 
women parachutists, female members of a Nazi motorbike club, female pilots, and athletes. The 
journal editors highlighted the achievements of the Nazi state in liberating women and making 
them physically fit to be strong mothers and workers.93 
 Other women’s journals, Shokufeh and Danesh, also propagandized the state idea that 
women could be active outside the home while remaining good mothers and wives. The journals’ 
editors promoted the idea that Iran’s women could master military occupations, particularly 
aviation.94 Sadigeh Dowlatshahi, a twenty-five-year-old clerk at the Treasury Ministry in Tehran, 
responded to this appeal. Born in 1914 to a Bahai family, she was educated in the public schools 
of Beirut and Tehran. In 1940, she enthusiastically accepted the Shah’s call to introduce both men 
and women into the newly established flight school. The government paid for her studies and 
provided a car to take her to the airbase and a personal plane for training. Reza Shah directly 
curated her achievements and visited her show flights during the graduation ceremony. The Iran’s 
print media highlighted her flying achievements, stressing her family status as a married woman 
in the meantime.95  
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The purpose of this project was to create an Iranian model of the emancipated Muslim 
woman. As Amin states, by popularizing Dowlatshahi’s image, the state showed that Iran’s women 
had become modern, mastering even the art of piloting an aircraft. Also, this image of Iranian 
women’s progress was closer to female Iranians than that imported from the West. However, this 
project to introduce women to aviation was short-lived and unsuccessful. Unlike the Soviet Azeri 
female aviators, after graduation neither Dowlatshahi nor other unnamed female aeronauts worked 
in aviation as the pilots or instructors.96 I state that Iran’s model of women’s transformation aimed 
only to create a native model of the emancipated woman rather than a professional woman.  
The Turkish model of the new woman was part of the broader national program to create 
a nationalist military-state. The Turkish military model emerged in Ottoman times, the years of 
loss and suffering as a result of the Balkan Wars and the First World War.97 The political and 
intellectual leaders of the collapsing Ottoman empire proposed several programs to create a nation-
state with centralized administrative power, a modern education system, and a citizen-army. One 
of the ideological fathers was Yusuf Akçura. In 1904, in his essay Uch Tarz-i Siaset, Three Types 
of Policies, Akçura stated that there were three models to create the future Turkish nation: 
Ottomanist, Islamist, and Turkist. According to Akçura, the first two had already played their roles 
in the history of Turkish people. The future would belong to Turkism that required the 
Turkification of all Muslim elements of the former Ottoman empire. This political platform was 
different from the previous two programs that tolerated cultural independence for all Imperial 
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subjects.98 The Republican government began to implement this doctrine on Turkism after the 
years of The War of Independence (1919–1923).   
As Ayşe Gül Altinay states, state-led Turkish nationalism purposefully suppressed cultural 
and ethnic differences within the new national borders. Along with this, to justify the politics of 
Turkishness, the Kemalist government rewrote Ottoman and Turkish history and created a myth 
about the Turkish nation as a military-nation, where men and women were equally remarkable in 
warfare.99 The new official discourse stated that all Turks, regardless of gender, had been the best 
soldiers since ancient times and possessed the military spirit. In addition, it argued that the 
establishment of a conscripted army in 1927 was not a necessity of the time but was a natural 
feature of the Turkish cultural character shaped throughout history. Altinay states that the myth 
that the “Turkish nation was a military-nation” became a basis for modern Turkish ideology and 
created military heroes of both genders.100 One of them was Sabiha Gökçen, the adopted daughter 
of Atatürk. In 1937, she became the world’s first combat pilot participating in an internal military 
campaign at the age of twenty-four.  
Gökçen was born in 1913 to the family of a military officer. In 1925, Atatürk adopted 
Sabiha after the death of both of her parents. Along with other twelve of Atatürk’s other adoptive 
children, she received a modern education in Istanbul, Vienna, and Paris. In May of 1935, she 
attended the ceremony for the establishment the Turkish Aviation Society and was impressed with 
the flight of Soviet guest aviators of both genders. She expressed her wish to become a pilot to 
Atatürk, who encouraged her to pursue this career to set an example to other Turkish women in 
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becoming modern. After completing two months of courses at the Turkish Aviation Society, she 
went to study in Moscow and Odessa along with seven male pilots. After returning to Turkey, at 
age twenty-three she joined the Air Academy as the only female student, to become a military 
officer. Like Iranian female pilot Dowlatshahi, Gökçen received personal training along with the 
private plane adjusted to her height. This was different from the Soviet tactic to prepare female 
pilots in a gender-mixed environment. In 1937, Gökçen had the chance to exercise her military 
skills participating in the Dersim Offence; Dersim was a Turkish province dominated by Kurds.101    
Atatürk, like the Soviet leaders, believed that soldiers do not have gender identity. So, he 
aspired for Gökçen to go to war, stating that “she is no longer a young girl but a young soldier”.102 
In the meantime, understanding that her participation in actual combat would become a hallmark 
in the process to make Turkish women modern, he assigned her another duty: to preserve her honor 
(and the nation’s) in case of capture by enemies. Atatürk gave her his personal pistol and asked 
her to kill herself rather than to become a captive and a victim of a rape.103  With this act, Atatürk 
highlighted that despite all the reforms to emancipate women, for the majority of Turkish society, 
she still was a woman whose sexuality could be violated and thus needed to be protected. This 
episode reflects that the republican society of the 1930s was not completely free from patriarchal 
prejudices where a threat to namus, female honor, was the ultimate danger, not death. This point 
of view was remarkably different from the Soviet discourse that did not consider gender difference 
when assigning military missions to its soldiers. Since the early 1930s, Soviet female pilots, 
regardless of their ethnic and religious background, were equal with male soldiers and received 
only one instruction: to protect the honor of their socialist motherland. It is important to admit that 
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in the 1930s, the word namus equally disappeared from the vocabulary of the Azeri official reports, 
periodicals, and works of fiction.  
After the Dersim operation, an ethno-national conflict with the Kurds who resisted the 
government-enforced policy to assimilate them, Gökçen became a national heroine. In accordance 
with the official rhetoric, Gökçen proved that Turkic women could, like their pre-Muslim 
ancestors, defend the interests of their nation. Atatürk stated that the participation of Gökçen in 
real combat, throwing bombs on patriarchal communities, was a symbolic act to end the country’s 
cultural backwardness. As he stated, she dropped “the final bomb that would destroy 
Feudalism.”104 This expression was similar to the Soviet program to introduce Muslim women to 
aviation.105 Both projects aimed to end patriarchal power in Muslim society by making women 
equal with men in the military sphere. However, unlike the Soviet program to create female pilots 
and employ them in military and civil aviation, Turkish government authorities never realized their 
program fully. Gökçen, like Dowlatshahi from Iran, was the only woman pilot to serve her country; 
she served only for a brief period of time and resigned from military service after Atatürk’s death 
in 1938. 
Unlike the short-lived Iranian and Turkish programs to introduce Muslim women to 
aviation, the Azeri government widely employed Azeri female aviators as pilots and instructors 
until their retirement in 1960s. The Azeri government also promoted Muslim women’s 
achievements in aeronautics, crediting the Socialist state and juxtaposing the achievements of 
Soviet Azerbaijan with those in Turkey and Iran. It is important to admit that similar to many 
Soviet people who came to prominence in the 1930s, the Azeri female pilots themselves glorified 
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the Soviet government for their liberation from patriarchy and support in professional spheres that 
could not be achieved by their Iranian and Turkish sisters.106 Seiidmamedova, in her 
autobiographical account Zapiski Letchitsy, The Aviator’s Notes, stressed that she came from a 
family that benefited from Soviet power. She provided the example of her mother, Mina Ali qizi, 
stating that she was an illiterate person before the revolution and silencing the fact about her 
education at the Tagiev school.  Seiidmamedova wrote that her mother went to study only after the 
establishment of Bolshevik power: she began directly with the training at the Medical University 
and went on to become a well-known doctor-gynecologist. Seiidmamedova and others compared 
the position of Azeri women before Soviet power to that in the socialist state, saying that women 
were deprived of the light, ishig, under chadra, and of fresh air behind the thick walls, because of 
the Sharia norms that kept them unenlightened.107  
Along with this, Seiidmamedova glorified the new gender roles nurtured by Soviet power, 
describing her older brother’s respect for her as a pilot who introduced him to aviation and showed 
him the Earth and the sky.108 This statement echoes the discourse promoted by the old-Imperial 
reformers, that it should be educated women who brought knowledge about the world to young 
men. As discussed elsewhere, the women’s journal Ishig also advocated these ideas, even placing 
an image of the educated mother showing the endless horizon to a young boy as a symbol of the 
new world full of opportunities on the cover page. Along with this, Seiidmamedova recalled that 
female pilots expressed their femininity during the war by decorating their uniforms with fur and 
flowers and bleaching or cutting their hair in non-military styles. She also described the skepticism 
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about women’s ability to fly and fight among fellow male pilots, who thought of every female 
pilot more as a woman rather than as a professional or a soldier.109 
Advocating for friendship among all Soviet peoples, Azeri female aviators also elevated 
the strong support of the Russian instructors who helped them to realize their dreams about long-
distance flights and parachute jumping from a plane. In particular, Seiidmamedova specified that 
it was Russian people, namely men, Vladimir Tkachenko and Nikolai Shestopalov, who introduced 
her and other Azeri students to OSOAVIAKHIM.110 Azeri female pilots also stressed their 
connection with all Soviet women and men. In particular, they described all Soviet people’s 
concerns about the imminent war with the imperialist West. Seiidmamedova recalled how she, like 
each Soviet person, followed the news about the heroism of the Soviet polar expeditions and the 
victory over the Japanese army in the Far East. She wrote with special admiration about the 
Russian female aviators who set the new world record in distance flight.111  
In September 1938, three Slavic female pilots, Marina Raskova, Polina Osipenko, and 
Valentina Grizodubova, performed a long-distance flight from Moscow to the Far East, 
Komsomolsk-na-Amure city. Their flight, named Rodina, Motherland, attracted much attention 
for promoting women’s role in aviation. They became the first women pilots to fly more than five 
thousand kilometers and set an international record for straight-line distance flying. They aimed 
to compete with world-famous female aviators, such as Amelia Earhart and Ruth Nichols, who 
had flown four thousand kilometers. The Soviet female pilots set a record, covering 5,947 
kilometers in twenty-six hours and twenty-nine minutes. The Soviet press presented this flight as 
the result of the socialist gender policy that enabled every Soviet woman to realize her dreams.112 
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Seiidmamedova was  joyful to graduate from the Air Military Academy in May 1941, hoping to 
be helpful to her motherland in a time of war in Western Europe and the Far East. She wrote that 
those dreams to defend her Vatan, Motherland, came true when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet 
Union. Seiidmamedova described the feeling of honor in becoming an equal crew member with 
the famous female pilots during the Second World War and admired them for their friendship.113  
In 1934, to popularize the Azeri female aviators’ achievements, along with the 
achievements of all Azeri women as emancipated all over the Soviet Union and Middle East, the 
Azeri government produced the silent film, Ismet, End of Adat, that was also distributed in Turkey 
and all over the Soviet Union.114 The film illustrated the life of Mamedbekova before and after the 
sovietization of Azerbaijan. Presenting the pre-revolution period as a period of darkness, the film 
stated that Muslim women were powerless creatures. According to the film’s plot, that situation 
changed during the Communist empowerment in Azerbaijan. Referring to Mamedbekova as an 
emancipated Azeri woman, they glorified the socialist reforms that helped her and others to live 
full lives as mothers, wives, and highly skilled professionals who mastered a traditionally male 
sphere, the military career.115 During the film’s production, Mamedbekova herself played the parts 
where the heroine should fly and instruct her students, however, the other parts of her life were 
represented by a Jewish-born actress, Zhuka Michelson. In 1933 and 1934, Azeri poet Mikail 
Mushfig (1908–1938) dedicated two poems to Mamedbekova, Afshan and Shoila. In 1935, the 
poet Samed Vurgun wrote the poem Leila. In all of these poems the authors glorified the Soviet 
state that had emancipated Azeri women through education and work opportunities and stressed 
the ignorant position of those Turkic women who lived in the capitalist states.  
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To attract more Muslim women to aviation, the Azeri government also assigned local 
female pilots to give lectures across the republic and to perform show flights. In one of those 
flights, Mamedbekova took on board Basti Bagirova, a famous cotton producer and two time 
recipient of the Hero of Socialist Labor. That flight symbolized the union of the urban and rural 
worlds, femininity and technology. Along with this, this demonstration flight had to promote the 
idea that in Stalinist society, city and village women were equally able to achieve sky-high 
limits.116 Even though the official Soviet discourse instructed women to defend and work for the 
benefit of their motherland, it also promoted the image of a professional woman and mother living 
according to her biological predestination.  
In particular, the Azeri government extensively popularized Mamedbekova’s 
transformation from an illiterate, veiled Muslim woman with many children to an independent 
professional woman who mastered a traditional male sphere: aviation. State authorities widely 
propagandized her motherly duty, raising her son Rustam as a combat pilot during the Second 
World War. Moscow and Baku-based officials, equally, assigned Mamedbekova to present 
socialist achievements in Muslim women’s emancipation at various meetings with Western male 
and female aviators in Moscow.117 Along with this, the Soviet Azeri media stressed the roles of 
the male family members of famous women pilots. Journalists and women pilots emphasized the 
importance of supportive fathers and husbands, who advised them to unveil, or to go to the club, 
and then to flight school. Two of the Azeri female pilots, Mamedbekova and Nurieva, were married 
to husbands who were Communists and government employees. They had children and, in the 
press, they promoted the image of a new kind of mother, who loved her offspring and respected 
her husband for his support in raising them. In particular, Mamedbekova recalled her children’s 
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admiration of her flying career, which shaped their predisposition to become pilots, like their 
heroic mother. She praised her husband for acting as a guardian while she was away for several 
weeks or months at a time for training.118  
As a result, Azeri female pilots became role models that demonstrated how the military 
and other careers could be combined with familial and maternal responsibilities. In the 1930s, the 
Azeri professional women also emphasized that their mothering responsibilities, to raise good 
citizens, would not be accomplished without the state network of kindergartens and schools. They, 
along with female industrial and agrarian workers, credited the Stalinist government for giving 
them opportunities to end an ignorant existence and to become fully liberated from male patriarchy 
and domestic routine unlike their female counterparts in Turkey and Iran. Azeri women wrote 
letters and articles crediting the Communist Party and socialist state for all their achievements, 
stressing Stalin’s role for his thoroughness in addressing Muslim women’s well-being.119  
Hence, with consolidation of Stalinist power, the program for women’s liberation changed 
significantly. The new economic and political program to make the Soviet Union a competitive 
world power redefined female liberties. Iran and Turkey underwent the same process to rapidly 
modernize Muslim societies through the transformation of womanhood. In all of these political 
entities, governments aimed to modernize the societies by promulgating economic change, 
secularism, and in the cases of Iran and Turkey, the nation-state. In republican Turkey, the shift 
from a multi-ethnic empire to an Anatolia-based nation-state with a Turkish national consciousness 
based on pre-Islamic heritage gave rise to the state-run women’s transformation.  
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The enfranchisement of women and secularization of the family code served to create a 
new state ideology. However, republican political leaders refused Turkish women the right to 
establish independent feminist associations, to work in traditional male industries, or to serve in 
the army, particularly in aviation. Only in the 1990s did several Turkish women receive education 
in administrative military occupations, after a long struggle claiming that the statute of the Army 
Academy postulated that “Turkish students” but not “Turkish male students” could study there.  
As Altinay argues, Turkish women, the “military daughters of the military-nation,” were related 
to the military only symbolically and only during the first years of Atatürk’s reforms.120  
In Iran, Raza Shah’s state program to emancipate women lasted only five years and failed 
because of the Shia clergy’s strong power over the local population. Another factor that limited 
the reforms derived from the nature of Reza Shah’s power: his regime was the result of a military 
coup rather than a social movement. Shah installed an army and police to control gender 
reformation. This tactic not only alienated the majority of the population from the reforms, but 
also subordinated women in their pursuit of emancipation. As Amin argues, Iran’s women never 
became fully liberated from patriarchy during the years of Women’s Awakening. The state simply 
expanded male supervision of Iranian women from traditional familial relationship (father, brother, 
husband) to wider social settings (Shah, government) during that reformative period.121 Hence, 
during the interwar period, states, rather than women and male native intellectuals, defined the 
development of womanhood.  
In the Soviet Union, to become a competitive power in the international arena, the state-
introduced Five-Year Plan, 1928–1932, brought the massive entry of women into the labor force. 
The Stalinist regime evoked the liberal family legalizations of the early Bolshevik period. In the 
 
120 Altinay, The Myth of The Military-Nation, 48. 




meantime, the government advanced a new image of femininity – a combination of a professional, 
highly-skilled woman and a happy mother. To ensure the compatibility of women’s family 
responsibilities with their professional duties, the Stalinist government promulgated a network of 
public child-care institutions. Along with this, the state introduced vast educational opportunities 
to acquire the new skills needed to enter even traditionally male occupations to all Soviet women. 
This program, accompanied by the new discourse about gender equality, significantly changed 
Soviet women’s societal status, regardless of the ethnic and cultural background.  
 
 
Figure 37. The image of emancipated unveiled Azeri Soviet Women, Baku, 1933. AAKFD photo. 
 
In 1930, to create the model of a liberated Muslim woman, the Azeri government 
introduced several Azeri women to aviation. The official Azeri program always stressed the 




Turkey and Iran. To create female heroines, the native government employed the examples of the 
all-Union Stakhanovites, shock workers, and Russian female aviators to inspire Azeri women to 
become modern. In meantime, unlike European Soviet women, the Azeri women always had to 
stress the liberating role of the Communist Party in rescuing them from oppressive Islamic and 
patriarchal norms. The Soviet authors manifested the new image of new Azeri women emphasizing 
their ignorant life before the Bolshevik revolution, their emancipation at the clubs for Muslim 
women, and finally their achievements working outside the home. The announcement of Azeri 
heroines was also a primary agenda of the native government that aimed to demonstrate to the all-







The incorporation of Azerbaijan into the Russian Empire marked a turning point in the 
history of Azeri Muslim people of the South Caucasus and Iran. To neutralize any association with 
Iran and to foster loyalty to Russian rule, Russian Imperial politics redefined the local society by 
establishing new norms of culture and social hierarchy. The tsarist politics of the involvement of 
the local Muslim gentry into the Russian imperial civil and military service created a new type of 
nobility and intelligentsia who became the intermediaries between Imperial authorities and the 
local population. The process of urbanization, in particular the transformation of Baku from a small 
town into a world leader in oil production expanded urban culture and changed the traditional 
Muslim intellectual milieu. This new urban, multi-ethnic environment boosted the formation of 
Azeri reformist discourse about the modernization of Muslim society. The new secularly educated 
elite established itself as a source of moral and cultural authority, replacing the traditional Islamic 
authority, ulama, in determining the way that the Azeri Muslim community lived and progressed. 
This modern, educated group of Azeris led the cultural transformation for the good of the millat, 
nation, claiming that the old, traditional authorities were unprepared for the needs and demands of 
the modern age. By establishing modern print media, theatre, and new-method education, the Azeri 
reformers created the new public space that enabled them to express ideas about societal and 
gender reorganization.  
In the early and mid-nineteenth century, two Azeri reformers, A. K. Bakikhanov and M. F. 
Akhundov, proposed the assimilation of Russian culture and the need to turn Azeri Muslims into 
valuable contributors to Imperial culture and society. However, despite this discourse and the 




culturally homogeneous, the Azeris secured intellectual autonomy, adjusting to the new cultural 
settings. The exposure to Russian language and “civilization” through education, instead of 
complete assimilation, produced the modern, secular, bilingual intelligentsia who began to 
question the role and status of Azeri millat within the all-Russian milieu. Consequently, at the end 
of the nineteenth century, a new cohort of reform-minded intellectuals, such as H. Zardabi, A. 
Agaev, M. E. Rasulzade, and others, emerged. This group of intellectuals and politicians took a 
different path to transform old culture into modern. They proposed to be different from that which 
was traditional as well as distinctive from that which was Russian, connecting the latter to 
reactionary and colonial power. 
Azeri intellectual sovereignty was a direct outcome of the deep-rooted traditional Muslim 
and Turkic culture, sustained by strong intellectual ties with the Muslim reformers of Iran and the 
Ottoman empire. This cultural environment allowed Azeri reorganizers to discuss ideas about 
cultural reformation of Muslim communities outside of the Russian empire. Moreover, through 
intellectual interconnections, Azeri reformers learned about the European-style cultural 
modernization that took place in the Ottoman empire and, thus, began to compare it with the 
Russian Imperial domain and tsarist programs on Muslim societal development. Consequently, 
reform-minded Azeri intellectuals chose to reinforce the Azeri domain, millat, by appropriating 
the European type of modernity, favoring Western liberal constitutionalism and enlightenment 
over autocratic Imperial values. This diversification allowed Azeri societal reformers to accept and 
adjust the European model of modernity into Muslim realities and thus, to participate not only in 
Russian but also in the global domain, equally Western and Eastern. Henceforth, I assert that Azeri 





The late-Imperial reform-minded Azeri men debating methods for the fulfilment of their 
hopes for the millat faced significant opposition from two societal powers: the tsarist autocratic 
colonial state and ulama, the traditional religious leaders. Both controlled two major societal 
pillars, education and family: the primary societal institutions that the Azeri reformers aimed to 
modify. The Azeri intellectuals, striving to modernize Muslim society in accordance with what 
they imagined to be the standards of the civilized world, proposed the transformation of elementary 
education. In particular, they believed that implementing the new pedagogical method, usul-i 
jadid, would nurture educated young men and women, giving them the skills that were necessary 
for success in the modern world. However, this initiative met strong criticism from the Russian 
Imperial authorities, who pointed to the already functioning state-run schools whose primary goal 
was to raise native commercial and administrative staff. Thus, even after the establishment of 
native public schools, the Russian government closely monitored all native initiatives on the public 
schooling of young men and women. In particular, it controlled the Neshr-i Maarif’s activity, 
claiming that its intellectual independence contributed to the rise of Azeri nationalism.  
While Azeri modernist reformers aimed radically to change society in the name of 
progress, their opponents, traditionalist ulama, opposed this program, recognizing only the need 
to make minor corrections to the education of young men. Traditional Islamic leaders considered 
every modernist reform as a deviation from Islamic values and insisted on the continuity of 
traditional gender and societal norms. Nevertheless, the modernity-oriented reformers succeeded 
in the introduction of desacralized public education in urban centers not only for Azeri Muslim 
young men, but also for young women. This innovation resulted in fundamental societal changes, 





The shift from traditional homeschooling to public education made Azeri Muslim women 
publicly visible and vocal members of the Azeri urban environment. Modern educated women 
voiced their thoughts on traditional gender relationships and illiteracy in the native print media. 
They established female associations and charitable societies. In Baku, the introduction of public 
schooling contributed to ending generational and gender hierarchies that prevailed in Muslim 
society. Modern education and work experience outside the home made Azeri women the new 
agents of societal modernization. Azeri Muslim women became integral agents towards societal 
transformation to create a new Azeri millat. However, these reforms that changed gender roles 
were limited only to culturally diverse Baku; outside this city, Azeri women continued to act in 
accordance with traditional societal expectations.  
In February 1917, the Russian Revolution established liberal constitutionalism, giving new 
hope for political and cultural independence to all Imperial peoples. One of the first decrees of the 
Provisional Government was to grant women of all nationalities in the Russian empire the right to 
vote. The new political regime also tolerated debates about the cultural and political status of 
Imperial subjects. In Azerbaijan, native intellectuals and politicians demanded the establishment 
of their own nation-state instead of Muslim cultural autonomy within a unified Russia. With the 
establishment of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, 1918–1920, led by the Musavat Party, 
Azeri reformers succeeded in becoming the leaders of their millat. Azeri women took an active 
role, participating in the municipal and national assemblies and media to discuss the future of the 
millat. Moreover, they began to articulate their own understandings of rights, debating Sharia, 
Islamic law, on female status in society and the family.  
Elite Azeri Muslim women believed that they were equal citizens of a young, independent 




suffrage. Instead, they demanded to implement this right among the local population, despite 
strong opposition from conservative members of the local society. Also, Azeri feminists, S. 
Efendiieva, S. Talishinskaia, A. Sultanova, D. Bairamova, and many others, unlike their female 
counterparts in Iran and the Ottoman empire, argued that women’s rights within Islamic law, 
Sharia, should be replaced by secular law. This difference in the agenda to end patriarchal and 
religious norms around gender roles was a direct result of the deep-rooted desacralization of female 
education and the interaction of Russian feminism and Muslim feminism in old-Imperial 
Azerbaijan. Hence, it was Russian and European reformist discourse to change women, rather than 
Muslims, that shaped and empowered Azeri women to challenge Sharia and demand women’s 
equality with men.  
This feminist agenda was part of a broader cultural politics initiated by the reform-minded 
intellectuals and politicians of the ADR about secularism and public enlightenment. They declared 
the Azeri language an official language, founded the first public university, sent students to Europe 
to study, and invited teachers from the Ottoman empire and Europe. Promoting this politics, they 
aimed to distance themselves and their young nation from the Islamic and Russian orbits to build 
a modern, Western-type millat. However, this Musavatist vision of what was good for the millat 
was not universally shared in Azeri society.  
Native Bolsheviks, who believed that the progress of Azerbaijan could be realized only 
under the aegis of Communism, were strong opponents to Musavat and the existence of the ADR 
as a pro-British and pro-Ottoman marionette state. Azeri Communists, Nariman Narimanov, 
Gazanfar Musabekov, Gamid Sultanov, Agamali ogli, Ayna Sultanova, Dzheiran Bairamova, and 




constitutionalism.  Being members of the Communist Party since the 1910s, they strongly believed 
in the liberal values of Communism and advanced the Bolshevik regime in Azerbaijan.  
Azeri Bolsheviks argued that the Musavatist program of societal development emphasized 
the needs of the elite, but not the interests of all of the Azeri population, leaving out peasants and 
nomads, who were traditionally the silent strata of Muslim society. It is true that during the two 
years of its existence and while at war with the Baku Soviet of Bolsheviks, the British army, the 
Russian White army, and Armenian military groups in the regions, the ADR’s government paid 
little attention to the rural world, while still extracting agricultural goods for the army and cities. 
It is also true that unlike the Bolsheviks, whose first decrees were to grant land to peasants and to 
stop all wars, the ADR government did not issue any resolutions regarding the agrarian and peace 
questions. Thus, the Bolsheviks’ appeal “To the Toiling Muslims of Russia and East” that called 
to overthrow “the imperialist robbers and enslavers” found support among the broad Azeri 
community that was very distant from elitist intellectual discussions and simply tired of social and 
political turmoil.1 
Along with the promise to stop war and give land to those who cultivate it, the Bolsheviks 
promoted religious freedom as an important factor in national sovereignty. Lenin declared this 
Bolshevik program in his appeal to the peoples of the East: “Muslims of Russia, Tatars of the 
Volga and the Crimea, Kirgiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks of Transcaucasia, 
Mountain peoples of the Caucasus – all those whose mosques and shrines have been destroyed, 
whose beliefs and customs have been crushed by the tsarist oppressive regime, listen to 
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Bolsheviks. Since now and forever, your beliefs and customs are free and inviolable. Since now 
and forever you can build your life freely!”2  
In particular, the Bolshevik program on the self-determination of Muslim peoples and their 
neighbors was important to Azeris. Having strong cultural connections with Iran and the Ottoman 
worlds, and being at war with Armenia, native politicians and intellectuals had to pay attention to 
the shift in regional power relations. Bolsheviks declared that they disapprove all treaties signed 
by Great Powers regarding the partition of Iran and Turkey promising to recognize all peoples’ 
right to determine the political future within the empires or outside.3 Moreover, the Bolsheviks 
supported this declaration by activating the local Communist cells and by sending military troops 
to the region. Hence, in 1920, many Azeris realized that the Bolsheviks had become a strong 
regional power and saw the need for cooperation to secure the safety of their nation. 
It is important to admit that some Azeri intellectuals and politicians opposed the advance 
of the Bolshevik regime, seeing it as the continuity of Russian colonial rule, and left Soviet 
Azerbaijan for Iran and Turkey. In particular, A. Agayev, A. Huseynov, A. Dzhafar ogli, M. E. 
Rasulzade contributed significantly to the history of modern Turkey by becoming leading 
academics and politicians. Those who stayed in Azerbaijan after its Sovietization, in April 1920, 
had various motives for cooperating with the new regime. Some politicians and intellectuals, such 
as A. Karaev, Kh. Shabanova-Karaeva, Y. Vezirov, and others, came to Bolshevik ideals in the 
late 1910s, as a result of their alienation from the imperial regime and local parties such as Muslim 
Social Democratic, Hummet; pan-Islamist, Ittihad; and pan-Turkist, Geirat. Some, like D. 
Mamedkulizade, H. Javanshir, S. Efendiieva, and S. Akhundova, put their hopes in Bolshevik 
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program for the promises of secularism, public enlightenment, and national self-determinism. 
Many accepting the new power simply tried to survive. 
In the 1920s, the Bolsheviks needed and employed those Azeris who graduated from the 
Imperial public educational centres, and even madrassah. Bolsheviks needed the native 
intelligentsia for their knowledge and skills to become the intermediaries to promote the Bolshevik 
political agenda to broad Azeri masses in the native language. They became the Bolsheviks’ 
manpower as teachers, civil servants, engineers, journalists, and writers. For the global 
perspective, due to their knowledge of Muslim cultures and regional languages, Azeri Communists 
and their sympathizers acquired an important role in conveying Bolshevik ideals to the Muslims 
of Iran, the Ottoman empire, and Afghanistan. In accordance with Lenin’s view, the struggle for 
socialism in Russia could not succeed without the victory of socialism in other countries, and thus 
required the spread of revolutions worldwide. Hence, Azeri Bolsheviks became the emissaries of 
Communist ideology and Baku came to be the international hub for Communist indoctrination of 
Muslim peoples. 
Russian Communist leaders organized the First Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku 
between 1–7 September, 1920. Nearly two thousand delegates came from more than twenty 
Eastern countries to discuss and define a common strategy to destroy imperialism and to endorse 
the world revolution. The Baku Congress’s program stressed the need for national and anti-
colonial revolutions and the necessity to foster a Muslim proletariat. In its final document, “Appeal 
to the Peoples of the East,” the leaders of the Baku Congress directed the struggle of oppressed 
peoples entirely against Great Britain, a strong power particularly in Iran and Afghanistan. To 
increase anti-British sentiments, Moscow-based Communists organized a public funeral for 




reburial of those Commissars from Krasnovodsk, a town in Turkmenistan, to Azerbaijan, as a 
public demonstration. They made a documentary chronicle out of this ceremony aiming to 
propagandize it all over the world. With this act, the Bolsheviks created martyrs of imperialism, 
stressing that all of the victims were members of the international proletariat: Azeri Turks, 
Armenians, Russians, Georgians, and Jews.4 
To attract Muslims, Bolshevik leaders also proclaimed that there was no contradiction 
between Islam and Communism. The leading Communists, Nariman Narimanov, Karel Radek, 
and Grigori Zinoviev, stated in their speeches that Communism is close to the principles of Islam, 
which means that no man may be a slave to another, and not a single piece of land may be privately 
owned.5 Azeri Communists, including A. Karaev, G. Musabekov, G. Sultanov, Agamali ogli, and 
others, also informed the delegates about the education and gender reformation that aimed to 
emancipate the most humbled stratum of traditional Muslim society – women.  
Azeri Muslim women also had important roles in the Communist discourse on gender 
emancipation. In 1921, the all-Russian Communist leaders organized the First Congress of Eastern 
Women in Baku, inviting female delegates to discuss tactics to attract Muslim women into class 
struggle and to raise a female proletariat in the East. The final resolution of the Congress insisted 
on eternal class conflict, which does not know gender boundaries, to eradicate the remnants of 
patriarchal living, such as veiling, women’s isolation, and early and polygamous marriages. To 
emancipate Muslim women gradually, Bolshevik authorities introduced gender-segregated clubs, 
literacy centres, and cooperative workshops and stores for Muslim women. They emphasized that 
one of the main goals of the Communist Party was to educate and empower Muslim women 
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through public schooling and labor outside the home. Furthermore, recognizing all religious 
matrimonial unions and training arranged before sovietization, Communist leaders stressed the 
peaceful character of their societal transformation. To propagandize this program in the Muslim 
East, Azeri female Communists acquired the leading roles and the Ali Bairamov Club became the 
model club to spread the knowledge about the Communist achievements in Muslim women 
emancipation. 
This Bolshevik rhetoric on women’s emancipation through universal education and the 
abolition of Sharia norms on family and female societal status echoed the old-Imperial modernist 
discourse. Many Azeri men and women became partners in the Bolshevik project to emancipate 
women by adjusting their pre-revolution agenda for societal modernization to Bolshevik state 
policy. It would be incorrect to state that there was a sharp division among the Azeri politicians 
and intellectuals who supported only the pro-Communist or pro-old-Imperial reformist discourses. 
In this work, I argue that the leading native Bolsheviks and their followers were the product of 
late-Imperial society, and that they came from elite families and accepted the ideas of Communism 
for their promise of social justice and gender equality.  
I argue that Soviet Azeri political leaders developed their own synthesis between 
Communist goals and the modernizing aspirations of pre-revolution reformers, introducing their 
own agenda and ideals about the New Woman and millat. This synthesis is clearly seen in the 
Soviet Azeri-native leaders’ program to modernize society ahead of the Moscow-sent directives, 
through the rapid abolition of the visible symbols of cultural backwardness, chadra and papakh. 
Azeri Soviet political and cultural leaders always juxtaposed their cultural achievements with the 
accomplishments in neighboring Iran and Turkey rather than in the Soviet Turkic republics which 




reformers. This connection is clearly seen in the advance of Muslim women female aviators in 
Azerbaijan, the only Muslim Turkic women in the family of Soviet female pilots, with similar 
projects initiated in Iran and Turkey.  
Along with this, I consider the synthesis in the acts of the native Zhenotdel activists and 
Sharg Gadini editors to emphasize the traditional concept of female sexual honor, namus, while 
promoting the end of seclusion, literacy, and new women’s rights in the family and society. The 
symbiosis of Communist and pre-revolution ideas can be also seen in the agenda of the Azeri 
Communists to abolish Arabic script, replacing it with Latin script but not Cyrillic. Azeri Soviet 
reformers considered this act to be the end of the power of conservative clerics and Russian 
colonialists and thus, promoted the agenda of the pro-Western, late-Imperial enlighteners. Hence, 
I recognize that Azeri Communists and their followers used the newly established government to 
revolutionize culture and society, an agenda they failed to achieve in the early 1900s. However, in 
1929, the Stalinist regime redefined the liberal values of Communism and replaced the old 
Bolshevik leaders with a new generation of functionaries whose education and public activity had 
been shaped entirely within the Soviet milieu. The outcome of the Stalinist politics was 
catastrophic for the old Communists and those who collaborated with them. All of them, except 
D. Bairamova, S. Efendiieva, and Kh. Shabanova-Karaeva, were executed or perished in the 
GULAG camps.  
The Stalinist regime, building a new world with new norms of socialization, education, and 
indoctrination, replaced all alternative cultural and political domains. As Stephen Kotkin says, 
Stalinism did not simply lay in the destruction of the society but in “the creation, along with such 




economy, political practice, and language.”6 The Stalinist regime, transforming village 
communities and forcing their inhabitants into collective farms, ended the social power of 
traditional leaders and replaced them with the new ones. To create new cultural values and a new 
intellectual elite, Stalinism also erased the old-Imperial cultural inheritance from public memory, 
replacing it with socialist ideology. Stalinist authority condemning the old-Imperial cultural 
achievements made it dangerous for those who collaborated with the regime to mention any 
progress other than Communist.  
In particular, public schooling for Muslim girls at the Tagiev schools became excluded 
from public memory. No reader of the official biographies of A. Sultanova, K. Shabanova-
Karaeva, G. Kadyrbekova, D. Bairamova, S. Efendiieva, S. Akhundova, and others, could have 
guessed that they were the graduates and teachers of these educational centres. In the late 1920s, 
these female activists defined the nature of the failure of the old-Imperial reformers to emancipate 
Muslim women and resist Soviet gender reforms as a class struggle, but not a cultural conflict. In 
their personal and official records, they claimed that only Communism could advance progress 
and rights for Muslim women. 
Since the late 1920s, class struggle initiated by the socialist government, rather than 
cultural differences, led to a break with traditional norms on women in the family and society. 
With the introduction of the Five-Year Plan, 1928–1932, the new economic and political program 
which aimed to make the Soviet Union a competitive world power, the Stalinist government 
redefined female liberties. Like all women in the Stalinist state, Azeri Muslim women had to fulfill 
economic plans which became the new norms of women’s liberation. It evoked the liberal family 
legalizations of the early Bolshevik period and advanced a new image of femininity — a 
 




combination of a professional, highly-skilled woman and a happy mother who was offered, in the 
meantime, social protection by the state. 
In interwar Turkey and Iran, gender reforms have also been closely related to political 
developments as well as with global modernization programs. The governments of both states were 
more concerned with granting women civic and political rights rather than elimination of the 
patriarchal foundations of Muslim societies. Their women’s organizations had never been more 
professional than the Soviet Zhenotdel that introduced workers and instructors to achieve the 
emancipation of Azeri Muslim women in specifically established, male-free clubs, artel’s, and 
cooperative stores. As a result, lacking state support to eradicate polygyny, bride prices, and 
seclusion, the women of Turkey and Iran focused on demanding legal and political equality rather 
than on the development of women’s status in the private sphere. Over time, this gender program 




Epilogue: Independence and Azeri Women’s New Challenges 
 
After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the newly independent Azerbaijan declared 
new “nationalizing” policy of national history, language, and family values. In the early 1990s, 
government leaders Elchibey (June 16, 1992 – September 1, 1993) and Heydar Aliyev 
(October 10, 1993 – October 31, 2003) welcomed Islam as part of a glorious national heritage 
and demonstrated their personal piety by performing the hajj or taking oaths on the Koran. 
They promoted the building of mosques and madrassah as a sign of national rebirth. However, 
this period of Islamic revival in the republic also culminated in a schism between traditional 
Shia Islam and Wahhabism, a fundamentalist current exported by Sunni Saudi Arab 
missionaries. In time, the latter Saudi Islamic influence became associated with threats of 
extremist ideology aiming to destabilize the regime and the region.  
Increased contact with the Muslim world divided Azeri society between those who 
insisted on the continuity of the secular, pro-Western path and those who argued for the return 
of Islamic heritage and the Sharia norms, in particular related to the women’s place in society 
and family. A new focus on Islamic observance brought the issue of women’s veiling to the 
forefront of politics again. Thus, under the leadership of Ilham Aliyev (son of H. Aliyev. 
President of the republic since October 31, 2003 – till present), the government introduced 
cultural markers between local traditional and foreign expressions of Islam to homogenize 
society. The government of modern Azerbaijan accepted the colorful headscarf that leaves the 
face bare and outlawed the full veil, signifying the latter as an expression of Iranian influence 




outlawing religious garb in public institutions as a threat to traditional culture and the secularist 
values of the modern state.782 However, the debates about Islamic norms of living and veiling 
which have emerged since 1990s continue to divide local society. It is important to note that 
those women who adopted religious norms do not participate in any public discussion on the 
role of Islam in the family and society, and male religious leaders represent their interests. 
Those Azeri feminists who participate in public discussions on women’s societal position 
demand better state support of women and girls in the family and community, to control the 
rise of violence toward them.  
The post-Soviet transition resulted not only in the revival of Islam and its gender norms. 
Most importantly, it resulted in a distraction of state programs that supported women in their 
roles as wives, mothers, and professionals. Considering Azeri women politically and socially 
equal with men, the government of modern Azerbaijan has not introduced any specific agency 
to monitor women’s position in the family and society and to defend their rights. The absence 
of state support profoundly affected the number of women in political representation and led 
to a disproportionate level of female unemployment and the end of social benefits to assist 
women. Most importantly, it gave rise to officially promoted male societal privilege as a part 
of traditional Azeri culture.  
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The question of gender equality, which was central in socialist Azerbaijan, became a 
part of the local UN-sponsored national non-government organizations that promote legal 
awareness and entrepreneurship and combat domestic violence and violence against women. 
This Western-supported discourse faces opposition from the newly emerged groups who claim 
they are returning to national traditions and Sharia gender norms and consider pro-Western 
influence as alien and harmful. Along with this, the state does extraordinarily little to support 
these NGO’s programs to defend women’s rights in the private and public spheres. 
In 2010, the Azerbaijani government issued The Law On Prevention of Domestic 
Violence but did not synchronize it with the modern Criminal Code.783 The Criminal Code of 
the Azerbaijan Republic does not criminalize domestic violence and does not recognize 
violence towards women, seeing both of these issues first and foremost as family issues. Thus, 
prosecution depends on the will of the victim’s family to proceed with the accusation. Also, 
“prosecution can only be brought if there is evidence physical violence resulted in injuries and 
death.”784 This confusion in legal regulations diminishes the role of the state as a defender of 
women’s rights and well-being and, moreover, resulted in the rise of patriarchy.  
In accordance with the United Nations Special Report from 2013, the perpetrators are 
mainly intimate partners, but sometimes close male family members and family friends who 
commit physical, sexual, and psychological abuse against women. The United Nations Special 
Report stated that: “violence against women in Azerbaijan persisted because of the strong 
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patriarchal norms, deeply rooted gender stereotypes and customary practices that are harmful 
to women.”785 It concludes that, “The fear of retaliation and escalation of violence, shame and 
fear of impact on the family’s reputation, not being believed, being blamed, the belief that 
official reporting would not help (as reflected in the experiences of other women), the fear that 
it would end the relationship, and the fear of losing the children. Moreover, women who sought 
state assistance and services, or who left home at least for one night, suffered from increased 
violence and were concerned for their own and their children’s safety.”786  
The official statistical data provided to the Special Rapporteur by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs shows that from 1 January 2011 to 30 November 2013, there were 16,253 cases 
of crimes against women, of which 9,140 cases were classified as violence against women. 
The same source indicates seventy-six cases of rape during this period, as well as 193 killings 
of women. Along with this, the data shows the high prevalence of early and/or forced marriages 
in Azerbaijan: more than five thousand girls were the victims of early marriages in 2013 alone. 
The report stressed the difficulty of obtaining accurate statistics on early marriages, given their 
illegal nature.787  
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The Azerbaijan Human Development Report also registered a higher prevalence rate 
of intimate partner violence, twenty-six percent, among Internally Displaced People, IPD, and 
refugee women who had to flee their homes as a consequence of the conflict in and around the 
Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, compared to respondents never subjected to 
forced displacement.788 The rise of crimes against women in their families and communities, 
and most important, the tolerance of these crimes, can be explained with several factors. First, 
with the end of Soviet rule and the transition from the planned socialist economy into a market 
economy, political and social insecurity left many men without stable income and undermined 
their societal position as main family providers and leaders. A second factor lies in the absence 
of strong government programs to defend women in the family and in a society that boosted 
the return of patriarchal relationships and the increase of gender-based violence. 
According to the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in 2018, 
the data for the number of female victims was 915 reported cases of domestic violence and 
forty-two killings of women by male family members.789 Since 2019, Azerbaijani feminists 
organized several protest marches to denounce domestic violence and violence against women 
as a result of strong patriarchal culture and a lack of state support. They demanded from the 
government the implementation of The Law On Prevention of Domestic Violence, and 
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recognition the Council of Europe Convention on Prevention and Combat of Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence, also called The Istanbul Convention. The latter will allow the 
criminalization of abuse toward women committed by men within and outside of the family. 
However, the government is deaf to the demands of Azeri feminists and always sends police 
military units to arrest female protest marchers.790 Hence, unlike the Azeri gender activists of 
the late-Imperial and Soviet periods, whose interests were promoted and defended by male 
intellectuals, politicians, and government, modern feminists are left alone in their struggle 
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adat: patriarchal tradition 
aga: a nobleman, a landlord 
akhund: a Shia Islamic priest  
alim: a man who has substantial Islamic education, a scholar 
batrak, batrachka for female (Russian): landless peasant; equivalent kesabchi in Azeri 
bek, bei: a nobleman, a landlord 
Bilim Yurt: House of Knowledge; a teacher-training school 
Bilim Chadyr: A Tent of Knowledge, a mobile training centre for the nomadic women and 
children  
chadra: a veil that covered full female body 
fetva: a decree made by a religious authority based on Islamic law 
gadin: a woman 
gazi: a judge in an Islamic court 
gız: girl or daughter; an Azeri woman’s full name was her given name, followed by her father’s 
gubernia (Russian): a major administrative subdivision in Russian empire, a province 
hajj: annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca 





hadith: a quotation, or an account of an incident in the life of the Prophet Muhammad or his 
followers, four righteous khalifs, Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Ali, used as a source for Islamic 
law and practice 
Hujum: attack; a campaign of cultural revolution and modernization in Azerbaijan and Central 
Asia, beginning in late 1926; in Uzbekistan it included public unveilings 
imam: a member of the Islamic clergy and authority in the Muslim community 
Jadid: a member of the late 19th and early 20th century reform movement among Russian 
Muslims best known for a commitment to modern education 
kalym: bride wealth; a payment by the groom or groom’s family to the parents of the bride; 
one of numerous gift transactions in the arrangement of a marriage 
kelagaia: a traditional headscarf in bright colors 
kesabchi: a poor person 
kulak (Russian): a rich peasant, subject to dispossession in 1929 during the process of the 
Stalinist agrarian reform 
Likbez: (Russian abbreviation of likvidatsia bezgramotnosti). A campaign to eradicate 
illiteracy among the Soviet people in 1920s 
madrasah: an Islamic education centre that provides religious education beyond the primary 
level 
mahr: “morning money” a traditional Islamic alimony paid to woman in divorce. Abolished 




maktab: an Islamic school providing basic instruction including reading and recitation of the 
Koran 
millat: nation. In the early 20th century, Muslim reformers used this term to refer to all Russian 
Muslims as a political and cultural group. In the Soviet period, since 1920, the term became 
used as “nationality” 
muallim: a teacher  
mullah: an Islamic priest 
namus: the traditional code of conduct in Azerbaijan that made women responsible for family 
honor through their chastity and modesty. Namus was strictly under the guardianship of male 
family members and its violation brought shame on the whole clan  
obrazovannyi (Russian): a term used in Azeri language to describe a man who received 
education in Russian training centres in 19th, 20th and 21st centuries. In modern Azerbaijan, the 
division between those educated at Russian and Azeri schools still exist. 
oblast’ (Russian): region; in Azeri, vilayet 
papakh: traditional male head wear  
name, followed by -gizi. For example, Yelena Jahangir gizi 
radzhbar: farmer, peasant; after 1930, a collective farm worker 
Rett Olsun Chadra: in Azeri, Veil Go Away, a campaign for rapid chadra abolition, 1928 -1929 
sigiah: a temporary marriage for the duration from three days to several months practiced by 
Shia Muslims 




shakird: a student 
sheikh: Sufi master; among Sunni Muslim communities a religious authority 
tarragiparver: a progressivist 
ulama: Islamic religious scholars; men with significant religious education and high public 
reputation. In early 20th century, ulama promoted a reform of the Muslim community of 
believers, umma, through reformation of Islam. Unlike them, Jadids and Azeri reformers stood 
for the reformation of millat through the modern education 
umma: the community of Muslims 
usul-i-jadid: a new method in education based on teaching the modern subjects  
vakila: in Russian delegatka; in the 1920s, a vakila was a woman elected by her community to 
attend training sessions so that she could become a political activist, a women’s advocate in 
court, or a member of local government and village councils 
vydvizhentsi: a worker promoted to the administrative post very quickly by joining the 
Communist Party often to replace the arrested intellectual or politician during the years of 
Stalin rulership 
ZAGS: Soviet registry office that records all marriages, births, and deaths 
ziiali: a member of the traditional Azeri intelligentsia 
 
 
 
 
 
